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SOLVING MECHANICS PROBLEMS USING M E T A - L E V E L INFERENCE 
A l a n B u n d y , L a w r e n c e B y r d , G e o r g e L u g e r , 
C h r i s M e l l i s h & M a r t h a P a l m e r . 
D e p a r t m e n t o f A r t i f i c i a l I n t e l l i g e n c e , 
U n i v e r s i t y o f E d i n b u r g h , 
E d i n b u r g h , S c o t l a n d . 
I n t h i s p a p e r w e s h a l l d e s c i b e a p r o g r a m ( M E C H O ) , w r i t t e n i n P r o l o g [ 1 4 ] , 
w h i c h s o l v e s a w i d e r a n g e o f m e c h a n i c s p r o b l e m s f r o m s t a t e m e n t s i n b o t h 
p r e d i c a t e c a l c u l u s and E n g l i s h . Mecho u s e s t h e t e c h n i q u e o f m e t a - l e v e l 
i n f e r e n c e t o c o n t r o l s e a r c h i n n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , common s e n s e 
i n f e r e n c e , m o d e l f o r m a t i o n and a l g e b r a i c m a n i p u l a t i o n . W e a r g u e t h a t t h i s 
i s a p o w e r f u l t e c h n i q u e f o r c o n t r o l l i n g s e a r c h w h i l e r e t a i n i n g t h e 
m o d u l a r i t y o f d e c l a r a t i v e k n o w l e d g e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . 
K e y w o r d s N a t u r a l L a n g u a g e , M a t h e m a t i c a l R e a s o n i n g , S e a r c h C o n t r o l , 
M e t a - l e v e l I n f e r e n c e , P r e d i c a t e C a l c u l u s , M e c h a n i c s . 
i s then p o s s i b l e 
i n o r d e r t o s o l v e 
s t u d y i n g n a t u r a l 
1 . I n t r o d u c t i o n 
The work d e s c r i b e d in t h i s paper addresses 
the q u e s t i o n o f how i t i s p o s s i b l e t o ge t a 
f o r m a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a problem f rom an 
E n g l i s h s t a t e m e n t , and how i t 
t o use t h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 
the p r o b l e m . Our purpose in 
language u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h 
p rob lem s o l v i n g i s t o b r i n g t o g e t h e r the 
c o n s t r a i n t s o f what f o r m a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n can 
a c t u a l l y be o b t a i n e d w i t h the q u e s t i o n o f what 
knowledge i s r e q u i r e d i n o r d e r t o s o l v e a wide 
range o f prob lems i n a s e m a n t i c a l l y r i c h 
doma in . We b e l i e v e t h a t these i s sues cannot 
s e n s i b l y b e t a c k l e d i n i s o l a t i o n . I n p r a c t i c a l 
te rms we have had the b e n e f i t s of an i n c r e a s e d 
awareness of common problems in b o t h areas and 
a r e a l i s a t i o n t h a t some of our t echn iques a re 
a p p l i c a b l e t o b o t h the c o n t r o l o f i n f e r e n c e and 
the c o n t r o l o f p a r s i n g . 
E a r l y work on s o l v i n g ma thema t i ca l prob lems 
s t a t e d in n a t u r a l language was done by Bobrow 
(STUDENT - ( i ] ) and C h a m i a k (CARPS - [ 5 ] ) . 
However the r u d i m e n t a r y p a r s i n g and s imp le 
semant ic s t r u c t u r e s used by Bobrow and Charn iak 
a re i nadequa te f o r any b u t the e a s i e s t 
p r o b l e m s . Our i n t e n t i o n has been to b u i l d on 
advances i n n a t u r a l language p r o c e s s i n g (eg 
[ 1 8 ] ) i n o r d e r t o s t udy p a r s i n g and problem 
s o l v i n g in a domain wh ich r e q u i r e s 
s o p h i s t i c a t e d knowledge about the w o r l d . The 
domain we have been wo rk i ng in is t h a t o f 
mechanics p r o b l e m s , wh ich d e a l w i t h i d e a l i s e d 
o b j e c t s such a s smooth p l a n e s , l i g h t 
i n e x t e n s i b l e s t r i n g s , f r i c t i o n l e s s p u l l e y s e t c . 
The i d e a l i s e d n a t u r e o f t h i s domain made i t 
f e a s i b l e t o c o n s i d e r b u i l d i n g a n e x p e r t 
i n f e r e n t i a l system which would be a b l e to cope 
w i t h a wide range of p r o b l e m s . To d a t e , our 
program has t a c k l e d problems i n the a reas o f : 
p u l l e y p r o b l e m s , s t a t i c s p r o b l e m s , m o t i o n o n 
smooth complex pa ths and m o t i o n under c o n s t a n t 
a c c e l e r a t i o n . Our i n t e n t i o n i s t o c o n t i n u e 
expand ing t h i s i n o r d e r t o f o r c e g e n e r a l i t y 
i n t o our s o l u t i o n s . I n r e c e n t yea rs a l o t o f 
s i m i l a r work has been i n p rog ress on 
such as o u r s . (eg [ 1 3 ] , 
We have been concerned to 
adopt methods deve loped by these worke rs i n t o 
Mecho, and to s o l v e mechanics prob lems t a c k l e d 
by them. 
P h y s i c s - t y p e domains 
[ 7 ] , [ 1 5 ] , [11 ] ) . 
T h i s work was suppor ted by SRC g r a n t number 
B/RG 94493 and an SRC r e s e a r c h s t u d e n t s h i p f o r 
C h r i s M e l l i s h . 
2 . D e s c r i p t i o n o f t he Program 
The b l o c k d iag ram ( f i g 1 ) g i v e s a v e r y 
g e n e r a l o v e r v i e w o f t he s t r u c t u r e o f the MECHO 
p rog ram. Each b l o c k r e p r e s e n t s a c l o s e l y 
r e l a t e d c o l l e c t i o n o f P r o l o g c l a u s e s 
( p r o c e d u r e s ) , t he ar rows between b l o c k s 
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i n d i c a t e i n v o c a t i o n / c o m m u n i c a t i o n l i n k s . (For 
p r a c t i c a l reasons MECHO i s s p l i t i n t o t h r e e 
s e p a r a t e modu les , bu t t h i s i s i r r e l e v a n t t o the 
o v e r a l l s t r u c t u r e ) . The accompanying d iagram 
( f i g 2 ) t r i e s t o c a p t u r e the changes i n 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and the v a r i o u s types o f 
knowledge r e q u i r e d d u r i n g the e x e c u t i o n o f the 
p r o g r a m . The f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n w i l l 
e l a b o r a t e on t h e s e . 
I n p u t t o the program i s i n 
E n g l i s h t e x t . An example taken 
o f p u l l e y prob lems would b e : 
the form of 
f rom the area 
"Two p a r t i c l e s of mass b and c a re 
connected by a l i g h t s t r i n g pass ing 
over a smooth p u l l e y . F ind the 
a c c e l e r a t i o n o f the p a r t i c l e o f 
mass b . " 
(Taken f rom [ 1 0 ] ) 
(1 ) 
The purpose o f the n a t u r a l language module i s 
to produce a se t o f p r e d i c a t e c a l c u l u s 
a s s e r t i o n s wh ich w i l l enab le t he problem s o l v e r 
t o s o l v e the p r o b l e m . Th i s o b j e c t i v e o f 
p r o d u c i n g a symbo l i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f the 
' m e a n i n g ' o f the problem s ta tement has been 
used by us as a v e h i c l e f o r e x p l o r i n g 
s y n t a x - s e m a n t i c s i n t e r a c t i o n . The s y n t a c t i c 
p a r s e r c a l l s semant ic r o u t i n e s as soon as 
p o s s i b l e i n o r d e r t o i n t e r p r e t f ragments o f 
t e x t and q u i c k l y r e j e c t i n a p p r o p r i a t e s y n t a c t i c 
c h o i c e s . The work o f t he syn tax r o u t i n e s 
d i v i d e s i n t o c l ause syn tax and phrase s y n t a x . 
The purpose o f s y n t a c t i c a n a l y s i s a t the 
c l a u s e l e v e l i s t o e s t a b l i s h c l ause bounda r i es 
a n d , w i t h i n each c l a u s e , t o p repare the ground 
f o r t he semant ic a n a l y s i s o f the main v e r b . 
Clause a n a l y s i s thus i n v o l v e s i d e n t i f y i n g the 
s t a r t o f new p h r a s e s , a s s i g n i n g s y n t a c t i c r o l e s 
to the phrases and p e r f o r m i n g phrase a n a l y s i s 
t o i n t e r p r e t the i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e o f the 
p h r a s e s . The i n t e r n a l phrase a n a l y s i s 
t y p i c a l l y r e t u r n s s i m p l y a r e f e r e n t (and some 
t y p i n g i n f o r m a t i o n ) t o the h i g h e r l e v e l s . Th i s 
means t h a t p r e l i m i n a r y r e f e r e n c e e v a l u a t i o n i s 
c a r r i e d ou t l o c a l l y , w i t h the i n f o r m a t i o n 
conveyed by a phrase b e i n g cap tu red in 
a s s e r t i o n s produced a s ' s i d e e f f e c t s ' b y 
semant ic r o u t i n e s c a l l e d d u r i n g t he a n a l y s i s . 
These semant ic r o u t i n e s a re r e s p o n s i b l e f o r 
i n t e r p r e t i n g what i t means f o r a g i v e n o b j e c t 
to have a c e r t a i n p r o p e r t y , and indeed f o r 
c h e c k i n g whether o r no t i t can have the 
p r o p e r t y . Domain s p e c i f i c i n f o r m a t i o n 
c o n c e r n i n g t y p i n g , i d e a l i s a t i o n and 
o b j e c t - p r o p e r t y p o s s i b i l i t i e s i s used t o answer 
these q u e s t i o n s . F a i l u r e o f t he semant i cs 
i n d i c a t e s t h a t the parse i s i n v a l i d . The 
f o l l o w i n g ( s i m p l e ) example shows the k i n d o f 
m e t a - l e v e l s t r u c t u r e s used i n t h i s p r o c e s s . 
m e a n i n g ( l i g h t , O b j e c t , m a s s ( O b j e c t , z e r o ) ) . 
t y p e _ c o n s t r a i n t ( l i g h t , p h y s o b j ) . 
The meaning p r e d i c a t e s t a t e s t h a t the meaning 
o f a p p l y i n g the p r o p e r t y l i g h t t o a n o b j e c t , i s 
t h a t t he o b j e c t has a mass of z e r o . 
t ype__cons t ra in t a s s e r t s t h a t b e i n g a p h y s i c a l 
o b j e c t i s a necessary c o n d i t i o n t o hav i ng the 
p r o p e r t y l i g h t . 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o no te t h a t the 
d e c l a r a t i v e a s s e r t i o n s wh ich g i v e the meaning 
of a phrase can be s p e c i f i e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y of 
how t h e y w i l l b e used . M e t a - l e v e l i n f o r m a t i o n 
c o n c e r n i n g the s t a t e o f t he a n a l y s i s i s used t o 
de te rm ine whether they a r e used to add new 
i n f o r m a t i o n o r t o t e s t neccessary c o n s t r a i n t s 
o n p r e v i o u s i n f o r m a t i o n . ( T h i s i s b a s i c a l l y 
the ' g i v e n ' / ' n e w ' d i s t i n c t i o n d i scussed i n 
[ 8 ] ) . 
One o f the aspec ts o f n a t u r a l language 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t has i n t e r e s t e d us e s p e c i a l l y 
i s the way i n wh ich c r i t e r i a o f semant ic 
w e l l - f o r m e d n e s s can be used to r e s o l v e cases o f 
a m b i g u i t y i n r e f e r e n c e e v a l u a t i o n . Our program 
i n c o r p o r a t e s a f u l l d e d u c t i v e mechanism, as 
opposed to semant ic m a r k e r s , to c a p t u r e the 
g l o b a l semant ic c o n s t r a i n t s t h a t a r i s e d u r i n g 
the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Reference e v a l u a t i o n 
proceeds c o n t i n u o u s l y d u r i n g the combined 
s y n t a c t i c and semant ic a n a l y s i s w i t h semant ic 
i n f o r m a t i o n b e i n g used t o f i l t e r s e t s o f 
p o s s i b l e c a n d i d a t e s f o r r e f e r e n t s . The method 
used to a c h i e v e t h i s i n a g e n e r a l way i s 
b a s i c a l l y t h a t o f Wal tz f i l t e r i n g [ 1 6 ] . A s can 
be seen , t he r e f e r e n t r e t u r n e d by the phrase 
syn tax i s l i k e l y t o b e i n c o m p l e t e l y s p e c i f i e d 
and f o r t h i s reason a l l i n t e r a c t i o n between the 
semant i cs and the d a t a - b a s e is handled by an 
i n t e r m e d i a t e d a t a - b a s e h a n d l e r wh ich implements 
The n o t a t i o n used h e r e , and in f o l l o w i n g 
examples , f o l l o w s the P r o l o g c o n v e n t i o n t h a t 
names s t a r t i n g w i t h an upper case l e t t e r a re 
l o g i c a l v a r i a b l e s wh ich a re p u r e l y l o c a l t o the 
s t r u c t u r e ( P r o l o g c l a u s e ) . Atoms, wh ich a re i n 
lower c a s e , and compound terms a l l s tand f o r 
t h e m s e l v e s . Rules a re o f t he form 
'P <— Q & R' meaning ' i f Q and R then P ' . 
Most examples have undergone s l i g h t cosme t i c 
a l t e r a t i o n . 
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t he i n f e r e n c e system and r e f e r e n c e f i l t e r i n g 
system over these r e f e r e n t s . 
The s y n t a c t i c s t r u c t u r e b u i l t by the c lause 
syntax s p e c i f i e s a main v e r b , and p o s i t i o n s 
such as ' l o g i c a l s u b j e c t ' and " l o g i c a l o b j e c t ' 
are f i l l e d by r e f e r e n t s . (We do not c o n s t r u c t 
a complete parse t r e e as s u c h ) . From t h i s 
s t r u c t u r e a se t o f a s s e r t i o n s i s generated by 
i n v o k i n g semantic r o u t i n e s . The semantic 
a n a l y s i s of the ve rb maps the main v e r b onto a 
base verb and e s t a b l i s h e s a mapping between the 
s y n t a c t i c r o l e s o f the c lause and the deep 
r o l e s assoc ia ted w i t h the base v e r b . As a 
r e s u l t the r e f e r e n t s are f i t t e d i n t o concep tua l 
s l o t s in a way s i m i l a r to c o n v e n t i o n a l 
' case f rame ' a n a l y s i s . The base ve rb then 
s p e c i f i e s the a s s e r t i o n s ( i n terms o f the 
r e f e r e n t s ) which f o l l o w f rom t h i s mapping. 
Base ve rbs d i f f e r from case frames In t h a t 
w h i l e they a t tempt t o g e n e r a l i s e c o l l e c t i o n s o f 
r e l a t e d v e r b s , they a re no t d e f i n e d i n terms o f 
u n i v e r s a l p r i m i t i v e r o l e s o r s l o t s . 
Given a s a t i s f a c t o r y parse of a sen tence , 
which produces a se t o f c o n s i s t e n t a s s e r t i o n s 
and d isambiguates the r e f e r e n t s , we are then 
ab le produce a se t of a s s e r t i o n s (by 
i n s t a n t i a t i n g out the r e f e r e n t s ) about the 
o b j e c t s in the p rob lem. These a re supp l i ed to 
the problem s o l v i n g module. As an example, the 
a s s e r t i o n s produced f o r the above problem 
s ta tement (1 ) would be : 
cue p u l l s y s _ s t a n ( s y s l , p u l l , s l , p l , p 2 , p e r i o d 1 ) 
The cueing of schemata is necessary to p r o v i d e 
e x t r a i n f o r m a t i o n , d e f a u l t s e t c . which are not 
g i ven e x p l i c i t l y bu t are 'house r u l e s ' i n t h i s 
domain. (Eg That the p u l l e y in a p u l l e y system 
has n e g l i g a b l e w e i g h t ) . We cue schemata, 
f a i r l y s i m p l i s t i c a l l y , b y r e c o g n i s i n g key words 
and c e r t a i n o b j e c t c o n f i g u r a t i o n s . For example 
the f o l l o w i n g s t r u c t u r e a s s e r t s t h a t a 
p u l l e y - s y s t e m schema can be cued i f o b j e c t s can 
be found which s a t i s f y the i d e a l - t y p e 
c o n t r a i n t s and have c e r t a i n r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
between each o t h e r . 
Th is schema a s s e r t s t h a t in a s tandard p u l l e y 
problem the o b j e c t s undergo cons tan t 
a c c e l e r a t i o n , the t e n s i o n i n bo th p a r t s o f the 
s t r i n g are equal i f t he re i s n o f r i c t i o n ( o n l y 
one r u l e shown), and t h a t the f r i c t i o n and mass 
o f the p u l l e y d e f a u l t t o zero i f not o t h e r w i s e 
g i v e n . ( T h i s example has been somewhat 
s i m p l i f i e d ) . 
The p r e d i c a t e c a l c u l u s n o t a t i o n can be used 
t o i n p u t problems d i r e c t l y t o the problem 
s o l v e r - and in f a c t resea rch on the problem 
s o l v e r has r e s u l t e d i n i t be ing ab le t o t a c k l e 
a w ider range of problems than the n a t u r a l 
language module can c u r r e n t l y h a n d l e . The 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s behind these 
a s s e r t i o n s v iew the o b j e c t s o f Newtonian 
Mechanics in terms of s imp le zero and one 
d imens iona l o b j e c t s ( p o i n t s and l i n e s ) which 
a re typed and have p r o p e r t i e s and r e l a t i o n s 
d e f i n e d over them. For example p a r t i c l e s , 
p u l l e y s , spa t i a l po in ts , moments of time are 
a l l types of POINT whi le rods, s t r i n g s , paths 
( t r a j e c t o r i e s ) , and periods of time are types 
of LINE. Physical q u a n t i t i e s , such as leng th , 
v e l o c i t y , force e t c . , form the other main 
branch of our type h ierarchy, (see [ A ] ) . 
The work of the Problem Solver d iv ides in to 
two types of task. There is the ove ra l l 
s t ra teg i c task of deciding what to do, how to 
solve the problem by producing equations which 
solve fo r unknown quant i t ies ( inc lud ing 
intermediate unknowns introduced during the 
s o l u t i o n ) . On the other hand there is the 
t a c t i c a l task of combining the input assert ions 
wi th general fac ts and inference ru les in order 
to prove required goals . We sha l l discuss each 
of these in t u r n . 
Our o v e r a l l s t rategy is a general goal 
d i rec ted a lgor i thm for equation ex t rac t i on 
developed from a study by David Marples of 
student engineers (12) . For instance, suppose 
a l , the acce lera t ion o f p a r t i c l e p l , i s the 
(only) sought unknown. (Here we continue the 
example s tar ted above (1) (2) ). Resolution of 
forces about pl w i l l be chosen to solve fo r al 
and t h i s produces the equat ion: 
(3) 
A l l possib le force cont r ibu t ions on pl are 
examined and since pl is attached to the end of 
the s t r i n g t h i s r esu l t s in the s t r i n g being 
considered. tens ion l was formerly unknown but 
the func t ion proper t ies of the predicate 
' t e n s i o n ' enable i t to be created (see l a t e r ) 
to a l low the equation to be formed. We have to 
introduce tens ion l as an unknown because it is 
not possible to solve fo r al without doing so. 
The next step is to solve for tens ion l which is 
a force and involves the s t r i n g sl. Again 
reso lu t i on of forces is selected - pl , p u l l , p2 
being objects on the s t r i n g which are possible 
candidates fo r reso lv ing about. pl has been 
prev ious ly used and only p2 can be used without 
in t roduc ing unknowns. The resu l t is the 
equat ion: 
(A) 
These two equations can be solved to produce a 
so lu t i on for a l . 
The input assert ions provide meta- level 
in format ion about whether ce r ta in quan t i t i es 
are sought or g iven . The Marples Algori thm 
works by t ravers ing the l i s t of sought unknowns 
in a f i xed order : the (quant i ty ) type of each 
unknown being used to provide a s h o r t l i s t of 
formulae that could solve fo r i t , and the 
d e f i n i t i o n of the quant i ty ( i e the asser t ion 
which introduced i t ) being used to f ind the 
physical ob jec ts , times and angles invo lved. 
Notice that there is a d i s t i n c t i o n made between 
' f o r m u l a e ' , which are composed of var iab les 
over quan t i t i es (eg 'F - M * A ' ) , and 
'equat ions ' which are i ns tan t i a t i ons of 
formulae (eg (3) and (4) above). In the 
Marples a lgor i thm we are reasoning about the 
proper t ies of formulae in order to successfu l ly 
produce appropr iate equat ions. 
Before the app l i ca t i on of a formula to 
produce an equat ion, there is a stage of 
q u a l i t a t i v e analys is where general fac ts about 
the problem are used to decide a p p l i c a b i l i t y . 
Our i n te res t here is in explor ing the se lec t i ve 
use of meta- leve l reasoning to guide the 
equation ex t rac t i on process. As wel l as 
deciding a p p l i c a b i l i t y we have to prepare a 
s i t u a t i o n w i t h i n which to apply a formula. 
This may i nvo l ve , f o r example, c o l l e c t i n g 
together a l l the objects connected to a 
p a r t i c l e i f we wish to resolve forces about i t . 
General independence c r i t e r i a (eg 'You can ' t 
resolve forces about the same object in 
l i n e a r l y dependent d i r e c t i o n s ' ) are also used 
to e l iminate redundant equat ions. 
The kind predicate asserts that al is a 
quant i ty of type accel defined in the given 
re lacce l asse r t i on . re la tes states that a l l 
the formulae whose names are given in the l i s t , 
contain var iab les of type accel and therefore 
can be used to solve fo r acce le ra t i on , prepare 
gives the c r i t e r i a fo r const ruct ing the 
s i t u a t i o n w i t h i n which to resolve fo rces , and 
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the i s f o r m p r e d i c a t e d e f i n e s the equa t i on by 
d e f i n i n g the meaning o f i t s component 
v a r i a b l e s . 
The equa t i on e x t r a c t i o n a l g o r i t h m is two pass 
i n t h a t i t f i r s t t r i e s t o produce a s o l u t i o n 
which does no t i n t r o d u c e new unknowns b e f o r e 
a l l o w i n g the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f e x t r a 
( i n t e r m e d i a t e ) unknowns which are added to the 
unknowns l i s t and have to be e v e n t u a l l y so lved 
f o r . No t i ce t h a t the q u a n t i t i e s man ipu la ted 
are p u r e l y symbo l i c ; they can be i n t r oduced by 
the c r e a t i o n mechanism (see l a t e r ) w i t h o u t 
t h e i r va l ues be ing known a t t h i s s t a g e . 
E .g . When the f i r s t equa t i on (3 ) was formed in 
the above example, the q u a n t i t y t e n s i o n l was 
i n t roduced w i t h o u t the program knowing, or 
t r y i n g to f i n d , i t s a c t u a l v a l u e . As can be 
seen, i t i s the Marples a l g o r i t h m which w i l l 
e v e n t u a l l y produce an e q u a t i o n which so lves f o r 
t e n s i o n l . 
The da ta -base s t o r e s a l l the f a c t s supp l i ed 
by the E n g l i s h s t a t emen t , bu t to b r i d g e the gap 
between the e x p l i c i t i n f o r m a t i o n d e r i v e d from 
the problem sta tement and t h a t needed to so l ve 
the problem the program r e q u i r e s a genera l 
knowledge of mechanics which is f o r m a l i s e d in a 
set of i n f e r e n c e r u l e s . An example of such 
( o b j e c t - l e v e l ) i n f e r e n c e r u l e s would be : 
The f i r s t r u l e says t h a t the r e l a t i v e 
a c c e l e r a t i o n between two p o i n t s o f r e f e rence i s 
zero i f t h e r e i s a cons tan t r e l a t i v e v e l o c i t y 
between them (over a c e r t a i n p e r i o d ) , and the 
second r u l e says t h a t two p o i n t s o f r e f e r e n c e 
have a cons tan t r e l a t i v e v e l o c i t y i f they a re 
in c o n t a c t ( a g a i n , over a c e r t a i n p e r i o d ) . The 
i n f e r e n c e r u l e s are a se t o f horn c lauses which 
have been hand ordered and c o n t a i n c e r t a i n 
t y p i n g i n f o r m a t i o n to gu ide s e l e c t i o n . The 
search s t r a t e g y i s depth f i r s t , w i t h p run ing o f 
s e m a n t i c a l l y meaning less g o a l s , and w h i l e t h i s 
cou ld be improved upon, c u r r e n t performance has' 
not ye t n e c e s s i t a t e d such a s t e p . 
An i m p o r t a n t p a r t of our work has been the 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f search c o n t r o l mechanisms 
which w i l l enable e f f e c t i v e use o f t h i s wea l th 
o f i m p l i c i t knowledge. A l l reques ts t o 
r e t r i e v e a s s e r t i o n s from the d a t a - b a s e , e i t h e r 
d i r e c t l y o r v i a i n f e r e n c e , a re handled by the 
I n fe rence c o n t r o l module . Th is module uses 
i n f o r m a t i o n from the request a long w i t h 
m e t a - i n f o r m a t i o n and i n f e r e n c e r u l e s in an 
a t tempt t o s a t i s f y the g o a l . The f i r s t s tep 
i n v o l v e s n o r m a l i s a t i o n o f the goa l to remove 
s y n t a c t i c sugar o r to express i t i n terms o f a 
sma l l e r set o f u n d e r l y i n g p r e d i c a t e s . Th is i s 
performed w i t h a one pass r e w r i t e r u l e s e t . 
The r e s u l t i n g goa l i s then c l a s s i f i e d acco rd ing 
t o the i n s t a n t i a t i o n s t a t e o f i t s component 
arguments and the p o s s i b i l i t y o f us ing f u n c t i o n 
p r o p e r t i e s and c e r t a i n o the r mathemat ica l 
p r o p e r t i e s o f the p r e d i c a t e (such as 
r e f l e x i v i t y , symmetry and t r a n s i t i v i t y ) . Th is 
i n f o r m a t i o n i s used to s e l e c t a p p r o p r i a t e 
p rov i ng s t r a t e g i e s . ( A bas ic s t r a t e g y o f ' u n i t 
p r e f e r e n c e ' w i l l always f i r s t check the 
data-base d i r e c t l y ) . 
Our two most impor tan t s t r a t e g i e s are the use 
of f u n c t i o n p r o p e r t i e s to prune search and the 
use of equ iva lence c l a s s type mechanisms to 
d i r e c t i t . The r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t r e a t s what 
would no rma l l y be cons idered f u n c t i o n s as 
p r e d i c a t e s w i t h e x t r a c o n t r o l I n f o r m a t i o n . 
Being a f u n c t i o n means t h a t c e r t a i n arguments 
are u n i q u e l y determined by c e r t a i n o the r 
arguments. For example, in the p r e d i c a t e 
t e n s i o n ( S t r i n g , T , T i m e ) ' The a c t u a l t e n s i o n T 
is determined once the S t r i n g and the Time have 
been g i v e n . 
These f u n c t i o n p r o p e r t i e s can be used to 
prevent use less i n f e r e n c e i f another 
( d i f f e r e n t ) va lue o f a f u n c t i o n argument i s 
a l r e a d y known (un iqueness p r o p e r t y ) ; to c rea te 
new e n t i t i e s t o s a t i s f y a goa l i f a l l a t t emp ts 
a t i n f e r e n c e have f a i l e d ( e x i s t e n c e p r o p e r t y ) ; 
and to a u t o m a t i c a l l y e l i m i n a t e b a c k t r a c k i n g by 
d i s r e g a r d i n g cho ices made d u r i n g i n f e r e n c e 
(uniqueness a g a i n ) . Examples o f the m e t a - l e v e l 
s t r u c t u r e s used by the program in pe r fo rm ing 
the above a r e : 
The r e w r i t e r u l e t e l l s us t h a t any a c c e l 
p r e d i c a t e can be r e w r i t t e n to a r e l a c c e l 
p r e d i c a t e w i t h the e a r t h as the o the r p o i n t o f 
r e f e r e n c e , and t h a t the s tandard i n f e r e n c e 
s t r a t e g y i s then a p p l i c a b l e . The meta 
p r e d i c a t e s p e c i f i e s the argument types and the 
f u n c t i o n p r o p e r t i e s o f the p r e d i c a t e r e l a c c e l . 
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The second major s t r a t e g y , which p rov ides an 
a l t e r n a t i v e to us ing the i n fe rence r u l e s , i s a 
genera l s i m i l a r i t y c l a s s mechanism based on 
equ iva lence c l ass i deas . P red ica tes which are 
(pseudo-) equ iva lence r e l a t i o n s and would 
n o r m a l l y produce s e l f - r e s o l v i n g i n fe rence r u l e s 
are de f i ned in terms of t h i s mechanism. A t r e e 
i s used t o represent s i m i l a r i t y c l a s s 
membership and the goa l (such as ' b e i n g in the 
same p l a c e ' ) is proved by e s t a b l i s h i n g 
equ iva lence of r o o t s . Th is can be seen as an 
a l t e r n a t i v e (and less exp los i ve ) a x i o m a t i s a t i o n 
of these p r e d i c a t e s . Our ex tens ion over 
t r a d i t i o n a l uses of t h i s method has been to 
a l l o w l a b e l l e d arcs and c a l c u l a t i o n d u r i n g the 
t r e e t r a v e r s a l . Thus p r e d i c a t e s l i k e ' v e c t o r 
s e p a r a t i o n ' and ' r e l a t i v e v e l o c i t y ' which have 
pseudo-equiva lence p r o p e r t i e s can a lso use t h i s 
s t r a t e g y . Here is an example of a s t r u c t u r e 
used in these cases: 
r e w r i t e ( samep lace (P ,Q ,T ime) , 
[ s a m e c l a s s ( P , Q , t o u c h ( T i m e ) ) , 
me rge (P ,Q , t ouch (T ime ) ) ] , 
s t r a t e g y ( s i m c l a s s ) ) . 
T h i s s t a t e s t h a t the p r e d i c a t e sameplace shou ld 
use t h e g e n e r a l sameclass mechanism on the 
p a r t i c u l a r t r e e t o u c h ( T i m e ) . A lso s p e c i f i e d i s 
an u p d a t i n g mechanism f o r add ing new sameplace 
a s s e r t i o n s ; I n t h i s case i t would i n v o l v e 
merg ing two s e p a r a t e t r e e s . 
These g e n e r a l s t r a t e g i e s can be a p p l i e d to a 
wide range o f p r e d i c a t e s and o f t e n c a p t u r e 
i m p o r t a n t f a c t s about the domain (eg the f a c t 
t h a t an o b j e c t cannot be in two p laces a t once 
i s a f a c t about the f u n c t i o n p r o p e r t i e s o f 
' a t ( O b j e c t , P l a c e , T i m e ) ' ) . The e x p l i c i t c o n t r o l 
o f new o b j e c t c r e a t i o n coup led w i t h the g o a l 
d i r e c t e d backward reason ing method o f the 
Marp les a l g o r i t h m r e s u l t s i n a 
c r e a t e / c o n s i d e r - b y - n e e d type o f b e h a v i o u r . 
R e s t r i c t i o n s , such a s ' d o n ' t c r e a t e ' o r ' d o n ' t 
i n f e r ' , can be added to the reques t f o r a goa l 
to be proved and t h i s enab les the Marp les 
a l g o r i t h m to be s e l e c t i v e over i t s use o f the 
I n f e r e n c e C o n t r o l i n accordance w i t h i t s needs 
a t the t i m e . 
For some mechanics problems a process of 
p r e d i c t i o n i s r e q u i r e d t o answer q u e s t i o n s l i k e 
" W i l l the p a r t i c l e reach the top o f the s lope 
i f i t s t a r t s w i t h v e l o c i t y V ? " . Each q u e s t i o n 
about the m o t i o n of a p a r t i c l e on a complex 
s l ope unpacks i n t o a s e r i e s o f q u e s t i o n s about 
the behav iou r on s imp le p a r t s o f the s l o p e . 
Some of these can be answered i m m e d i a t e l y on 
the b a s i s o f the q u a l i t a t i v e shape o f the 
s l o p e , b u t o t h e r s i n v o l v e the s o l u t i o n o f 
i n e q u a l i t i e s c o n t a i n i n g unknown q u a n t i t i e s . 
These unknowns a re d e c l a r e d as sought and the 
e q u a t i o n e x t r a c t i o n a l g o r i t h m i s c a l l e d t o 
s o l v e f o r them. The i n e q u a l i t i e s can then be 
so l ved to answer the q u e s t i o n . Our p resen t 
p r e d i c t i o n system i s s p e c i a l purpose and b u i l t 
around prob lems s i m i l a r t o those i n t a c k l e d b y 
De K l e e r , ie m o t i o n p rob lems . 
S ince the e q u a t i o n s produced by the e q u a t i o n 
e x t r a c t i o n a l g o r i t h m are i n terms o f symbo l i c 
q u a n t i t i e s , t h e r e i s a s tage o f U n i t Convers ion 
where the a c t u a l v a l u e s a re s u b s t i t u t e d and a 
f i n a l u n i t system i s s e l e c t e d - c o n v e r s i o n 
f a c t o r s b e i n g added where a p p r o p r i a t e . (Some 
prob lems i n v o l v e a c o m b i n a t i o n o f a l l s o r t s o f 
d i f f e r e n t u n i t s - f e e t , y a r d s , m i l e s ) . 
The two e q u a t i o n s produced above ( ( 3 ) & ( 4 ) ) 
a re v e r y s i m p l e i n t h a t n o p a r t i c u l a r u n i t s a re 
i n v o l v e d . The o n l y s t e p w i l l be the 
s u b s t i t u t i o n of b and c f o r massl and mass2 
r e s p e c t i v e l y g i v i n g : 
- b . g + t e n s i o n l * b . a l 
e g - t e n s i o n l ■ c . a l 
(5) 
(6) 
The set of s imul taneous equat ions and/or 
i n e q u a l i t i e s produced by the problem s o l v i n g 
module is passed to the a lgebra module (PRESS) 
which w i l l so lve them to produce a f i n a l answer 
to the prob lem. Let us look at how PRESS 
produces a s o l u t i o n f o r a l g iven (5) and ( 6 ) . 
The two equa t ions are so lved by i s o l a t i n g 
t e n s i o n l in the second equat ion (which was 
in tended to so lve f o r t e n s i o n l ) , and then us ing 
the r e s u l t as a s u b s t i t u t i o n i n t o the f i r s t 
e q u a t i o n . Th is f i n a l r e s u l t can then be 
s i m p l i f i e d w i t h a l be ing i s o l a t e d o n the l e f t 
hand s ide to g i v e the f i n a l answer: 
al » g . ( c - b ) / (c+b) (7) 
The ex tens ion of equa t i on s o l v i n g techn iques 
t o i n e q u a l i t i e s ( t h e r e are i n t e r e s t i n g 
connect ions) has enabled us to so lve the 
i n e q u a l i t i e s produced by the p r e d i c t i o n 
prob lems, bu t in a d d i t i o n we have found t h a t 
the i n f o r m a t i o n requ i r ed to j u s t i f y the use o f 
c e r t a i n r e w r i t e r u l e s i s o f t e n o f the form 
' o n l y i f X > 0 ' e t c . So lv ing and p rov i ng 
i n e q u a l i t i e s i s t h e r e f o r e o f d i r e c t use w i t h i n 
the system. 
However, PRESS was not developed p u r e l y as a 
s e r v i c e program f o r MECHO. It was in tended as 
a v e h i c l e to exp lo re ideas about c o n t r o l l i n g 
search in mathemat ica l reasoning us ing 
m e t a - l e v e l d e s c r i p t i o n s and s t r a t e g i e s [ 3 ] . 
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Rather than us ing exhaus t i ve a p p l i c a t i o n over a 
l a r g e set o f r e w r i t e r u l e s , i t uses the 
m e t a - l e v e l s t a t e g i e s o f i s o l a t i o n , c o l l e c t i o n 
and a t t r a c t i o n t o c a r e f u l l y c o n t r o l a p p l i c a t i o n 
o f seve ra l d i f f e r e n t se ts o f r e w r i t e r u l e s . 
Th is s e l e c t i v i t y has many advantages: 
p r i n c i p l e d methods f o r g u i d i n g search cut down 
use less work, i d e n t i c a l r u l e s may be used in 
d i f f e r e n t ways (eg l e f t t o r i g h t o r r i g h t t o 
l e f t ) i n d i f f e r e n t c i r cumstances w i t hou t 
caus ing prob lems, and t h e o r e t i c a l requ i rements 
such as p roo f o f t e r m i n a t i o n o f the r e w r i t e 
r u l e s are made much e a s i e r . 
When PRESS is used as an equa t i on and 
i n e q u a l i t y s o l v e r ( i e as a module o f MECHO), i t 
c l a s s i f i e s the equa t ions ( i n e q u a l i t i e s ) t o be 
solved so as to genera te guidance i n f o r m a t i o n . 
An e x c i t i n g area of research t h a t we would l i k e 
to expand on is t h a t o f d e s i g n i n g i n c l u s i o n and 
o r d e r i n g c r i t e r i a t o c l a s s i f y a l g e b r a i c 
i d e n t i t i e s which are produced by a theorem 
p r o v e r . Th is would enable the system to 
a u t o m a t i c a l l y l e a r n new r u l e s . The use of 
m e t a - l e v e l reason ing to p lace new r u l e s i n t o a 
framework where they w i l l be s e l e c t i v e l y and 
c o r r e c t l y a p p l i e d overcomes many of the obv ious 
' e x p l o s i o n ' and ' l o o p i n g ' problems t h a t would 
occur w i t h haphazard a d d i t i o n s to a l a r g e 
s i n g l e r e w r i t e r u l e s e t . 
3 . D i scuss ion 
Throughout the above d e s c r i p t i o n of the Mecho 
program we have c o n s t a n t l y emphasised the 
impor tance o f ' m e t a - i n f o r m a t i o n ' i n c o n t r o l l i n g 
s e a r c h . Th is has been a p p l i e d in the r e j e c t i o n 
o f s e m a n t l c a l l y meaning less pa r ses , the c o n t r o l 
o f i n f e r e n c e , the e x t r a c t i o n o f equa t i ons and 
the g u i d i n g o f a l g e b r a i c m a n i p u l a t i o n . 
The theme t h a t has emerged from our work is 
the b e n e f i t to be gained from a x i o m a t i s i n g the 
m e t a - l e v e l o f the domain under i n v e s t i g a t i o n 
and pe r fo rm ing i n f e r e n c e a t t h i s l e v e l , 
p roduc ing o b j e c t l e v e l p roo f s as a s i d e e f f e c t . 
Th is is the methodology i n v e s t i g a t e d by Pat 
Hayes in the GOLUX p r o j e c t [ 9 ] , except t h a t we 
have developed our m e t a - l e v e l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 
f o r a p a r t i c u l a r domain r a t h e r than adop t i ng 
genera l purpose r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s based on 
r e s o l u t i o n theorem p rov ing systems. 
In [2 ] we showed how GPS cou ld be viewed in 
t h i s way. At the o b j e c t - l e v e l the search space 
can be viewed as an o p e r a t o r / s t a t e OR t r e e in 
which the s t a t e s are nodes and the o p e r a t o r s 
are a rcs between them. At the m e t a - l e v e l the 
search space can viewed as a method/goa l AND/OR 
t r e e In which the goa l s are nodes and the 
methods are a rcs between them. A s imp le depth 
f i r s t search a t the m e t a - l e v e l then induces a 
h i g h l y complex, m i d d l e - o u t search a t the 
o b j e c t - l e v e l . 
In o rder to make c l e a r the d i s t i n c t i o n we are 
drawing between m e t a - l e v e l and o b j e c t - l e v e l 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s in Mecho, we s h a l l l i s t below 
examples of the d e s c r i p t i o n s used at each 
l e v e l . When d e f i n i n g a n o t a t i o n i t i s usua l t o 
d e f i n e the c o n s t a n t s , v a r i a b l e s , f u n c t i o n 
symbols and p r e d i c a t e symbols of the language; 
and then to show how terms and formulae can be 
formed by composing them toge the r w i t h the 
l o g i c a l c o n n e c t i v e s . We s h a l l f o l l o w t h i s type 
o f o u t l i n e in an i n f o r m a l f a s h i o n . (To avo id 
con fus i on w i t h e a r l i e r t e r m i n o l o g y we s h a l l use 
the words ' a s s e r t i o n ' and ' r u l e ' t o rep lace 
' f o r m u l a ' ) . 
At the o b j e c t - l e v e l we have the f o l l o w i n g 
k inds o f p r i m i t i v e : 
cons tan t s p l , e n d l , mass2, a l , r i g h t , 90, 
270, l b s , f e e t e t c . 
v a r i a b l e s P I , S t r , P e r i o d , A c c e l , F , M, 
e t c . 
f u n c t i o n symbols + , * , cos e t c . 
p r e d i c a t e symbols a c c e l , r e l a c c e l , mass, 
f i x e d _ c o n t a c t e t c . 
These are formed i n t o terms such as 'M * A' and 
a s s e r t i o n s such as 'F - M * A ' , ' a c c e l ( p l , a l , 
2 7 0 , p e r i o d l ) ' e t c . F i n a l l y , l o g i c a l 
connec t i ves are used to form these a s s e r t i o n s 
i n t o i n f e r e n c e r u l e s l i k e : 
r e l a c c e l ( P 1 , P 2 , z e r o , D i r , P e r i o d ) 
<— c o n s t r e l v e K P l , P 2 , P e r i o d ) . 
The o n l y f u n c t i o n symbols a t the o b j e c t - l e v e l 
are f o r s t r a i g h t fo rward a r i t h m e t i c and 
t r i g o n o m e t r i c f u n c t i o n s . Th is is because we 
have recorded f u n c t i o n p r o p e r t i e s by making 
m e t a - l e v e l a s s e r t i o n s about o b j e c t - l e v e l 
p r e d i c a t e s . 
A t the m e t a - l e v e l a l l these o b j e c t - l e v e l 
d e s c r i p t i o n s are me ta -cons tan ts a long w i t h 
a d d i t i o n a l me ta -cons tan t s f o r schema names, 
fo rmu la names, o b j e c t t y p e s , s t r a t e g y t ypes 
e t c . As examples of m e t a - l e v e l p r i m i t i v e s we 
have: 
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constants (Any object l eve l d e s c r i p t i o n ) . 
physobj, p u l l s y s , reso lve , 
p a r t i c l e , l i n e , leng th , dbinf 
e t c . 
var iab les Type, Eqn, Goal, Strategy, 
Exprl e t c . (see l a t e r ) 
func t ion symbols Constructors fo r l i s t s , se ts , 
bags e t c . 
predicate symbols meaning, sys ln fo , schema, 
k i nd , r e l a t e s , i s fo rm, r e w r i t e , 
meta e tc . 
Again these can be formed in to meta-terms and 
meta-assert ions and we gave several examples 
dur ing the program desc r i p t i on . What we sha l l 
now examine are the meta-rules which are formed 
from these asser t ions . (These use the same 
l o g i c a l connectives as the ob jec t - l eve l r u l e s ) . 
We sha l l take s imp l i f i ed examples from each of 
the four main areas of our work. 
The f i r s t example is a ru le used by the 
Natural Language module, which spec i f ies the 
condi t ions fo r a property to be co r rec t l y 
appl ied to a p a r t i c u l a r e n t i t y . 
a t t r i b u t e ( P r o p e r t y , E n t i t y , S t a t e ) 
<— type constra int (Property,Type) & 
isa(Type,Ent i ty ) & 
meaning(Property,Ent i ty ,Assert ion) & 
cons is ten t (Asser t ion ,S ta te ) . 
This ru le states that a p a r t i c u l a r Property can 
be a t t r i b u t e d to an En t i t y in a given State (of 
the parse) , i f the En t i t y s a t i s f i e s the 
type_constra in t of of the Property, and if the 
meaning of the a t t r i b u t i o n is consistent w i th 
a l l the other assert ions in the current State. 
( I f , fo r example, the Assert ion was 'mass(s i , 
ze ro ) ' then t h i s would involve checking that no 
other mass was known for sl. It is here that 
we see one of the key connections wi th our work 
on Problem Solv ing, since t h i s is prec ise ly a 
matter o f ' f u n c t i o n p r o p e r t i e s ' ! ) . 
The fo l low ing is an example taken from the 
Marples A lgor i thm, and it def ines the 
requirements fo r an equation to solve fo r a 
p a r t i c u l a r quan t i t y . 
solves_for(Q,Eqn) 
<-- kind(Q,Type,Defn) & 
r e l a t e s ( T y p e , F l i s t ) & 
se lec t (Formula ,F_ l is t ) & 
prepare(Formula,Defn,Situat ion) & 
isform( Formula,Situation,Eqn) . 
This ru le states that Eqn solves fo r Q if Q has 
type Type and Formula is a formula that re la tes 
Type quan t i t i es to other q u a n t i t i e s , and if 
S i tua t ion is the s i t u a t i o n w i t h i n which to 
apply the Formula given the Defn of Q, and if 
Eqn is the i n s t a n t i a t i o n of the formula in the 
given S i t u a t i o n . It can be seen that t h i s ru le 
is a d i r e c t ax iomat isat ion of our e a r l i e r 
descr ip t ion of how the Marples a lgor i thm 
ext rac ts equat ions. (The select goal would 
speci fy the q u a l i t a t i v e guidance and apply the 
independence c r i t e r i a (given extra arguments)). 
In a s im i l a r way we give the fo l lowing 
example of ru les which describe how the 
Inference Control uses func t ion p roper t ies . 
i s_sa t i s f led(Goa l ) 
<— rewri te(Goal,Newgoal,Strategy) & 
decompose(Newgoal,Pred,Args) & 
meta(Pred,N,Args,Types,Func_info) & 
method(Strategy,Func_info,Newgoal). 
method( s t r a t e g y ( d b i n f ) , 
funct ion(Fargs ■> Va l s ) , Newgoal) 
<— al Inbound(Fargs) & 
use_funct ion_propert ies(Newgoal). 
The f i r s t ru le s tates that Goal is s a t i s f i e d i f 
it rewr i tes to Newgoal whose predicate symbol 
has c e r t a i n Func_info, and if a method is used 
based on the Strategy and t h i s Func_info. 
(Certa in arguments to meta have been ignored) . 
The second ru le states that the normal 
inference method w i l l prove Newgoal given i t s 
func t ion proper t ies i f a l l the funct ion 
arguments, Fargs, are bound, and if 
o b j e c t - l e v e l in ferenc ing is performed using 
func t ion property pruning. 
As a f i n a l example we take a ru le concerned 
wi th algebraic equation so l v i ng . This ru le is 
i n t e res t i ng in that whi le PRESS does not 
cu r ren t l y use i t , i t could be derived from 
ru les PRESS does have. Automating t h i s 
procedure would be an i n te res t i ng area fo r 
study. 
solve(U,Exprl ,Ans) 
<— occ(U,Expr l ,2) & 
co l lec t (U,Expr l ,Expr2) & 
iso la te(U,Expr2,Ans) . 
This ru le states that Ans is an equation which 
solves for U given Exprl if Exprl contains two 
occurances of U, if Expr2 is an equation 
derived from Exprl in which these two 
occurances have been co l lec ted together , and if 
1025 
Ans is an equa t i on d e r i v e d from Expr2 in which 
U has been i s o l a t e d on the l e f t hand s i d e . 
A l l the above r u l e s can be seen as 
c l a s s i f y i n g o b j e c t - l e v e l d e s c r i p t i o n s and us ing 
t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n i n d e c i d i n g what t o do . 
However the e f f e c t s are v e r y d i f f e r e n t i n the 
d i f f e r e n t a r e a s . I n the n a t u r a l language 
p rocess ing m e t a - l e v e l r u l e s mon i t o r 
o b j e c t - l e v e l a s s e r t i o n s , r e j e c t i n g s e m a n t i c a l l y 
unacceptab le consequences of a p a r s e . In 
equa t i on e x t r a c t i o n the e f f e c t i s t o s e l e c t 
equa t ions us ing a means/ends a n a l y s i s 
t e c h n i q u e . I n I n f e r e n c e C o n t r o l the r e s u l t i s 
use o f the most e f f e c t i v e a x i o m a t i s a t i o n f o r 
the goa l i n hand, and in A l g e b r a i c m a n i p u l a t i o n 
m u l t i p l e r e w r i t e r u l e s are s e l e c t i v e l y b rought 
to bear on e x p r e s s i o n s . Thus r e l a t i v e l y s imp le 
m e t a - l e v e l search s t r a t e g i e s can induce a wide 
v a r i e t y o f complex o b j e c t - l e v e l b e h a v i o u r s . 
These m e t a - i n f e r e n c e techn iques were s t r o n g l y 
suggested by our use of the programming 
language P r o l o g . The f a c t t h a t Pro log 
procedures are a l s o p r e d i c a t e c a l c u l u s c lauses 
and the f a c t t h a t p r e d i c a t e c a l c u l u s has a 
c l e a r seman t i cs , encourages the user to a t t a c h 
meanings to h i s procedures and these meanings 
are u s u a l l y m e t a - t h e o r e t i c . However, P ro log as 
a programming language o n l y o f f e r s a s i n g l e 
l e v e l o f ' s y n t a c t i c ' s t r u c t u r e s (a toms, 
compound terms e t c . ) , and a l a c k of ca re can 
lead to a b l u r r i n g o f t h e o r e t i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n s . 
Dur ing the development of Mecho, a l a c k of 
emphasis ( r e a l i s a t i o n ? ) o f these d i s t i n c t i o n s 
r e s u l t e d in a m i x i n g o f o b j e c t and meta l e v e l s , 
( f o r example the use of Pro log v a r i a b l e s to 
rep resen t v a r i a b l e s a t bo th l e v e l s , the m i x i n g 
o f o b j e c t and meta l e v e l a s s e r t i o n s i n r u l e s 
such as i 8 f o r m ) . We p lan to remove these 
a b e r r a t i o n s . 
Weyrauch's work on the FOL system (See [ 1 7 ] ) , 
i s o f impor tance i n r e l a t i o n t o t h i s need f o r 
an adaquate t h e o r e t i c a l f o r m a l i s m . The 
d i s t i n c t i o n between the o b j e c t - l e v e l and the 
m e t a - l e v e l i s fundamental w i t h i n h i s sys tem, 
and h i s use o f ' r e f l e c t i o n p r i n c i p l e s ' i s 
designed to cap tu re the r e l a t i o n between these 
l e v e l s . We f e e l t h a t h i s work i s o f d i r e c t 
va lue t o workers i n the f i e l d o f e x p e r t 
sys tems, such as o u r s e l v e s . 
The p r i n c i p l e o f u t i l i s i n g 'knowledge about 
knowledge' i s becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y i m p o r t a n t 
in p r a c t i c a l AI programs. Davis and Buchanan 
[6 ] c l a s s i f i e d four d i f f e r e n t k i nds o f 
m e t a - l e v e l knowledge used by t h e i r TEIRESIAS 
sys tem. They rep resen t knowledge about o b j e c t s 
and the d a t a - s t r u c t u r e s used to d e s c r i b e them 
in schemata and d e s c r i b e the argument type 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e i r f u n c t i o n s i n 
t e m p l a t e s . The i r program can c l a s s i f y and 
b u i l d models o f the i n f e r e n c e r u l e s i t uses and 
m e t a - r u l e s are used to gu ide the cho ice of 
i n f e r e n c e r u l e s to be used and the o rder of 
us ing them. In MECHO, the Na tu ra l Language and 
I n fe rence C o n t r o l modules bo th use i n f o r m a t i o n 
l i k e t h a t s to red in TEIRESIAS t e m p l a t e s . MECHO 
m e t a - l e v e l i n f e r e n c e r u l e s are s i m i l a r i n 
s p i r i t t o TEIRESIAS m e t a - r u l e s except t h a t the 
MECHO r u l e s are more genera l purpose and they 
genera te a v a r i e t y o f d i f f e r e n t search 
s t r a t e g i e s i n d i f f e r e n t c o n t e x t s . 
4 . Conc lus ion 
In t h i s paper we have d iscussed Mecho, a 
program f o r s o l v i n g mechanics prob lems. We 
have shown how the techn ique of us ing and 
c o n t r o l l i n g knowledge about the domain by 
i n f e r e n c e a t the m e t a - l e v e l , can be a p p l i e d to 
a range of d i f f e r e n t a r e a s . Many workers in 
the f i e l d (eq [ 9 ] , [ 6 ] , [ 1 7 ] ) , have argued t h a t 
c o n t r o l l i n g search by us ing m e t a - l e v e l 
i n f e r e n c e i s s u p e r i o r t o b u i l t - i n , smart search 
s t r a t e g i e s because the search i n f o r m a t i o n i s 
more modular and t r a n s p a r a n t . The argument is 
f o r systems to make e x p l i c i t the f u l l knowledge 
i n v o l v e d i n t h e i r b e h a v i o u r , which i n t u r n a i d s 
the m o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h e i r da ta and s t r a t e g i e s , 
thus improv ing t h e i r robustness and g e n e r a l i t y . 
Th is leads the way to systems which cou ld 
a u t o m a t i c a l l y mod i fy t h e i r s t r a t e g i e s and 
e x p l a i n t h e i r c o n t r o l d e c i s i o n s . 
We conc lude t h a t m e t a - l e v e l i n f e r e n c e can be 
used to b u i l d s o p h i s t i c a t e d and f l e x i b l e 
s t r a t e g i e s , which p r o v i d e power fu l techn iques 
f o r c o n t r o l l i n g the use o f knowledge, w h i l e 
r e t a i n i n g the c l a r i t y and m o d u l a r i t y o f a 
d e c l a r a t i v e knowledge r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . 
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What is an Image? 
Harold Cohen 
University of Cal i forn ia at San Diego 
B-027, UCSD, La J o l l a , CA 92093 
Image-making, and more pa r t i cu la r l y art-making, are considered as rule-based a c t i v i t i e s in which 
cer ta in fundamental ru le-sets are bound to low-level cognit ive processes. AARON, a computer-
program, models some aspects of image-making behavior through the act ion of these ru les, and 
generates, in consequence, an extremely large set of highly evocative "freehand" drawings. The 
program is described, and examples of i t s output given. The theoret ical basis for the formula­
t ion of the program is discussed in terms of cu l tu ra l considerations, pa r t i cu la r l y wi th respect 
to our re lat ionship to the images of remote cul tures. An art-museum environment implementation 
involving a special-purpose drawing device is discussed. Some speculation is offered concerning 
the function of randomising in creat ive behavior, and an account given of the use of randomness 
in the program. The conclusions offered bear upon the nature of meaning as a function of an 
image-mediated transaction rather than as a function of i n ten t i ona l i t y . They propose also that 
the structure of a l l drawn images, derives from the nature of visual cogni t ion. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
AARON is a computer program designed to model 
some aspects of hunan art-making behavior, and 
to produce as a resul t "freehand" drawings of a 
highly evocative kind ( f igs 1,2). This paper 
describes the program, and offers in i t s 
conclusions a number of propositions concerning 
the nature of evocation and the nature of the 
transaction — the making and reading of images 
— in which evocation occurs. Perhaps 
unexpectedly — for the program has no access 
to visual data — some of these conclusions 
bear upon the nature of visual representation. 
This may suggest a view of image-making as a 
broadly referent ia l ac t i v i t y in which various 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e modes, including what we ca l l 
visual representation (note 1 ) , share a 
s igni f icant body of cannon character ist ics. 
In some respects the methodology used in th is 
work relates to the modelling of "expert 
systems" (note 2 ) , and it does in fact re ly 
heavily upon my own "expert" knowledge of 
image-making. But in i t s motivations it comes 
closer to research in the computer simulation 
of cognit ion. This is one area, I believe, in 
which the investigator has no choice but to 
model the human prototype. Art is valuable to 
human beings by v i r tue of being made by other 
human beings, and the question of f inding more 
e f f i c i en t modes than those which characterise 
hunan performance simply does not ar ise. 
My expertise in the area of ijnage-making rests 
upon many years of professional ac t i v i t y as an 
a r t i s t — a painter, to be precise (note 3) — 
and it w i l l be clear that my ac t i v i t i es as an 
a r t i s t have continued through my last ten years 
of work in computer-modelling. The motivation 
for th is work has been the desire to understand 
more about the nature of art-making processes 
than the making of ar t i t s e l f allows, for under 
normal circumstances the a r t i s t provides a 
near-perfect example of an obviously-present, 
but v i r t ua l l y inaccessible body of knowledge. 
The work has been informal, and C|ua psychology 
lacks methodological r igor . It is to be hoped, 
however, that the body of highly specialised 
knowledge brought to bear on an elusive problem 
w i l l be some compensation. 
AARON is a knowledge-based program, in which 
knowledge of image-making is represented in 
rule form. As I have indicated I have been my 
own source of specialised knowledge, and I have 
served also as my own knowledge-engineer. 
Before embarking on a detailed account of the 
program's workings, I w i l l describe in general 
terms what sort of program it i s , and what it 
purports to do. 
F i r s t , what i t is not. I t is not an " a r t i s t s ' 
t o o l " . I mean that it is not interact ive, it is 
not designed to implement key decisions made by 
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f igure 1. 
f igure 2. 
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the user, and it does not do transformations 
upon input data. In short , i t is not an 
instrument, in the sense that most computer 
appl icat ions in the a r t s , and in music 
pa r t i cu la r l y , have ident i f ied the machine in 
essent ia l ly instrument- l ike terms, 
AARON is not a transformation device. There is 
no input, no data, upon which transformations 
could be done: in fact it has no data at a l l 
which it does not generate for i t s e l f in making 
i t s drawings. There is no lexicon of shapes, or 
parts of shapes, to be put together, assembly 
l i ne fashion, in to a complete drawing. 
It is a complete and funct ional ly independent 
e n t i t y , capable of generating autonomously an 
endless succession of d i f f e ren t drawings (note 
4 ) . The program s tar ts each drawing with a 
clean sheet of paper — no data — and 
generates everything it needs as it goes along, 
bui ld ing up as it proceeds an internal 
representation of what i t is doing, which is 
then used in determining subsequent 
developments. I t is event dr iven, but in the 
special sense that the program i t s e l f generates 
the events which dr ive i t . 
It is not a learning program, has no archival 
memory, is qui te simple and not pa r t i cu la r l y 
c lever. It is able to knock o f f a pre t ty good 
drawing — thousands, in fact — but has no 
c r i t i c a l judgement that would enable i t to 
declare that one of i t s drawings was "bet ter" 
than another. That has never been part of the 
aim. Whether or not it might be possible to 
demonstrate that the a r t i s t moves towards 
higher goals, and however he might do so 
through his work, art-making in general lacks 
clear internal goal-seeking structures. There 
is no ra t ional way of determining whether a 
"move" is good or bad the way one might judge a 
move in a game of chess, and thus no 
immediately apparent way to exercise c r i t i c a l 
judgement in a simulat ion. 
This lack of internal goal-or ientat ion carr ies 
wi th it a number of d i f f i c u l t i e s for anyone 
attempting to model art-making processes: for 
one th ing , evaluation of the model must 
necessarily be informal. In the case of AARON, 
however, there has been extensive tes t ing . 
Before describing the test ing procedure i t w i l l 
be necessary to say with more care 
dist inguishing here between the program's goals 
and my own — what AARON is supposed to do. 
Task De f i n i t i on . 
It is not the intent of the AARON model to turn 
out drawings which are, in some i l l - de f i ned and 
loosely-understood sense, aesthet ica l ly 
pleasing, though i t does in pract ise turn out 
pleasing drawings. I t is to permit the 
examination of a par t icu lar property of 
freehand drawing which I w i l l c a l l , in a 
del iberate ly general fashion, standing-for-
ness. 
The Photographic "Norm" 
One of the aims of th i s paper is to give 
clearer d e f i n i t i o n to what may seem i n t u i t i v e l y 
obvious about standing-for-ness, but even at 
the outset the " i n t u i t i v e l y obvious" w i l l need 
to be treated with some caut ion. In 
par t i cu la r , we should recognise that unguarded 
assumptions about the nature of "v isua l " 
imagery are almost cer ta in to be colored by the 
XX th century's deep preoccupation with 
photography as the "normal" image-making mode. 
The view that a drawn image is e i ther : 
1. representational ( concerned wi th the 
appearance of th ings) , or 
2. an abstraction ( i . e . fundamentally 
appearance-oriented, but transformed in the 
in terest of other aims) o r , 
3. abstract ( i . e . i t doesn't stand for 
anything a t a l l ) , 
betrays jus t t h i s pro-photographic f i l t e r i n g , 
and is a long way from the h is to r i ca l t r u t h . 
There is a great wealth of imagistic material 
which f i t s none of these paradigms, and it is 
by no means clear even that a photograph 
carr ies i t s load of standing-for-ness by v i r tue 
of recording the varying l i g h t in tens i t ies of a 
par t icu lar view at a par t icu lar moment in t ime. 
It is for th is reason that image-making w i l l be 
discussed here as the set of modes which 
contains visual representation as one of i t s 
members. It is also why I used the word 
"evocative" in the f i r s t paragraph rather than 
"meaningful". My domain of enquiry here is not 
the way in which par t icu lar meanings are 
transmitted through images and how they are 
changed in the process, but more generally the 
nature of image-mediated transactions. What 
would be the minimum condit ion under which a 
set of" marks may function "as an image? This 
question characterises economically the scope 
of the enquiry, and it also says a good deal 
about how the word "image" is to be used in 
t h i s paper, though a more complete d e f i n i t i o n 
must wait un t i l the end. 
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Art-making and Image-making. 
The reader may detect some reluctance to say 
f i rm ly that th is research deals with art-making 
rather than with image-making, or vice-versa. 
The two are presented as continuous. Art-making 
is almost always a highly sophisticated 
a c t i v i t y involving the inter locking of complex 
patterns of be l ie f and experience, while in the 
most general sense of the term image-making 
appears to be as "natura l" as ta lk ing . All the 
same, art-making is a case of image-making, and 
part of what AARON suggests is that art-making 
rests upon cognit ive processes which are 
absolutely normal and perfect ly common. 
functions which normally require an a r t i s t to 
perform them, and thus it requires the whole 
art-making process to be carried forward as a 
test ing context. The program's output has to be 
acceptable to a sophisticated audience on the 
same terms as any other a r t , implying thereby 
that it must be seen as or ig ina l and of high 
qua l i t y , not merely as a pastiche of exist ing 
work. 
A va l id test ing procedure must therefore 
contain a sophisticated art-viewing audience, 
and the informal in s i tu evaluation of the 
simulation has been carried out in museum 
environments: the DOCUMENTA 6 international 
f igure 3. 
Evaluation. 
A simulation program models only a small piece 
of the ac t ion , and it requires a context in 
which to determine whether it functions as one 
expects that piece to funct ion. AAPON is not an 
a r t i s t . It simply takes over some of the 
exhib i t ion in Kassel, Germany, and the 
prestigeous Stedel i jk Museum in Amsterdam, the 
two exhib i ts together running for almost f i ve 
months and with a to ta l audience of almost hal f 
a m i l l i on museum-goers. In both of these shows 
drawings were produced continuously on a 
Tektronix 4014 display terminal and also wi th 
an unconventional hard-copy device ( to be 
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described l a t e r ) . A POP 11/34 ran the program 
in f u l l view of the gal lery v i s i t o rs ( f i g 3) . 
In addit ion and at other times the program's 
output has been exhibited in a more orthodox 
mode in museums and gal ler ies in the US and in 
Europe. 
These exhibits were not set up as sc ien t i f i c 
experiments. Nor could they have been without 
d is tor t ing the expectations of the audience, 
and thus the significance of any resul ts . No 
formal records were kept of the hundreds of 
conversations which took place between the 
a r t i s t and members of the audience. This report 
is therefore essential ly narrat ive, but offered 
with some confidence. 
Audience Response. 
A v i r t u a l l y universal f i r s t assumption of the 
audiences was that the drawings they were 
watching being made by the machine had actual ly 
been made in advance by the " rea l " a r t i s t , and 
someow "fed" to the machine. After it had been 
explained that th is was not the case viewers 
would talk about the machine as if it were a 
human a r t i s t . There appeared to be a general 
consensus that the machine exhibited a good-
natured and even w i t t y a r t i s t i c personality, 
and that i t s drawings were quite d r o l l ( f i g 4 ) . 
Sane of the viewers, who knew my work from ray 
pre-computing, European, days claimed that they 
could "recognise my hand'' in the new drawings. 
This las t is par t icu lar ly in terest ing, since, 
while I cer ta in ly made use of my own body of 
knowledge concerning image-making in wr i t ing 
the program, the appearance of my own work 
never consciously served as a model for what 
the program was supposed to do. 
More to the point , while a very small number of 
people insisted that the drawings were nothing 
but a bunch of random squiggles, the majority 
c lear ly saw them in referent ia l terms. Many 
would stand for long periods watching, and 
describing to each other what was being drawn: 
always in terms of objects in the real world. 
The drawings seem to be viewed mostly as 
landscapes inhabited by "creatures", which 
would be "recognised" as animals, f i s h , birds 
and bugs. Occasionally a viewer would 
"recognise" a landscape, and once the machine's 
home was ident i f ied as San Francisco, since it 
had jus t drawn Twin Peaks. 
It might be correct ly anticipated that on those 
other occasions when drawings have simply been 
framed and exhibited without any reference to 
their o r ig ins , the question of their or ig ins 
has never ar isen, and they have met with a 
typical 
responses 
cross-section of museum-goers 
Even without formal evaluation, it might 
reasonably be claimed that the program provides 
a convincing simulation of human performance. 
The next part of th is paper is divided into 
f ive sections. In the f i r s t , a general 
description of the production system as a whole 
is given. The following three sections deal 
with part icular parts of the production system: 
the MOVEMENT CONTROL par t , the PLANNING par t , 
and the part which handles the internal 
representation of the drawings as they proceed. 
The second of these, on PLANNING, also gives an 
account of the theoretical basis for the 
program. The f i f t h section has something to say 
about the function of randomness in the 
program, and also discusses to what extent it 
might be thought to paral le l the use of 
randomness in human art-making behavior. The 
th i rd and f ina l part draws conclusions. 
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2. TOE PROGRAM ''AARON" 
24 THE PRODUCTION SYSTEM. 
The main program (note 5) has about three 
hundred productions. Many of these are to be 
regarded as micro-productions in the sense that 
each of them handles only a small part — an 
-action-atom- — of a larger conceptual un i t of 
act ion. For example, the drawing of a single 
l i n e , conceptually a single act , actual ly 
involves twenty or t h i r t y productions on at 
least three levels of the system. This f i ne -
grain control over the drawing process 
subscribes both to i t s general i ty — most of 
these action-atoms are invoked by many 
d i f f e ren t s i tuat ions — and to i t s f l e x i b i l i t y , 
since it allows a process to be interrupted at 
any point for further consideration by higher-
level processes. 
Levels of Organisation. 
The organisation of the system is he i rarch ica l , 
in the sense that the higher levels are 
responsible for decisions which constrain the 
domain of action for the lower levels ( f i g 5 ) . 
Each level of the system is responsible only 
for i t s own domain of decison-making, and there 
is no conceptual homunculus s i t t i n g on the top 
holding a bluepr int and di rect ing the whole 
operat ion. No single part knows what the 
drawing should turn out to be l i k e . There is 
some pract ica l advantage to th is level-wise 
s p l i t t i n g up of the system, but the program was 
designed th is way pr imar i ly for reasons of 
conceptual c l a r i t y , and from a desire to have 
the program structure i t s e l f — as well as the 
material contained wi th in it — re f lec t my 
understanding of what the human image-making 
process might be l i k e . I believe that the 
constant sh i f t i ng of at tent ion to d i f fe ren t 
levels of de ta i l and conceptualisation provides 
th i s human process with some of i t s important 
character is t ics . Thus the l e f t part of each 
production searches for combinations of up to 
f i ve or six condit ions, and each r igh t part may 
perform an arb i t ra ry number of actions or 
action-atoms, one of which may involve a jump 
to another level of the system. 
'ARTWORK' 
The topmost level of the system, the ARTWORK 
l e v e l , is responsible for decisions re lat ing to 
the organisation of the drawing as a whole. It 
decides how to s t a r t , makes some preliminary 
decisions which may la ter determine when and 
how it is to f i n i s h , and eventually makes that 
determination. The program current ly has no 
archival memory, and begins each drawing as if 
it has never done one before. (One can easi ly 
imagine the addit ion of a higher level designed 
to model the changes which the human a r t i s t 
del iberately makes in his work from one piece 
to the next: th i s level would presumably be 
cal led EXHIBITION.) 
ARTWORK also handles some of the more important 
aspects of spat ia l d i s t r i bu t i on . It is my 
be l ie f that the power of an image to convince 
us that it is a representation of some feature 
of the visual world rests in large part upon 
the image's f ine-grain structure: the degree to 
which it seems to re f lec t patterns in the 
changes of information density across the f i e l d 
of v is ion which the cognit ive processes 
themselves impose upon visual experience. 
Put crudely, th is means, for example, that a 
decision on the part of the reader of an image 
that one set of marks is a de ta i l of another 
set of marks rather than standing autonomously, 
is largely a function of such issues as 
re la t ive scale and proximity. This function is 
qui te apart from the more obviously af fect ive 
issue of shape ( and hence "semantic") 
re lat ionship. I t is the overal l control of the 
varying density of information in the drawing, 
rather than the control of i n te r - f i gu ra l 
re lat ionships, which is handled by ARTWORK. 
''MAPPING" and "PLANNING-
A l l problems involving the f inding and 
al locat ion of space for the making of 
individual elements in the drawing is handled 
by MAPPING, though i t s functions are not always 
heirarchical ly higher than those of PLANNING, 
which is responsible for the development of 
these individual f igures. Sometimes PLANNING 
may decide on a f igure and ask MAPPING to 
provide space, while at other times MAPPING may 
announce the existence of a space and then 
PLANNING w i l l decide what to do on the basis of 
i t s a v a i l a b i l i t y . Sometimes, indeed, MAPPING 
may override a PLANNING decision by announcing 
that an appropriate space is not avai lable. A 
good example of th is occurs when PLANNING 
decides to do something inside an exist ing 
closed f igure and MAPPING rules that there 
i s n ' t enough room, or that what there is is the 
wrong shape. 
MAPPING w i l l be referred to again in re la t ion 
to the data-structures which const i tute the 
program's internal representation of what i t is 
doing, and PLANNING also as one of the 
cent ra l ly important parts of the program. 
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LINES AND SECTORS 
Below t h i s level the heirarchical structure of 
the system is f a i r l y s t ra ight forward. Each 
f igure is the resu l t of (potent ia l ly ) several 
developments, each provided by a return of 
cont ro l to PLANNING. Each of these 
developments may consist of several l i nes , and 
for each of the successive l ines of each 
development of any f igure LINES must generate a 
s ta r t i ng point and an ending po in t , each having 
a d i r e c t i o n associated wi th i t ( f i g 6 ) . I t also 
generates a number of parameters on the basis 
nf specifications drawn Up in PLANNING which 
determine how the l i n e is to be drawn: whether 
reasonably s t ra i gh t , wiggly, or strongly 
curved, and, if various overlapping modes are 
ca l led for ( f i g 7 ) , how they are to be handled. 
As I have ind icated, l i nes are not drawn as the 
resu l t of a s ingle production. When LINES 
passes control to SECTORS the program does not 
know exactly where the l i ne w i l l go, since the 
constra int that it must s t a r t and end facing 
speci f ied d i rec t ions does not specify a path: 
there are an indeterminate number of paths 
which would sa t i s f y the const ra in t . The program 
does not choose one, it generates one. SECTORS 
produces a series of "imagined" p a r t i a l 
dest inat ions — signposts, as it were ( f i g 8) 
— each designed to br ing the l i ne closer to 
i t s f i na l end-state. On set t ing up each of 
these signposts it passes control to CURVES, 
whose funct ion is to generate a series of 
movements of the pen which w i l l make it veer 
towards, rather than actua l ly to reach, the 
current signpost. Control is passed back to 
SECTORS when the pen has gone far enough 
towards the current signpost that i t is time to 
look fur ther ahead, and it is passed back to 
LINES when the current l i n e has been completed 
and a new one is demanded by the development 
s t i l l i n progress. 
2.2 MOVEMENT CONTROL 
We are now down to the lowest level of the 
program, and to the way in which the curves 
which make up the drawing are ac tua l ly 
generated. This par t is not discontinuous from 
the res t , of course. The f l e x i b i l i t y of the 
program rests in large par t upon the fac t that 
the heirarchy of control extends downwards to 
the f inest-grained decisions: no par t of the 
contro l s t ructure is considered to be so 
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automatic that i t should f a l l below the 
interface l i n e . Thus, the story of how the pen 
gets moved around follows on from the 
descr ipt ion of how the intermediate signposts 
are set up. 
Abstract Displays and Real Devices 
In the ear l ie r versions of the program a l l the 
development work was done exclusively on a 
graphic d isp lay, and the "pen" was handled as 
an abstract , dimensionless en t i t y without 
real-world constraints upon i t s movements. 
Conceptually, however, I always thought of the 
problem of moving the pen from point A facing 
d i rec t ion alpha, to point B facing d i rec t i on 
beta, as being rather l i k e the task of d r iv ing 
a car o f f a main road in to a narrow driveway 
set at some known arb i t ra ry angle to i t . This 
is c lear ly not a dead-reckoning task for the 
human d r i ve r , but one which involves continuous 
feedback and a successive-approximation 
strategy. 
It seemed qui te reasonable, therefore, to be 
faced at some point wi th the problem of 
constructing an actual vehicle which would 
carry a real pen and make real drawings on real 
sheets of paper. That s i tua t ion arose in the 
Fal l of '76 when I was preparing to do the 
museum exhibi t ions which I mentioned e a r l i e r , 
and decided that if I wanted to make the 
drawing process v i s i b l e to a large number of 
people simultaneously, I would need to use 
something a good deal bigger than the usual 
graphic display wi th i t s 20-inch screen. 
The Tur t le , 
The answer turned out to be a small two-wheeled 
t u r t l e ( f ig 9 ) , each of i t s wheels 
independently driven by a stepping motor, so 
that the tu r t l e could be steered by stepping 
the two motors at appropriate rates, it is thus 
capable of drawing arcs of c i rc les whose radius 
depends upon the rat io of the two stepping 
rates. 
Since the two wheels can be driven at the same 
speed in opposite direct ions, the tu r t le can be 
spun around on the spot and headed off in a 
straight l i ne , so that th is kind of device is 
capable of simulating a conventional x-y 
p lo t te r . But it seemed ent i re ly unreasonable to 
have b u i l t a device which could be driven l i ke 
a car and then use it to simulate a p lo t ter . 
In consequence the pen-driving procedures 
already in the program were re-written to 
generate the stepping rates for the motors 
d i rec t l y — to stay as close as possible to the 
human model's performance — rather rather than 
calculating these rates as a function of 
decisions already made. 
The advantage here was a conceptual one, with 
some practical bonus in the fact that the 
t u r t l e does not spend a large part of i t s time 
spinning instead of drawing. It also turned out 
unexpectedly that the generating algorithm 
simpl i f ied enormously, and the quali ty of the 
freehand simulation improved noticeably. 
Feedback. 
The program does not now seek to any place — 
in cartesian terms — but concerns i t se l f 
exclusively with steering: thus the tu r t l e ' s 
cartesian posit ion at the end of executing a 
single command is not known in advance. Nor is 
th is calculat ion necessary when the tu r t le is 
operating in the real world. It was not 
designed as a precision drawing device, and 
since it cannot perform by dead-reckoning for 
long without accumulating errors, the principle 
of feedback operation was extended down into 
th is real-world part of the program. The device 
makes use of a sonar navigation system ( f ig 10) 
by means of which the program keeps track of 
where i t actually i s . Instead of te l l ing i t to 
"go to x,y" as one would t e l l a conventional 
p lo t te r , the program te l l s it ' 'do the following 
and then say where you are''. 
A more detailed account of the tu r t le system, 
and i t ' s ef fect upon the simulation of freehand 
drawing dynamics, is given in Appendix 1. 
f igure 10. 
2.3 "PLANNING" 
No single level of the program can be described 
adequately without reference to the other 
levels with which it interacts: i t has already 
been mentioned, for example, that MAPPING may 
either precede PLANNING in determining what is 
to be done next, or it may serve PLANNING by 
finding a space specified there. Addit ionally, 
any development determined in PLANNING may be 
modified subsequently either as a result of an 
imminent co l l i s ion with another figure or 
because provision exists in the program for 
"stacking" the current development in order to 
do something not or ig ina l ly envisaged ( f i g 
11a,b). A l l the same, the drawing is conceived 
predominantly as an agglomeration of f igures, 
and to that extent PLANNING, which is 
responsible for the development of individual 
f igures, is of central importance. 
Behavioral Protocols in Image-Making. 
Of the ent ire program, it is also the part 
least obviously related to the effects which it 
accomplishes. While the formal results of i t s 
actions are clear enough — an action cal l ing 
for the closure of a shape w i l l cause it to 
close, for example — it is not at a l l clear 
why those actions result in the speci f ical ly 
evocative qual i ty which the viewer experiences. 
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A rule-by ru le account of t h i s e f fec t is not 
appropriate, because the indiv idual rules do no 
more than implement conceptual e n t i t i e s — 
which I w i l l c a l l behavioral protocols 
— which are the fundamental uni ts from which 
the program is b u i l t . These protocols are 
never e x p l i c i t l y stated in the program, but 
the i r existence is what authorises the ru les . 
Thus, before describing in de ta i l what is in 
PLANNING I should give an account of the 
thinking which preceeded the wr i t ing of the 
program, and t r y to make clear what I mean by a 
protocol . 
Background. 
It is a matter of fac t that by far the greatest 
part of a l l the imagery to which we attach the 
name of "a r t " comes to us from cultures more or 
less remote from our own. It is also a matter 
of fac t that w i th in our own cu l tu re , and in 
re la t ion to i t s recent past, our understanding 
of imagery rest to a great extent upon pr ior 
common understandings, pr io r cu l tura l 
agreements, as to what is to stand for what — 
p r i o r , that is to say, to the viewing of any 
par t icu lar image. I t is un l ike ly that a 
Renaissance depict ion of the Cruc i f ix ion ("of 
Chr ist" being understood here by means of jus t 
such an agreement!) would carry any great 
weight of meaning if we were not already 
fami l iar both wi th the story of Chr ist and wi th 
the established conventions for dealing wi th 
the various parts of the story. Indeed, we 
might be qui te confused to f ind a depict ion of 
a beardless, curly-headed youth on the cross 
unless we happened to possess the now-abstruse 
knowledge that Chr ist was depicted that way — 
attaching a new set of meanings to the o ld 
convention for the representation of Dionysus 
— un t i l well into the 7th century. In general, 
we are no longer party to the agreements which 
make th i s form acceptable and understandable. 
We must evidently d is t inguish between what is 
understandable without abstruse knowledge — we 
can, indeed, recognise the f igure on the cross 
as a f igure — and what is understandable only 
by v i r tue of such knowledge. 
In the most general sense, a l l cu l tu ra l 
condit ions are remote from us, and d i f f e r only 
in the degree of the i r remoteness. We cannot 
rea l l y comprehend why the Egyptians made 
sphinxes, what Michelangelo thought the ancient 
world had in common with Chr i s t i an i t y , or how 
the internal combustion engine was viewed by 
the I t a l i a n Futur ists seventy years ago who 
wanted to tear down the museums in i t s honor. 
What abstruse knowledge we can gain by reading 
Michelangelo's wr i t i ngs , or the Futur is t 
Manifesto, does not place us in to the cu l tu ra l 
f igure 11a,b. 
environment in which the work is embedded. A 
cul ture is a contiuium, not a s ta t i c event: i t s 
understandings and meanings s h i f t constantly, 
and the i r survival may appear without close 
scrut iny to be largely a rb i t ra ry . In the 
extreme case, we f ind ourselves surrounded by 
the work of ear l ie r peoples so u t te r l y remote 
from us that we cannot pretend to know anything 
about the people themselves, much less about 
the meanings and purposes of their surviving 
images. 
The Paradox of Ins is tent Meaning fulness. 
There is an imp l i c i t paradox in the fact that 
we pers is t in regarding as meaningful — not on 
the basis of careful and scholarly detective 
work, but on a more d i r ec t l y confrontational 
basis — images whose or ig ina l meanings we 
cannot possibly know, including many that bear 
no e x p l i c i t l y visual resemblance to the things 
in the world. Presumably th i s state of a f f a i r s 
arises in part from a fundamental cu l tu ra l 
egocentrism — what, we ask, would we have 
intended by th i s image and the act of making 
i t ? — which is fundamentally d i s t o r t i v e . 
There has also been a par t icu lar confusion in 
t h i s century through the widespread acceptance 
of what we might ca l l the telecommunications 
model of our transactions through imagery, 
pa r t i cu la r l y since in applying that model no 
d i f f e ren t i a t i on has been observed between the 
cul ture we l i v e in and the cultures of the 
remote past. In the view of th i s model, 
o r ig ina l meanings have been encoded in the 
image, and the appearance of the image in the 
world ef fects the transmission of the meanings. 
Allowing for noise in the system — the 
i n e v i t a b i l i t y of which gives r ise to the 
not ion, in a r t theory, of " in terpre ta t ion" — 
the reception and decoding of the image makes 
the o r ig ina l meanings avai lable. 
However useful the model is as a basis for 
examining real telecommunication-like 
s i tua t ions , in which the intended meanings and 
the i r transformations can be known and tracked, 
it provides a general account of our 
transactions through images which is quite 
inadequate. The encoding and decoding of 
messages requires access to the same code-book 
by both the image-maker and the image-reader, 
and that code-book is precisely what is not 
carr ied across from one culture to another. 
I think it is clear also that the paradox of 
ins is ten t meaning fulness, as we might ca l l i t , 
const i tutes the normal condition of image-
mediated transactions, not an abnormal 
condit ion. It evidently extends below the level 
at which we can recognise the f igure , but not 
what the f igure stands fo r , since so much of 
the available imagery is not in any very 
obvious sense "representational" at a l l . The 
paradox is enacted every time we look at a few 
marks on a scrap of paper and proclaim them to 
be a face, when we know perfect ly well that 
they are nothing of the sor t . 
Cognitive Bases for Image Structure. 
In short, my tentat ive hypothesis in s tar t ing 
work on AARON was that a l l image-making and a l l 
image-reading is mediated by cognit ive 
processes of a rather low-level k ind, 
presumably processes by means of which we are 
able to cope also with the real world. In the 
absence of common cul tura l agreements these 
cognit ive processes would s t i l l unite image-
maker and image-viewer in a single transaction. 
On th is level — but not on the more complex 
culture-bound level of specif ic iconological 
in ten t iona l i t y — the viewer's egocentr ic i ty 
might be j u s t i f i e d , since he could correct ly 
ident i fy cognit ive processes of a famil iar kind 
in the making of the image. But l e t me de ta i l 
th is posi t ion with some care. I am not 
proposing that these processes make it possible 
for us to understand the intended meanings of 
some remotely-generated image: I am proposing 
that the intended meanings of the maker play 
only a re la t i ve ly small part in the sense of 
meaningfulness. That sense of meaningfulness is 
generated for us by the structure of the image 
rather than by i t s content. 
I hope I may be excused for dealing in so 
abbreviated a fashion with issues which are a 
good deal less than sel f -ev ident . The notion of 
non-enculturated behavior — and that notion 
lurks behind the last few paragraphs, obviously 
— is a suspect one, since a l l human behavior 
is enculturated to some degree: but my purpose 
was not to say what part of human behavior is 
dependent upon enculturating processes and what 
is not. It was simply to ident i fy some of the 
determinants to a general image-structure which 
could be seen to be common to a wide range of 
enculturating patterns. The implication seemed 
strong — and s t i l l does — that the minimum 
condit ion for generating a sense of 
meaningfulness did not need to include the 
assumption of an intent to communicate: that 
the exercise of an appropriate set of these 
cognit ive processes would i t s e l f be su f f i c ien t 
to generate a sense of meaningfulness. 
Cognitive S k i l l s , 
The task then was to define a sui table set. I 
have no doubt that the options are wide, and 
that my own choices are not exclusive. I chose 
at the outset to include: 
1. the a b i l i t y to d i f f e ren t i a te between 
f igure and ground, 
2. the a b i l i t y to d i f f e ren t i a te between 
open and closed forms, and 
3. the a b i l i t y to d i f f e ren t i a te between 
insideness and outsideness (note 6 ) . 
AARON has developed a good deal from that 
s ta r t ing po in t , and some of i t s current 
a b i l i t i e s c lear l y r e f l e c t highly enculturated 
patterns of behavior. For example, the program 
is now able to shade f igures in a mode 
d i s t i n c t l y l inked to Renaissance and post-
Renaissance representational modes: other 
cul tures have not concerned themselves wi th the 
f a l l of l i g h t on the surfaces of objects in the 
same way. Nevertheless, a large part of the 
program is involved s t i l l in demonstrating i t s 
awareness of the more p r im i t i ve 
d i f f e ren t i a t i ons . 
Protocols and Rules. 
Against th i s background, I use the term 
protocol to mean the procedural ins tan t ia t ion 
of a formal awareness. This is c lear ly a 
defination which rests upon cogni t ive, rather 
than perceptual, modes, since it involves the 
awareness of re la t iona l structures. Thus, for 
example, the program's a b i l i t y to d i f f e ren t i a te 
between form and ground makes possible an 
awareness of the spat ia l relat ionships between 
forms, and generates f i n a l l y a set of avoidance 
protocols, the funct ion of which is to proh ib i t 
the program from ignoring the existence of one 
f igure in drawing another one. The protocols 
themselves are not e x p l i c i t l y present in the 
program, and are manifested only through the i r 
enactment by the rules which describe what to 
do in par t icu lar circimstances where the 
overlapping of f igures is threatened. 
Figure Development 
In keeping wi th the heirarchical st ructur ing 
which informs the program as a whole, PLANNING 
considers a f igure to be the resu l t of a number 
of developments, each determined in part by 
what has gone before. The program enacts a 
number of repe t i t i on protocols, and a single 
development in the making of a f igure can of ten 
involve the repe t i t i on of a single act ion ( f i g 
12), rather than the agglomeration of d i f f e ren t 
act ions. The f i r s t productions to deal wi th 
the f i r s t development of any f igure decide, on 
the basis of frequency considerations, that 
t h i s f igure w i l l be closed, that i t w i l l be 
open, or that it w i l l be, for the moment, 
''unconmitted" — that i s , a l i ne or a complex 
of l ines w i l l be drawn, but only at a la ter 
stage w i l l it be decided whether or not to 
close. I f the primary decision is for c losure, 
then PLACING w i l l decide between a number of 
opt ions, mostly having to do wi th size and 
shape — MAPPING permitt ing — and wi th 
conf igurat ion. In some cases it w i l l not 
actual ly draw the boundary of a closed form at 
a l l , and w i l l leave the d e f i n i t i o n of the 
occupied space to await subsequent space­
f i l l i n g moves. 
If the decision is for a non-closed form, then 
again a number of options are open. In both 
cases the avai lable options are stated largely 
in terms of repe t i t ion protocols, the enactment 
of which determines the formal character is t ics 
of the resul t ing conf igurat ion. These 
character is t ics are not uniquely de f in ing , 
however, and a number of d i f f e ren t formal sub­
groups may resul t from a single repe t i t i on 
protocol and i t s ru les . For example, one such 
protoco l , involving a single l i ne in t h i s case, 
requires the l i ne to move a given distance 
(more-or-less) and then change d i r e c t i o n , 
continuing t h i s cycle a given number of times. 
A l l the f igures marked in ( f i g 13) resu l t from 
t h i s : the de ta i l s of implementation in the 
indiv idual cases are responsive to thei r unique 
environmental condi t ions, and in any case may 
be changed at any point by the overr iding 
avoidance pro toco l , which guarantees the 
t e r r i t o r i a l i n teg r i t y o f ex is t ing f igures. 
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Thus the program w i l l know at the beginning of 
each development what the current intent ion i s , 
but w i l l not know what shape w i l l resu l t . A 
closed form generated by a "go, turn, repeat" 
cycle may in fact turn out to be extremely long 
and narrow ( f i g 14), and a number of second 
developments associated with a closed-form 
f i r s t development w i l l then be unavailable: 
there w i l l be a l i m i t , for example, upon what 
can be drawn inside i t , though it may develop 
in other ways, as th i s one does. 
P ro l i f e ra t i on . 
Even with constraints of th is sort there is a 
s ign i f i can t p ro l i f e ra t ion in the number of 
productions associated with the second 
development of any f igure . A typical f i r s t 
development might be i n i t i a ted by: 
It ( th is is a f i r s t development 
and the las t f igure was open 
and at least n f igures have been done 
and at least q of them were open 
and at least t uni ts of space are now 
available) 
Then 
This f igure w i l l be closed 
specif icat ions for repet i t ion 
specif icat ions for configuration 
to move on from th i s point : 
If ( th is is a second development 
and the f i r s t was closed 
and i t s properties were 
a. (size) 
b. (proportions) 
c. (complexity) 
f igure 14. 
i 
f igure 13. 
d. (proximity to . . . ) 
Then either 
1 . div ide i t 
. . . specif icat ions . . . 
or 
2. shade i t 
. . . spec i f i ca t ions . . . 
or 
3. add a closed form to it 
. . . spec i f i ca t ions . . . 
4. do a closed form inside 
. . . spec i f i ca t ions . . . 
or 
5. do an open form inside 
. . . spec i f i ca t ions . . . 
This is a prototype for an expanding class of 
productions, each responding to a d i f fe rent 
combination of properties in the f i r s t 
development. Simi lar ly , continuation w i l l 
requ i re . . . 
If ( th is is a th i rd development 
and the f i r s t was a closed form 
. . . propert ies. . . 
and the second was a closed form 
. . . proper t ies. . . ) 
Then 
shade the ent i re f igure: 
specif icat ion 1: 
a boulder with a hole in it 
or 
specif icat ion 2: 
a f l a t shape with a hole 
or 
specif icat ion 3: 
a penumbra. 
If ( th is is a th i rd development 
and the f i r s t was closed 
and the second was a series of 
paral le l l ines inside i t . . . 
and the remaining inside space is at 
least s . . . ) 
Then 
do another series of l ines: 
specif icat ion 1: 
perpendicular to f i r s t 
or 
specif icat ion 2: 
alongside the f i r s t . . . 
• • 
f igure 15. 
or 
specif icat ion 3: 
do a closed form in available 
space... 
(note 7 ) . 
The Relationship of Closed Forms and Open 
Forms. 
The same pro l i fe ra t ion of options occurs for 
open-lined structures also, but not to the same 
degree. One of the interesting things to come 
out of th is program is the fact that open-line 
structures appear to function quite d i f fe ren t l y 
when they are alone in an image than when they 
appear in the presence of closed forms. There 
seems to be no doubt that closed forms exert a 
special authority in an image — perhaps 
because they appear to refer to objects — and 
in their presence open-lined structures which 
in other circumstances might exert similar 
pressure on the viewer are relegated to a sort 
of spatial connective-tissue funct ion. A 
similar context-dependancy is manifested when 
material is presented inside a closed form ( f i g 
15): it is "adopted", and becomes either a 
de ta i l of the form, or markings upon i t . This 
seems to depend upon part icular configurational 
issues, and especially the scale relat ionship 
between the "parent" form and the newly 
introduced mater ial . This manifestation is 
important, I believe, in understanding why we 
are able to recognise as "faces" so wide a 
range of closed forms with an equally wide 
range of internal markings following only a 
very loose d is t r ibu t ion speci f icat ion. 
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Limits on Development. 
At the present time no f igure in the program 
goes beyond three developments, and few go that 
f a r , for a number of reasons. In the f i r s t 
place, most of the (formal) behavior patterns 
in the program were i n i t i a l l y intended to model 
a qui te p r im i t i ve level of cognit ive 
performance, and for most of these a single 
development is actual ly adequate. Once a z ig ­
zag l i ne has been generated, repe t i t i on , for 
example — as it is found in exist ing pr imi t ive 
models — seems l imi ted to those shown in ( f i g 
16). 
It has remained qui te d i f f i c u l t to come up with 
new material general enough for the purposes of 
the program. It is the general i ty of the 
protocols which guarantees the general i ty of 
the whole, and new material is i n i t i a ted by the 
introduct ion of new protocols. On the level of 
the procedures which carry out the action parts 
of the subsequently-developed productions, the 
approach has been to avoid accumulation of 
special routines to do special things. There is 
only one single procedure adapting the 
protocols of repet i t ion and reversal to the 
generation of a range of zigzag-l ike forms, for 
example ( f i g 13). 
But there has been another, and equally 
s ign i f i can t reason, for the l im i ta t i on upon 
permissible developments. It is the lack of 
adequate, and adequately important, 
d i f fe ren t ia t ions in the exist ing f igures. For 
the pr imi t i ve model represented by the ear l ie r 
states of the program it was almost enough to 
have a set of a b i l i t i e s cal led up by the most 
perfunctory consideration of the current state 
of the drawing: the stress was on the 
de f i n i t i on of a suitable set of a b i l i t i e s (as 
represented by the right-hand parts of the 
productions), and as it turned out it was qui te 
d i f f i c u l t to exercise those a b i l i t i e s without 
generating moderately interest ing resu l ts . But 
for a more sophisticated model it is c lear ly 
not enough merely to extend that set of 
a b i l i t i e s , and the problem of determining why 
the program should do th is rather than that 
becomes more pressing. 
The l im i t a t i on here can be considered in two 
ways. One is that I had reached the point of 
exhausting temporarily my own insights into the 
image-building process. The other is that I had 
not made provision in the f i r s t versions of the 
program for being able to recognise the kind of 
d i f fe ren t ia t ions I would want to deal wi th — 
since I could not know at the outset what they 
were going to be — and thus lacked a structure 
for developing new ins ights. This leads to a 
consideration of my next topic: how the program 
builds i t s own representation of what it has 
done up to any point in the making of the 
drawing. 
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2.4 INTERNAL REPRESENTATION 
In the ear l i e r stages of the development of the 
program, provision had been made for 
progressive access to the information stored in 
the data-st ructure, fol lowing the pr inc ipa l 
that it should not have to access more than it 
actual ly needed for the making of any 
par t icu lar decis ion. In pract ise, a great deal 
more was stored than was ever accessed. At the 
f i r s t level of de ta i l the program made use of a 
qu i te coarse matrix representation, in each 
c e l l of which was stored an i den t i f i e r for the 
f igure which occupied i t , and a number of codes 
which designated the various events which might 
have occurred in i t : a l i ne belonging to a 
closed form, a l i ne belonging to an open form, 
a l i n e junc t ion , an unused space inside a 
closed f igure , and so on. Obviously, it was 
not possible to record a great deal in t h i s 
way, and data concerning the connect iv i ty of 
the f igure in par t icu lar required a second 
level of the s t ructure. 
This was an unpleasantly elaborate l i n k e d - l i s t 
structure of an orthodox k ind. By d e f i n i t i o n , 
the kind of drawing AARON makes is not merely a 
growing, but a continuously-changing, 
s t ruc ture . What was a point on a l i ne becomes a 
node when another l i ne intersects i t , and th is 
change has to be recorded by updating the 
ex is t ing s t ruc ture, which must now idea l l y show 
the four paths connecting th i s node to four 
adjacent nodes. 
Both updating t h i s structure and accessing the 
information contained wi th in it proved to be 
qu i te tiresome, and the scheme was never 
general enough to admit of further development. 
As a resu l t , it was used less and less , and 
decision -making has been based almost 
exclusively on the information contained in the 
matrix on the one hand, and in a th i rd level of 
the s t ruc ture , a simple p roper ty - l i s t attaching 
to each f i gu re , on the other. The most 
surpr is ing thing about th i s s imp l is t i c and 
d i s t i n c t l y ad-hoc scheme is that it was 
actual ly qu i te adequate to the needs of the 
program. 
Exp l i c i t Data and Imp l i c i t Data. 
Human beings presumably get f i r s t -o rder 
information about a p icture by looking at the 
p ic tu re . I have always found it qui te 
f rus t ra t ing that the program couldn ' t do the 
same th ing : not because it made any di f ference 
to the program, but because it made it 
d i f f i c u l t for me to think about the kind of 
issues I believed to be s ign i f i can t . Part of 
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the problem of using a l i n k e d - l i s t structure to 
represent the connect iv i ty of a f i gu re , for 
example, derived from the fact that 
connect iv i ty had to be e x p l i c i t l y recorded as 
it happened: it would have been much too 
d i f f i c u l t to traverse a structure of t h i s kind 
post-hoc in order to discover facts about 
connect iv i ty . If one could traverse the f igure 
the way the eye does — loosely speaking! — it 
would not be necessary to give so much 
at tent ion to recording e x p l i c i t l y a l l the data 
in the world without regard for whether i t 
would ever be looked at again. 
In short , the primary decision to be made was 
whether to accept the absolute non-s imi lar i ty 
of p ic ture and representation as given, devise 
a more sophisticated l i s t - s t r uc tu re and drop 
the matrix representation altogether, or to 
drop the l i s t - s t r u c t u r e and develop the matrix 
representation to the point where it could be 
very eas i ly traversed to generate information 
which was imp l i c i t w i th in i t . I opted for the 
l a t t e r . A descr ipt ion is included in Appendix 
2, though at the time of wr i t i ng (December '78) 
the implementation is not yet complete. 
2.5 The FUNCTION Of RANDOMNESS. 
This section does not deal wi th any single part 
of AARON: randomness is an act ive decision­
making pr inc ip le throughout the program, and I 
think it is important to say why that is the 
case. As a preface, it might be worth recording 
that beyond the l i m i t s of a mathematically 
sophisticated community most people evidently 
view randomness in a thoroughly absolut is t 
fashion, and as the opposite to an equally 
absolute determinism. There is a f i rmly-held 
popular be l ie f that a machine ei ther does 
exactly what it has been programmed to do, or 
it acts "randomly". The fact that AARON 
produces non-random drawings, which i t s 
programmer has never seen, has given many 
people a good deal of t rouble. 
What I mean by "randomness" is the 
imposs ib i l i ty of predict ing the outcome of a 
choice on the basis of previously-made choices. 
I t fo l lows, of course, that "randomness", in 
t h i s sense, can never be absolute: if the 
domain of choice is the set of pos i t ive 
integers, one must be able to predict that the 
outcome w i l l be a posi t ive integer, not a cow 
or a co lor . In AARON the domain of choice is 
always a great deal more constrained than tha t , 
however. The coro l lary to the notion of 
randomness as a decision-making pr inc ip le is 
the precise del ineat ion of the choice space: in 
pract ice, the introduction into the program of 
a new decision character is t ica l ly involves the 
set t ing of rather wide l i m i t s , which are then 
gradually brought in u n t i l the range is quite 
smal l . 
Randomness by Design and by Default . 
AI researchers in more demonstrably goal-
oriented f i e lds of in te l lec tua l a c t i v i t y must 
obviously spend much time and e f f o r t in t ry ing 
to bring to the surface performance rules which 
the expert must surely have, since he performs 
so w e l l . I am not in a posi t ion to know to what 
extent "Let 's t r y x" would const i tute a 
powerful ru le in other a c t i v i t i e s : I am 
convinced that it is a very powerful rule 
indeed in art-making, and more generally in 
what we ca l l creat ive behavior, provided that 
"x" is a member of a r igorously constrained 
set . 
A number of a r t i s t s in th i s century — perhaps 
more in music than in the visual ar ts — have 
del iberate ly and consciously employed 
randomising procedures: tossing coins, r o l l i ng 
d ice , disposing the parts of a sculpture by 
throwing them on the f l oo r , and so on. But th i s 
simply derives a strategy from a p r inc ip le , and 
examples of both can be found at almost any 
point in h is tory . I t is almost a truism in the 
trade that great co lo r i s ts use d i r t y brushes. 
Leonardo recommended that the d i f f i c u l t y of 
s tar t ing a new paint ing on a clean panel — 
every painter knows how hard that f i r s t mark is 
to make — could be overcome by throwing a 
d i r t y sponge at it (note 8 ) . But one suspects 
that Leonardo got to be pret ty good with the 
sponge! An a r t i s t l i k e Rubens would himself 
only paint the heads and hands in h is f igure 
compositions, leaving the clothing to one 
assistant , the landscape to another, and so on. 
A l l the assistants were h ighly-qual i f ied 
a r t i s t s in thei r own r i g h t , however. The 
process was not unl ike the workings of a modern 
f i l m crew: the delegation of responsib i l i ty 
reduces the d i rec to r ' s d i rec t con t ro l , and 
randomises the implementation of h is 
in tent ions, while the expertise and commonly-
held concerns of the crew provide the l i m i t s 
(note 9 ) . 
Randomising in the Program: Rules and Meta­
ru les. 
For the hunan a r t i s t , then, randomising is not 
unconstrained, and therefore cannot be 
characterised by the rule " I f you don' t know 
what to do, do anything". Rather, one suspects 
the existence of a meta-rule which says, 
"precisely define a space wi th in which any 
choice w i l l do exactly as wel l as any other 
choice". In AARON, the implementation of the 
low-order ru le has the fol lowing form: 
(a and b and . . .n) 
Then 
p% of the time do (x) ; 
q% of the time do (y) ; 
r% of the time do (z) ; 
which f i l l s out the descr ipt ion of the format 
discussed in PLANNING. The same frequency-
control led format is used wi th in the act ion 
part of a production in determining 
speci f icat ions: 
make a closed loop: 
speci f icat ion 1: number of sides 
50% of the time, 2 sides (simple loop) 
32% of the time, 3 sides 
• • • 
speci f icat ion 2: proportion 
50% of the time, between 1:4 and 1:6 
12% of the time, between 3:4 and 7:8 
• • • 
speci f icat ion 3. 
AARON has only the simplest form of these 
meta-rules, which are used to determine the 
bounds of the choice space: 
i f (a ) lowbound is La, highbound is Ha 
i f (b ) lowbound is Lb, highbound is Hb 
i f (n ) lowbound is Ln, highbound is Hn 
speci f icat ion taken randomly between 
lowbound and higbound 
where a,b,n are varying conditions in the state 
of the drawing. No consistent attempt has been 
made to develop more sophisticated meta-rules. 
In the f i na l analysis, the existence of such 
rules implies a judgemental view of the task at 
hand, and they are consequently beyond the 
scope of a program l i ke AARON, which is not a 
learning program and has no idea whether it is 
doing well or badly. 
The Value of Randomness. 
What does randomness do for the image-maker? 
Pr imar i ly , I believe i t s function is to produce 
p ro l i f e ra t i on of the decision space without 
requir ing the a r t i s t to " invent" constantly. 
One resu l t of that function is obviously the 
generation of a much greater nunber of d iscreet 
terminations than would otherwise be possible, 
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and consequently the sense that the ru le-set is 
a great deal more complex than is actual ly the 
case. A second resu l t is that the a r t i s t faces 
himself constantly wi th unfamil iar s i tuat ions 
rather than fol lowing the same path unendingly, 
and is obliged to pay more a t ten t ion , to work 
harder to resolve unanticipated juxtaposi t ions. 
It is a device for enforcing h is own heightened 
par t i c ipa t ion in the generating process. 
This l as t might seem less important in AARON: 
the program's a t tent ion is absolute, af ter a l l . 
But for the viewer the fac t that AARON 
exercises the function is qui te important. 
There is one level of our transactions wi th 
images on which we respond wi th some astuteness 
to what is actual ly there. The fact that AARON 
l i t e r a l l y makes decisions every few 
microseconds — not binary decisions only, but 
also concerning quant i ta t ive speci f icat ions — 
shows c lear ly in the continuously changing 
d i rec t ion of the l i n e , in every nuance of 
shape, and succeeds in convincing the viewer 
that there i s , indeed, an i n t e l l i g e n t process 
at work behind the making of the drawings. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
=================== 
AARON produces drawings of an evocative k ind. 
It does so without user in tervent ion; without 
recourse to user-provided data; and without the 
reperto i re of transformational manipulations 
normal to "computer graphics". It remains now, 
if not to propose a coherent theory of image-
making, at least to pu l l together those 
fragments of explanation already given into 
something resembling a plausible account of why 
AARON works. 
This w i l l be largely a matter of put t ing things 
in the r i gh t places. 
Art-making and Image-making 
F i r s t : no adequate j u s t i f i c a t i o n has yet been 
given for the many references to a r t and a r t -
making, as opposed to images and image-making, 
beyond saying that the f i r s t are a special case 
of the second. What makes them special? 
Ar t is a b i t l i k e t r u t h . Every cul ture has, and 
acts ou t , the convict ion that t ru th and a r t 
e x i s t , no two cul tures w i l l necessarily agree 
about what they are. There is no doubt, for 
example, that we use the word "a r t " to denote 
a c t i v i t i e s in other cul tures qui te unl ike what 
our own a r t i s t s do today, for the qui te 
inadequate reason that those ear l ie r acts have 
resulted in objects which we choose to regard 
as a r t objects. I f i t i s surpr is ingly d i f f i c u l t 
to say what a r t i s , i t is not only because i t 
is never the same for very long, but also 
because we evident ly have no choice but to say 
what i t is for us. 
A l l the same, no j u s t i f i c a t i o n is possible for 
making reference to i t without attempting to 
say — once again! — what it i s , and doing so 
in terms general enough to cover the greatest 
number of examples. Also, those terms should do 
something to account for the extraordinary 
persistence of the idea of a r t , which 
transcends a l l of i t s many examples. 
B r i e f l y , my view is that th i s persistence stems 
from a persistent and fundamental aspect of the 
mind i t s e l f . It would be stat ing the obvious 
here to propose that the mind may be regarded 
as a symbol processor of power and f l e x i b i l i t y . 
I w i l l propose, rather , to regard it as devoted 
pr imar i ly to establ ishing symbolic 
re lat ionships: to attaching signif icance to 
events, and asserting that t h i s stands for 
tha t . This i s , surely, a large part of what we 
mean by understanding. 
As for a r t : in i t s spec i f i ca l l y cu l tu ra l 
aspects a r t external ises speci f ic assertions — 
the number three stands for the perfect ion of 
God, the racing car stands for the s p i r i t of 
modern man, the swastika stands for the semi-
mythical migrations of the Hopi people, or for 
a number of other things in a number of other 
cu l tu res . But on a deeper l e v e l , a r t is an 
elaborate and sophisticated game played around 
the curious fac t that w i th in the mind things 
can stand for other th ings. it is almost always 
characterised by a deep preoccupation wi th the 
structures of standing-for-ness, and a 
fascinat ion wi th the apparently endless 
d i ve rs i t y of which those structures are 
capable. What we see in the museums resul ts 
from a complex interweaving of the highly 
individuated and the highly enculturated, and 
in consequence any single manifestation is 
bound f i rmly to the cul ture w i th in which it was 
generated: or it is rehabi l i ta ted to serve new 
ends in a new cu l tu re . But u l t imate ly , a r t 
i t s e l f , as opposed to i t s manifestat ions, is 
universal because it is a celebrat ion of the 
human mind i t s e l f . 
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The Embeddedness of Knowledge 
Second: much of what has come out of the 
wr i t i ng of AARON has to be regarded simply as 
extensions to the body of knowledge which the 
program was intended to external ise. Writ ing it 
was not merely a demonstrative undertaking, and 
it is far from clear what has been raised to 
the surface and what newly discovered. I have 
regarded the program as an invest igat ive t o o l , 
though for present purposes the d i s t i nc t i on is 
not important. 
It remains impossible to give an adequate 
account of t h i s knowledge other than by 
reference to the program i t s e l f . There are 
several reasons for t h i s . In the f i r s t place, 
t h i s knowledge does not present i t s e l f 
i n i t i a l l y as predominantly prescr ip t ive . The 
f i r s t i n t u i t i o n of i t s existence comes in the 
form of an awareness that an issue — closure, 
r epe t i t i on , spat ia l d i s t r i bu t i on — is 
s i gn i f i can t : the program should be structured 
in terms of that issue, as wel l as in terms of 
a l l the other issues already contained. In t h i s 
sense the l e f t parts of the productions might 
eventually be taken together to represent the 
set of issues which AARON believes to be worth 
attending to in the making of an image. But 
th i s stage comes much l a t e r , and by th i s time 
an indiv idual production functions as part of a 
fabr ic of issues, wi th so many threads tying it 
to so many knowledge sources, that a one-to-one 
account of how it achieves i t s e f fec t is 
general ly out of the question. 
In fac t , there is only a single example I can 
ca l l to mind in which an ef fect can be ascribed 
wi th cer ta in ty to a single production: a 
par t icu lar class of junct ion in a meandering 
horizontal l i ne w i l l i n f a l l i b l y generate strong 
landscape reference, though only if the 
branching at the junct ion goes o f f on the lower 
side of the l i ne ( f i g 17). This degree of 
s p e c i f i c i t y is cer ta in ly exceptional, but less 
powerful as an evocator rather than more so. 
In general, t h i s par t icu lar class of junct ion 
— it is more easi ly characterised v isua l l y 
than verbal ly — tends strongly to denote 
spat ial overlap: but the speci f ic e f fec t is 
evidently qui te context-dependant, and 
dependant also upon the precise configurat ion 
of the junct ion i t s e l f . 
"Personality" as a Function of Complexity. 
At the higher end of the scale of e f fec ts , the 
problem of saying what causes what becomes more 
d i f f i c u l t s t i l l . I have never been able to 
understand how there can be such general 
agreement about the "personal i ty" which AARON'S 
drawings pro ject , or why that "personal i ty" 
appears to be l i k e my own in a number of 
respects. Personality has never been an issue 
on the conscious level of wr i t ing code, and I 
know of nothing in the program to account for 
i t . Tb put the problem another way, I would not 
know how to go about changing the program to 
project a d i f f e ren t "personal i ty" . 
I assume that the personality projected by an 
image is simply a part of a continuous spectrum 
of pro ject ion, not dist inguishable in type from 
any other par t . But I am forced now to the 
conclusion that these more elusive elements of 
evocation — personali ty is only one of them, 
presumably — are generated out of the 
complexity of the program as a whole, and not 
from the act ion of program pa7ts: that given an 
adequate level of complexity any program w i l l 
develop a "personal i ty" . This "personal i ty" may 
be more or less clear in individual cases, and 
may perhaps depend upon how many people have 
worked on the program — AARON is almost 
exclusively my own work — but it w i l l in any 
case be a function of the program, and outside 
the w i l l f u l control of the programmer. I f th i s 
is the case it seems extremely unl ike ly that 
any complete causal account of the workings of 
a program would ever be possible. 
The Continuousness of Image-making and 
and image reading 
Thi rd: I want to return to the question which 
l i e s at the root of t h i s work. What const i tutes 
a minimum condit ion under which a set of marks 
w i l l function as an image? 
The reader w i l l have noted that much of what 
has been wr i t ten here appears to bear as much 
upon the business of image-reading as it does 
upon image-making. There is no cont rad ic t ion: 
the central issue being addressed is the 
image-mediated transaction i t s e l f , and image-
making in par t icu lar has no meaningful, or 
examinable, existence outside of that 
transaction. Knowledge about image-making _is 
knowledge about image-reading: both rest upon 
the same cognitive processes. Thus the sk i l led 
a r t i s t does not need to enquire what the viewer 
sees in his work: the sat isfact ion of his own 
requirements guarantees it a reading in the 
world, and the exp l i c i t individual readings 
which it w i l l have are irrelevant to him. The 
trainee a r t i s t , the student, on the other hand, 
frequently responds to his teacher's reading of 
h is work by object ing, "You're not supposed to 
see it that way", evidently unaware that the 
reading does not y ie ld to conscious cont ro l . 
Lack of s k i l l in image-making more often than 
not involves a fa i lu re to discern the 
difference between what is in the image-maker's 
mind and what he has actual ly put on the 
canvas. 
It is equally t rue, I believe, that image-
reading has no meaningful existence outside the 
transactional context: not because the whole 
event is always present — it almost never is 
— but because every act of image-reading is 
i n i t i a ted by the unspoken assertion "What I see 
is the result of a w i l l f u l himan act" . That is 
a part of what we mean by the word "image". 
However much we may amuse ourselves seeing 
dinosaurs in clouds or dragons in the 
f i rep lace, we have no d i f f i c u l t y in 
d i f fe rent ia t ing between marks and shapes made 
by man, and marks and shapes made by nature, 
and we do not hesitate to assign meaning in the 
one case where we deny it in the other: unless 
we belong to a culture with a more animistic 
at t i tude to nature than th is one has. 
In short, I believe that the f i r s t requirement 
of the condition in the question is the 
undenied assumption of human w i l l (note 10). 
The rest of the condition is given by the 
display of behavior which draws attent ion to a 
part icular group of cognitive elements. In 
other words, evidence of cognitive process may 
be substituted for the results of an act of 
cognit ion. An actual desire to communicate — 
which may include the simple desire to record 
the appearance of the world — is not a 
necessary condit ion. 
AARON's strength l i e s in the fact that i t is 
designed to operate w i th in , and feed in to , the 
transactional context, not to reproduce the 
aesthetic qua l i t ies of exist ing ar t objects. I t 
takes f u l l advantage of the viewers' 
predispositions and does nothing to disabuse 
them: indeed, it might f a i r l y be judged that 
some parts >f the program — the simulation of 
freehand dynamics, for example — are aimed 
pr imari ly at sustaining an i l l us ion (note 11). 
But the i l l us ion can only be sustained f u l l y by 
sat isfying the conditions given above, and once 
that is accomplished the transactions which i t s 
drawings generate are rea l , not i l l usory . Like 
i t s human counterpart, AARON succeeds in 
delineating a meaning-space for the viewer, and 
as in any normal transaction not t o ta l l y 
prescribed by pr ior cul tural agreements, the 
viewer provides plausible meanings. 
Standing-for-ness. 
Fourthly: there is a multitude of ways in which 
something can stand for something else, and in 
adopting the general term "standing-for-ness" I 
intended for the moment to avoid the excess 
meanings which c l ing to words l i ke "symbol", 
" re fer rent" , "metaphor", "s ign" , and so on: 
words which abound in ar t theory and ar t 
h istory. An image, I have said, is something 
which stands for something else, and of course 
it is quite p la in that I have been discussing 
only a very small subset of such things. 
What are the defining characterist ics of th is 
subset? 
Before attempting to answer that question, it 
should be noted that , while AARON's performance 
is based upon vis ion-speci f ic cognitive modes 
(note 12), there are two closely related 
questions which cannot be asked about AARON at 
a l l . 
Images of the World and i t s Objects. 
The f i r s t of these has to do with the fact that 
in the real world people make images of things. 
How do people decide what marks to make in 
re lat ion to those things? 
It is d i f f i c u l t to avoid the conclusion that 
image-making as a whole is vision-based, even 
though it bears d i rec t l y on the issue of 
appearances only occasionally. It is my bel ief 
that even when an image is not purposively 
referent ia l — as is the case with AARON — or 
when the a r t i s t seeks to refer to some element 
of experience which has no visual counterpart, 
i t is his a b i l i t y to echo the structure of 
visual experience which gives the image i t s 
p laus ib i l i t y (note 13). 
The Persistence of Motifs 
The second question has to do with the fact 
that actual image elements, mot i fs, have been 
used over and over again throughout human 
history, appearing in t o ta l l y disconnected 
cul tura l sett ings, and bearing quite d i f fe ren t 
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meanings as they do so. What is it that makes 
the zigzag, the cross, the swastika, squares, 
t r iang les , sp i ra l s , mandalas, para l le l l i nes , 
combs ( f i g 18), ubiquitous, so desirable as 
imagist ic raw material? 
My own answer to t h i s question is that the 
cogni t ive modes and thei r dependant behavioral 
protocols are absolutely ubiquitous, and that 
the recurring appearance of these mot i fs is 
f igure 19. 
hardly even surpr is ing (note 14). In f ac t , we 
have only to s ta r t cataloguing the mot i fs to 
rea l ize that most of them are simply formed 
through the combination of simple procedures. 
The swastika, for example, is both cross and 
zigzag, jus t as the mandala is cross and closed 
form, and the so-called diamond-backed 
ratt lesnake moti f of the Cal i forn ian Indians is 
a symmetrically repeated zigzag ( f i g 19). 
Taken together, these two questions point to 
the dua l i s t i c nature of image-making. I f , as I 
believe to be the case, it can be shown that 
the representation of the world and i t s objects 
by means of images fol lows the same cogni t ion-
bound procedures as the simpler images I have 
been discussing, then it w i l l be clear that the 
form of an image is a funct ion both of what is 
presented to the eye and of the possession of 
appropriate modes. 
Representation. 
I said at the outset that my conclusions would 
bear upon the nature of visual representation, 
as d i s t i n c t from what the Al/Cognit ive Science 
community means by the word ' ' representat ion". 
It is s t i l l the case that my speci f ic concerns 
are wi th what people do when they make marks on 
f l a t surfaces to represent what they see, or 
think they see, in the wor ld. A l l the same, 
some speculation is j u s t i f i e d about possible 
correspondences between the two uses of the 
word. 
I t is important, for example, to note that the 
l ines which the a r t i s t draws to represent the 
ou t l ine of an object do not actual ly correspond 
to i t s edges, in the sense that an edge-finding 
algorithm w i l l replace an abrupt tonal 
d iscont inu i ty wi th a l i n e . In f ac t , the edges 
of an object in the real world are almost never 
delineated by an unbroken s t r ing of abrupt 
tonal d i scon t inu i t i es . I f the a r t i s t i s 
unperturbed by the disappearance of the edge, 
i t is l i k e l y to be because he i s n ' t using that 
edge, rather than because he has some e f f i c i e n t 
algorithm for f i l l i n g in the gaps. S imi la r l y , 
most of the objects in the world are occluded 
by other objects, yet i t would not normally 
occur to the a r t i s t that the shape of a face is 
the part l e f t v i s i b l e by an occluding hand ( f i g 
20). 
f igure 20. 
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The face ev ident ly ex is ts for him as a 
cogn i t i ve u n i t , and w i l l be recorded by means 
of whatever s t ra teg ies are appropriate and 
avai lab le for the representation (note 15). 
I t is as true to your meaning of 
" representat ion" as to mine, not only that i t 
res ts upon the possession of appropriate and 
avai lab le s t ra teg ies , but also that new 
s t ra teg ies may be developed to f i t par t i cu la r 
concerns. Both are bound by en t i t y - spec i f i c 
considerat ions, however: considerat ions, that 
is to say, which are independant of the 
par t i cu la r event or object being represented 
and take the i r form from the underlying 
s t ructures of the e n t i t y — the a r t i s t ' s 
cogn i t ive modes on the one hand and the 
s t ruc tu ra l i n t e g r i t y of a computer program on 
the o ther . 
What is a Representation "Like"? 
It could not be ser iously maintained that a 
computer program is " l i k e " a human being in a 
general sense, and it should not be necessary 
to po in t out that a representation in my 
meaning of the word is not " l i k e " the thing 
represented, other than in precisely defined 
senses of l ikeness. That may not be qu i te 
obvious, however, when we consider the idea 
tha t a p o r t r a i t is " l i k e " the s i t t e r . Even 
though we may be careful enough to say that the 
p o r t r a i t LOOKS l i k e the s i t t e r , or that a 
musical passage SOUNDS l i k e the rus t l i ng of 
leaves, we tend to stop short of that level of 
d e t a i l at which i t becomes clear that the 
appearance of a painted p o r t r a i t and the 
appearance of a person actua l ly have very 
l i t t l e in common. A representation may be about 
appearance, but we never confuse the 
representat ion wi th the r e a l i t y , no matter how 
" l i f e l i k e " i t i s . In f ac t , we might rather 
bel ieve that a l l representations of a given 
c lass are more l i k e each other than any of them 
is l i k e the th ing represented. L i f e fol lows i t s 
laws, representations fo l low t h e i r s . 
What is an Image? 
The purpose of an act of representation is to 
draw a t ten t i on to some par t i cu la r aspect of the 
represented ob jec t , to d i f f e r e n t i a t e that 
aspect from i t s context , not to reconst i tu te 
the ob ject i t s e l f . To that degree we might 
regard a v isual representation as cons t i tu t ing 
a p a r t i a l theory of that object and i t s 
existence, j u s t as we might regard a computer 
program as cons t i tu t ing a theory of the process 
i t models. But neither the a r t i s t nor the 
program designer has any choice but to proceed 
in terms of the modes which are avai lable or 
which they are capable of developing. In the 
case of the v isual representat ion, the making 
of an image, I have t r i ed to demonstrate the 
cogni t ive bases of those modes, and a lso , 
through my own program AARON, to demonstrate 
the i r raw power in the image-mediated 
t ransact ion. 
That, f i n a l l y , def ines my use of the word 
"image". An image is a reference to some aspect 
of the world which contains w i th in i t s own 
st ructure and in terms of i t s own s t ructure a 
reference to the act of cogni t ion which 
generated i t . I t must say, not that the world 
is l i k e t h i s , but that i t was recognised to 
have been l i k e t h i s by the image-maker, who 
leaves behind t h i s record: not of the wor ld , 
but of the ac t . 
APPENDIX I TOE TURTLE SYSTEM. 
When the real t u r t l e is not running, the 
program simulates i t s path, and calculates 
where it would have been in an er ror - f ree world 
af ter completing each command. In t h i s case it 
subst i tutes a chord for the arc which the real 
t u r t l e would have traced out . (The s t ra ight 
l i ne segments which may jus t be v i s i b l e in the 
i l l u s t r a t i o n s here are due to the fact that 
they were photographed o f f the Tektronix 4014 
d isp lay, not from an actual t u r t l e drawing.) 
The Navigation System. 
The navigation system is correct to about .2 
inches: that is an absolute determined by the 
sonar operating frequency — about 40KHz — and 
does not change wi th the size of the drawing. 
Even wi th so coarse a resolut ion the feedback 
operation is e f f i c i e n t enough for the t u r t l e to 
do everything on the f loor that the program can 
do on the screen; indeed, if the t u r t l e is 
picked up while it is drawing and put down in 
the wrong place it is able to f ind i t s way back 
to the r i gh t place and facing the correct 
d i r ec t i on . 
The Dynamics of Freehand Drawing. 
There are several complexities in t h i s par t of 
the program which are worth mentioning. One of 
them is that the program has to be able to 
accomplish dramatic sh i f t s in scale in the 
drawing, to make small things which look l i k e 
small examples of big things: smoothly-curved 
closed forms should not turn in to polygons as 
they get smaller. This is required both on the 
issue of s h i f t s in information density and also 
to maintain implied semantic relat ionships 
between forms. 
A second complexity is that the movement of the 
l i ne should convincingly r e f l ec t the dynamics 
of a freehand drawn l i n e , and th i s should mean, 
roughly, that the "speed" of a l i ne should be 
inversely related to the rate of change of 
curvature: the pen should be able to move 
fur ther on a single command if i t ' s path is not 
curving too rad ica l l y . (The converse of th i s 
is that the amount of information needed to 
specify an a rb i t ra ry l i ne should be a function 
of i t s rate of change of d i r ec t i on , wi th the 
s t ra ight l i n e , specif ied by i t s two end points , 
as the l im i t i ng case.) 
Movement Scal ing. 
Th i rd , the pen should proceed more "care fu l l y " 
when it is close to some f i n a l , c r i t i c a l 
posi t ion than when it has re la t i ve l y far to go 
and plenty of time l e f t to correct for 
carelessness. This, too, implies a scaling of 
movement in re la t ion to the state of the local 
task. F ina l l y , there is the pract ica l problem 
that for any given number of cycles of a 
stepping pat tern , the actual distance traversed 
by the pen w i l l vary wi th the ra t i o of the 
t u r t l e ' s two wheel speeds. Unfortunately, t h i s 
re lat ionship is not l inear , and neither does i t 
provide a useful simulation of freehand 
dynamics. 
B r i e f l y , the l ine-generating procedure 
concludes tha t , given the present posi t ion and 
d i rec t ion of travel of the pen in re la t ion to 
the current signpost and to the f i na l 
dest inat ion, i t w i l l be appropriate to dr ive 
the two wheels at stepping rates r1 and £2, 
taking n steps on the faster of the two. In 
doing so""it takes account of a l l of the above 
considerations. The r a t i o determined for the 
two speeds is a funct ion of two var iables: the 
angle A between the current d i rec t ion and the 
d i rec t ion to the current signpost, and a 
scaling factor given by the remaining distance 
Dd to the f i na l dest inat ion as a proport ion of 
the or ig ina l distance Do ( f i g 11). This speed 
ra t i o then becomes one of the two variables in 
a funct ion which y ie lds the number of steps to 
be taken — the distance to be t ravel led — by 
the fast wheel: the other var iable being the 
re la t i ve size of the block of space al located 
to the current f i gu re . 
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These functions have to be tuned with some care 
to be sure that each variable is correct ly 
weighted, and to compensate for the turn-
distance ra t i o of the t u r t l e geometry i t s e l f . 
But none of th i s — or any other part of the 
program — involves any s ign i f icant 
mathematical precis ion. There are only f i f t een 
stepping rates avai lable, synmetrically 
disposed between fast forward and fast reverse. 
The whole program, including extensive 
trigonometric operations, uses integer 
ari thmetic — th is for h is tor ica l reasons as 
well as l im i ta t ions of available hardware — 
and the geometry of the current t u r t l e 
determines that i t can only change d i rec t ion in 
increments of about one s ix th of a degree. (The 
t u r t l e was not un t i l recently in ter rupt -dr iven, 
and for design reasons th is incremental 
direction-change factor was one degree in the 
ear l ie r version.) Everything re l ies upon the 
feedback mode of operation to provide 
correct ion and to prevent error accumulation. 
The point is that a good car dr iver can dr ive a 
car with sloppy steering as well as a car with 
t i gh t steering up to the point where feedback 
correct ion cannot be applied fast enough. 
APPENDIX II — MATRIX REPRESENTATION. 
This descript ion is given here pr imari ly because it o f fers some insight into the kinds of con-
siderations which the program believes to be important, and the way in which these considera-
t ions are accessed: not because there is anything par t i cu la r l y or ig ina l from a data-structure 
point of view. 
Much of the deta i l of the implementation is demanded by the word-length of the machine, and 
would go away in a larger machine. The intent is to make a l l the information re lat ing to a par­
t i cu la r part of the drawing ef fect ive ly reside in a par t icu lar c e l l . 
The program uses the single words representing matrix ce l l s in d i f fe ren t ways according to what 
is happening in the c e l l s : -
A "simple" event means, essent ia l ly , that a l l the data w i l l be contained wi th in th is one word, 
although it w i l l be seen that i t s s impl ic i ty relates to i t s use in a more meaningful sense:-
Before beginning work on the drawing, the program "roughens" the surface: that i s , it declares 
some parts to be unuseable for the a l locat ion of space to a new f igure , although a developing 
f igure may go in to th i s "rough" space. This is done in order to maximise the rate of change of 
density across the image:-
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V Linking. 
The forward and backward l inks are a very important device here. Lines are mapped onto the 
matrix as they are drawn, using an adapted form of Bresham's Algorithm to ensure that 
st r ings of ce l l s never include corner-to-corner cont igu i ty . This also means that for any 
given c e l l , the l ine i t contains must have entered i t from, and w i l l subsequently leave i t 
i n to , only one of four c e l l s : thus the fou r -b i t l ink ing permits a complete traversal of any 
series of l i ne segments not involving a complex event. 
At t h i s po in t , the single word is inadequate, and it is used as a pointer, words now being 
allocated in pairs from a f r e e l i s t . Here again, one level down from the matr ix, the words 
w i l l be variously decoded. In par t i cu la r , in the event that the ce l l is occupied by two 
f igures, the two words are each used as pointers to new pairs of words, one for each f i g ­
u re : -
A ce l l at th is level may contain complex events from one or both of two classes: 
connective and conf igurat ional . Configurational events frequently involve order-2 
nodes — nodes, that i s , which f a l l on a continuous l i ne — and include sharp an­
g les, strong curvature, and so on. in pract ise, the program forces complex events 
so that they always occur wi th in an 8-cel l displacement in x and y from another 
c e l l , and the locat ion of the next event can then be recorded rather cheaply:-
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"Sense", here, means convex or concave if the l i ne is the boundary of a closed f i g ­
ure, and up/r ight or down/left i f i t is not. I f t h i s is a f igure node of any order 
other than two, one entry w i l l be needed for each adjacent node:-
in addit ion to the displacements which chain th i s node to each of i t s connected nodes. 
This means that the traversal of the f igure as it is represented by the matrix can con­
tinue from th is point un t i l the next node is reached. 
Thus, the ent i re structure is contained essent ia l ly w i th in the matr ix , and the short 
l i s t s which may be tacked onto any single c e l l serve merely to extend the e f fec t ive 
capacity of that c e l l . 
Idea l l y , t h i s matrix should be as f ine as possible: since the resolut ion of high-grade 
video is only 1024x1024, a matrix of t h i s size would obviously const i tute an extremely 
good representation. However, there are two considerations which make so f ine a gra in 
unnecessary. The f i r s t is that the program keeps a f u l l l i s t of a l l the actual coordi­
nate pairs for each f igure as it is drawing i t , and can access it should some very pre­
cise intersect ion be required. The second is that the program is designed to simulate 
freehand drawing, not to do mechanical drawings, and once a f igure is completed some 
approximation to it for purposes of avoidance or even intersect ion is unobjectionable. 
The maximum error induced by assuming a point to be at the center of a c e l l in a matrix 
of 90x160 w i l l be about 7/8th of an inch in a sixteen-foot drawing: only three times the 
thickness of the l i n e . 
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NOTES ON TOE TEXT 
note 1. The word "representat ion" is used here 
in a more general sense than it now car r ies 
w i th in the A . I . community: the problem of 
formulat ing an in ternal (machine) 
representat ion of some set of knowledge d i f f e r s 
from the more general problem p r imar i l y in i t s 
technological aspects. 
note 2. "The Art of A r t i f i c i a l I n te l l i gence : 1, 
Teams and Case Studies of Knowledge 
Engineering," Ed Feigenbaum, Proceedings of 
IJCAI5, 1977; pp.1014-1029. 
note 3. In the decade before I became involved 
in my present concerns my work was exhibi ted at 
a l l of the most serious in ternat ional shows, 
and I represented my country at many of them, 
including the Venice Biennale: as well as in 
some f i f t y one-man shows in London, New York 
and other major c i t i e s . 
note 4. D i f fe ren t from each o ther , loosely 
speaking, in the way one might expect a human 
a r t i s t ' s drawings to d i f f e r one from another 
over a short period of t ime. 
note 5. Wr i t ten in "C" , under the UNIX 
operating sustem. 
note 6. I am re fe r r ing here to d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s 
performed in r e l a t i on to the image, not in 
r e l a t i o n to the real wor ld , w i th which the 
program has had no v isual contact . 
note 7. The program does not attach semantic 
descr ip tors to the things i t draws: the terms 
"penumbra", "boulder" and so on are my own 
descr ip t ions , and are used here for the sake of 
s i m p l i c i t y . 
note 8. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , from the po in t of view 
of my argument here, the d i r t y marks were 
intended to "suggest" the elements of a 
composit ion. 
note 9. The one unconstrained randomising agent 
in t h i s scenario, the f i n a l cu t t i ng o f the f i l m 
by the producer rather than the d i r e c t o r , has 
also demonstrated i t s e l f to be devastat ingly 
non-creat ive. 
note 10. "Undenied" is stressed here because 
there ex is ts an odd case in which the w i l l of 
the a r t i s t is to produce objects which demand 
the contemplation of the i r own q u a l i t i e s for 
the i r own sake — what they are rather than 
what they stand for — and which thus seek to 
deny the viewer h is normal assumptions. To the 
degree that t h i s aim can ac tua l ly be achieved 
the resu l t ing object could not properly be 
ca l led an image, and I doubt whether aesthet ic 
contemplation could properly be ca l led reading. 
Thus much of XXth Century abstract a r t f a l l s 
outside t h i s discussion. 
note 11 . It is worth no t ing , though, that AARON 
did mechanical s t r a i g h t - l i n e shading for about 
two years — it ran faster that way — and in 
that time only two people ever remarked on the 
inconsistency. 
note 12. I w i l l leave aside the in teres t ing 
question of whether there are not more general 
underlying structures which are common to a l l 
physical experience. It is presumably no 
accident that terms 1 ike " repet i t i o n " , 
"c losure" , and others I have used in r e l a t i on 
to v isua l cogni t ion are f ree ly used in r e l a t i on 
to music, for example. 
note 13. The contro l of the rate of change of 
information densi ty across the surface of the 
image, to which I referred e a r l i e r , is the most 
powerful example I know in t h i s regard. The eye 
is capable of handling un i ts as small as a 
speck of dust and as large as the sky, but the 
processes which d r ive the eye seem always to 
adjust some threshold to y i e l d a preferred 
d i s t r i b u t i o n spanning only a few octaves. 
note 14. In f ac t , the more thea t r i ca l 
explanations which range from world-wide 
migrat ions to the inf luence of ex t ra ­
t e r r e s t r i a l voyagers are not even necessary. 
note 15. He is un l i ke ly to t rea t the boundary 
between face and hand as par t of the face, but 
as par t of the hand, and may very well indicate 
the f u l l boundary of the face as if he could 
ac tua l ly see i t . 
1057 
FLATS, A MACHINE FOR NUMERICAL, SYMBOLIC 
AND ASSOCIATIVE COMPUTING 
E i i c h i Goto * ' * * , Tetsuo Ida , Ke i H i r a k i , Masayuki Suzuki and Nobuyuki Inada 
* I n s t i t u t e of Phys ica l and Chemical 
Saitama 351 Japan 
** Department of I n fo rma t i on Science, 
U n i v e r s i t y o f Tokyo, 7 - 3 - 1 , Hongo, 
Research, 2 - 1 , Hirosawa, Wako-shi , 
Facu l t y o f Science, 
Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113 Japan 
Abs t rac t 
Func t i ona l aspects of a machine c a l l e d FLATS, p resen t l y (June 1979) in the design s tage , are de­
s c r i b e d . FLATS aims to e f f i c i e n t l y run both numer ica l and a lgeb ra i c programs. Overf low f r ee and 
v a r i a b l e p r e c i s i o n a r i t h m e t i c , t a b l e look-up computa t ion , and a s s o c i a t i v e computat ion based on 
s i n g l e - h i t content addressed tab les are in t roduced f o r advanced numer i ca l , a lgeb ra i c and symbolic 
computing. Hashing hardware, tag mechanism and hardware l i s t process ing are used to r e a l i z e these 
f e a t u r e s . 
1 . I n t r o d u c t i o n 
Numerical computat ion and symbolic formula mani­
p u l a t i o n are the major p r a c t i c e s i n s c i e n t i f i c 
computat ion. Whi le numer ica l computat ion has a 
long h i s t o r y , computer-aided a lgebra or la rge 
sca le formula man ipu la t i on has become p r a c t i c a l 
on ly r e c e n t l y . 
In t h i s paper, we descr ibe the a r c h i t e c t u r e of 
FLATS, a machine which aims to e f f i c i e n t l y run 
s c i e n t i f i c computat ions. We consider Fo r t r an (F) 
and L isp (L) as major s c i e n t i f i c programming 
languages f o r reasons: 
( i ) S c i e n t i f i c numer ica l programs are w r i t t e n 
most ly i n F o r t r a n . 
( i i ) L i sp i s the major host language used f o r 
symbolic and a lgeb ra i c systems such as 
REDUCE1 and MACSYMA2. Moreover, L i sp has 
been used f o r w r i t i n g a very l a rge number 
of programs in the AI a rea . 
Hence, h igh e f f i c i e n c y in runn ing programs w r i t ­
ten in f F f and f L* is considered a minimum r e ­
qu i rement , which i s symbolized in the f i r s t two 
l e t t e r s of 'FLATS1. f A' in FLATS stands f o r 
a s s o c i a t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s ; ?T f and f S f stand f o r 
Tab le , Set and S t r i n g which are the data types 
used in FLATS. 
Many e f f o r t s have been made to increase the speed 
o f computat ions by i n t r o d u c i n g p a r a l l e l i s m 3 ' * 4 ' 5 , 
in which we inc lude the pipe l i n e a r c h i t e c t u r e 
as a s p e c i f i c implementat ion (of p a r a l l e l i s m ) . 
Vec to r i zed opera t ions on f l o a t i n g and f i x e d 
po in t numbers o f f i x e d b i t l eng th are recognized 
as a c lass computat ions su i t ed f o r h i g h l y p a r a l ­
l e l machines. I t should be no ted , however, t ha t 
h i g h l y p a r a l l e l a lgo r i thms are not known f o r or 
not app l i cab le to c e r t a i n computat ions. For 
example, take the E u c l i d i a n gcd a l g o r i t h m . The 
gcd of two i n t ege rs TQ and r j , say, is obta ined 
by success ive ly computing the remainder sequence 
r 0» r l » r2» r 3 ' * « ( r . i * s t n e remainder o f r -
d i v i ded by r ) u n t i l i t reaches the f i r s t zero 
remainder r n 0 w i t h r . g i v i n g the gcd. 
P a r a l l e l schemes f a s t e r than the Euchid ian a l ­
gor i thm are not known. Hence, f o r gcd, a ma­
chine equipped w i t h a s i n g l e s o p h i s t i c a t e d h igh 
speed remainder u n i t would do b e t t e r than p a r a l ­
l e l machines w i t h hundreds o f slower u n i t s . L i s t 
p rocess ing , a r b i t r a r y p r e c i s i o n i n tege r a r i t h -
meter , and v a r i a b l e p r e c i s i o n f l o a t i n g po in t 
a r i t h m e t i c are o ther examples of opera t ions which 
are not su i t ed f o r contemporary h i g h l y p a r a l l e l 
machines. The o b j e c t i v e of FLATS is to e f ­
f i c i e n t l y run those opera t ions which are not 
su i t ed f o r h i g h l y p a r a l l e l machines. 
FLATS is b a s i c a l l y a s i n g l e i n s t r u c t i o n stream 
machine and p a r a l l e l i s m s h a l l be pursued on ly to 
a l i m i t e d ex ten t such as advance c o n t r o l , p a r a l ­
l e l hashing and p a r a l l e l i n t e r p o l a t i o n but i t 
s h a l l not i nco rpo ra te p a r a l l e l processor a r r a y s . 
FLATS may hence be regarded complementary to the 
h i g h l y p a r a l l e l machine approach. 
The numer ica l support to a l geb ra i c man ipu la t i on 
systems is ind ispensab le s ince the process o f a l ­
gebraic man ipu la t i on requ i res exact c a l c u l a t i o n 
o f i n te rmed ia te (and f i n a l ) numer ica l coe f ­
f i c i e n t s as opposed to approx imat ions done by 
convent iona l f i x e d p r e c i s i o n f l o a t i n g a r i t h m e t i c . 
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Furthermore, the r e s u l t s of the a lgebra ic compu­
t a t i o n must o f t e n be g iven to numer ica l compu-
t a i o n systems. 
Func t i ona l requirement f o r FLATS is t he re fo re to 
i nco rpo ra te the d i f f e r e n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the 
two languages (F and L ) , e . g . compi le- t ime v s . 
run - t ime data type checks, and s t a t i c v s . dynamic 
s torage a l l o c a t i o n , i n t o a s i n g l e a r c h i t e c t u r e , 
w i t hou t impa i r i ng the e f f i c i e n c y o f e i t h e r one. 
Besides the advanced numer ica l f e a t u r e s , a s s o c i ­
a t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s have been found to be very 
power fu l 6 i n e f f i c i e n t l y c a r r y i n g out basic opera 
t i o n s i n formula man ipu la t i on . 
We f i r s t g ive in sec t i on 2 f u n c t i o n a l s p e c i f i c a ­
t i o n s of FLATS from use rs ' po in t of v iew, and in 
s e c t i o n 3 consider the implementat ion from a r c h i ­
t e c t u r a l po in t o f v iew. 
2. FLATS from users 1 po in t of view 
2 .1 Overf low f r ee and v a r i a b l e p r e c i s i o n com­
p u t i n g 
We observe tha t most contemporary computer sys­
tems n e i t h e r prov ide adequate means f o r hand l ing 
(1) ove r f l ows , (2) p r e c i s i o n h igher than b u i l t -
in standard p r e c i s i o n s , e . g . double or quadruple, 
nor (3) v a r i a b l e p r e c i s i o n a r i t h m e t i c . The de­
s ign and implementat ions of some impor tant c lass 
of a l g o r i t h m s 7 ' 8 ' 9 are hampered by the lack of 
the systemat ic support of these three f e a t u r e s . 
To remedy such d e f e c t s , FLATS is provided w i t h 
f o l l o w i n g means: 
- In tegers are t rea ted w i t h automatic m u l t i p l e -
p r e c i s i o n . 
- Exponents and mantissas of f l o a t i n g numbers are 
expressed in i n tege rs as s ta ted above, hence 
p r a c t i c a l l y no over f low would occur. 
- A v a r i a b l e p r e c i s i o n scheme10 is adopted, in 
which p r e c i s i o n is s p e c i f i e d by a s ta tus word 
c a l l e d an ASW (A r i t hme t i c Status Word), which 
is pa r t of the PSW (Program Status Word). 
These fea tu res are made a v a i l a b l e to users in an 
extended FORTRAN c a l l e d BFORT (Bignum F o r t r a n ) . 
2.2 Tabu la t i ve computing 
Before h igh speed computers came i n t o ex tens ive 
use, look-up of mathematical tab les was an es­
s e n t i a l process o f numer ica l c a l c u l a t i o n . This 
f a c t i s i n q u i t e con t ras t t o 'on-demand' comput­
i ng p reva len t today. To pursue f u r t h e r the 
speed-up of the present numer ica l computat ion, 
t a b l e look-up is becoming again a p r a c t i c a l 
method, owing to the recent advances in memory 
f a b r i c a t i o n technology. In FLATS, we prov ide 
f o l l o w i n g means f o r t a b u l a t i v e comput ing 1 1 ; 
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LEAP12, a v a r i e t y of a s s o c i a t i v e language and 
a r c h i t e c t u r e s f o r the a s s o c i a t i v e process ing have 
been proposed and implemented. 
We consider an AMT (Address mapping t a b l e ) and 
an h-op hash t a b l e ( F i g . 1) as the two bas ic 
e n t i t i e s f o r b u i l d i n g assoc ia t i ve data s t r u c ­
t u r e s 1 3 . We de f i ne an AMT as a mapping from 
b i t pa t te rns o f f i x e d s izes ( a c t u a l l y 32 b i t s / 6 4 
b i t s ) i n t o addresses (consecut ive i n t e g e r s ) . An 
AMT may be regarded as a s i n g l e - h i t a s s o c i a t i v e 
memory. A m u l t i - h i t a s s o c i a t i v e scheme such as 
found in LEAP is to be dea l t w i t h by so f twa re , 
making use of a r r a y s , l i n k e d - l i s t s and AMT's. 
Table 1 g ives the b u i l t - i n data types in FLATS. 
The data types STR, INT, FLOAT, VECT (one d i ­
mensional a r ray ) are the same as in most o ther 
languages except t ha t INT and FLOAT are of a r ­
b i t r a r i l y h igh p r e c i s i o n a s s ta ted i n 2 . 1 . 
PAIR is the same as in Standard L i s p 1 4 . 
The data types p r e f i x e d by H denote those types 
obta ined by hashing (h -op ) . h - type ob jec t s are 
guaranteed to be unique by v i r t u e of hash ing. 
The L i sp concept of ' i n t e r n ' corresponds to t ha t 
o f h-op w i t h the f o l l o w i n g d i f f e r e n c e s ; t ha t 
h-op does not a l l ow remob15 and t ha t h-op can 
apply to a l l data types in FLATS, whereas I n t e r n 
op in L isp 1.5 is a p p l i c a b l e on ly to atomic 
symbols, h - t ype ob jec ts must be read-on ly so 
as f o r the hashing search mechanism to work 
p r o p e r l y . Hence, HSTR ob jec ts are the same as 
atoms o f L i s p ; i . e . every d i f f e r e n t s t r i n g o f 
charac ters is represented as a unique p o i n t e r 
to a t a b l e c a l l e d o b l l s t in L isp 1.5, or to name 
tab les in assemblers and comp i le rs . HINT and 
HPAIR ob jec t s are m u l t i - p r e c i s i o n i n t e g e r s and 
hashed l i s t s , r e s p e c t i v e l y . E q u a l i t y check o f 
two long i n tege rs of type HINT or two l i s t s of 
type HPAIR is reduced to t ha t of two p o i n t e r s . 
HPAIR and HINT can be made by the shared l i n k e d 
l i s t method as shown in F i g . 1 . 
I n s e r t i o n , d e l e t i o n and membership t e s t of an 
AMT e n t r y correspond to the same opera t ions on 
a s e t . A ' s e t ' c reated by h-op ( represented 
by an AMT) is g i v e n 6 , 1 6 and shown in F i g , 1. 
In FLATS the hashed AMT (HAMT) is a synonym to 
' s e t 1 . 
A CAT cons i s t s of an AMT and RAM (random access 
memory, i . e . hardware term f o r VECT shar ing the 
same addresses)• A CAT can be hashed s i m i l a r l y 
to an AMT and the r e s u l t a n t data type is c a l l e d 
HCAT. 
These data t ypes , e s p e c i a l l y the hashed t ypes , 
have been found to be very use fu l in po lynomia l 
man ipu la t i on . For example, take a po lynomia l 
P = 3AX2 + 4 BY3, where AX2 and BY3 are term 
i d e n t i f i e r s ; and 3 and 4 are c o e f f i c i e n t s . 
There are many (non-unique) ways to represent a 
term i d e n t i f i e r in l i s t forms owing to the com-
3. FLATS from a r c h i t e c t s ' po in t of view 
3.1 Tagged a r c h i t e c t u r e 
A p r a c t i c a l s o l u t i o n f o r e f f i c i e n t d e t e c t i o n o f 
the b u i l t - i n data types g iven in 2.3 is a tagged 
a r c h i t e c t u r e 1 0 ' 1 7 Table 2 g ives tags to be used 
in FLATS. 
Take numer ica l computat ion f o r example. A r i t h ­
met ic opera t ions on smal l numbers tagged as 
" s i n t " (shor t i n t e g e r ) o r " a f l o a t " ( shor t f l o a t ­
i ng number) are to be made w i t h standard hardware 
at h igh speed, w h i l e those on tagged " b i g " num­
bers are to be trapped and handled by m i c r o ­
programming. Since " s i n t " or " s f l o a t " numbers 
are l i k e l y t o appear w i t h h igh p r o b a b i l i t y i n 
most programs, the slow down f a c t o r due to the 
" b i g " numbers i s very s m a l l . 
B i t - l o s s , a common o b j e c t i o n aga ins t t a g b l t ( s ) , 
can be remedied by us ing a s p e c i f i c exponent 
va lue as a ' t r a p p i n g t a g * . In the case of 7 - b i t 
exponent -64 <. p < 63 FLOAT r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , p -
- 6 4 , +63, +62 are used as the tags to denote data 
types o ther than " s f l o a t " w i t h the mant issa pa r t 
having d i f f e r e n t meanings g iven in t a b l e 2. The 
e f f e c t i v e b i t loss i s on ly log 2 (123/128) - -0 .06 
b i t s i n t h i s scheme. 
3.2 Hashing Hardware 
AMT's can be implemented e i t h e r by us ing CAM 
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(content addressable memory) chips or by hashing. 
In a prev ious pape r 1 8 , we presented a hardware 
hashing scheme which makes use of p a r a l l e l r ead ­
out mechanism of memory. A p a r a l l e l hashing 
hardward cons is t s of m u l t i p l e RAM banks, hash 
address sequence generators and a hashing con­
t r o l u n i t . A s i n g l e comparator i s at tached to 
every RAM bank ( c f . F i g . 2) in the p a r a l l e l 
hashing hardware, whereas in CAM ch ip such as 
I n t e l 3104 a comparator is at tached to every 
memory c e l l . Even at a ch ip l e v e l , a CAM r e ­
qu i res severa l t imes more gates than a RAM c h i p . 
Hence t o t a l number of gates requ i red f o r r e a l i z ­
a t i o n of CAM is g rea te r by at l eas t one order 
of magnitude than tha t f o r the hash t a b l e , w i t h 
no s i g n i f i c a n t speed gain over p a r a l l e l hashing: 
The items in the hash tab le are searched in 
average 0(1) memory cyc le (a q u a n t i t y independent 
of the number of i tems entered in the hash 
t a b l e ) , i n comparison w i t h s t r i c t 0(1) used to 
search i tems entered in CAM. Since we are 
i n t e r e s t e d i n the o v e r a l l e f f i c i e n c y i n our 
intended a p p l i c a t i o n s , i t i s more advantageous 
to inves t the resource on enlargement of RAM 
memory than on s t i l l expensive CAM ch ips . More­
over , h-op of complex types such as AMT, CAT 
and VECT cannot be performed w i t h CAM's. 
Figure 2 shows the schematic diagram of the par ­
a l l e l bank hashing hardware of FLATS. Hashing 
is e s s e n t i a l l y the cyc le (hash probe cyc le ) of 
( i ) hash address genera t ions , ( i i ) memory 
accesses, ( i i i ) key comparisons and ( i v ) judge­
ment of t e r m i n a t i o n based on the comparisons. 
The hash t a b l e s , ( i . e . AMT's and CAT!s and an 
h-op t a b l e ) , are taken in main memory c o n s i s t i n g 
of J banks. In a simple p a r a l l e l hashing scheme 
w i t h J banks, a s i n g l e hash address generator 
and J comparators are used together w i t h some 
a u x i l i a r y hash sequence c o n t r o l c i r c u i t s . To 
handle key d e l e t i o n , de tec to rs of reserved words 
f o r denot ing empty and de le ted s ta tes are p r o v i d ­
ed in each bank. 
Assuming t h a t the opera t ions ( i ) - ( i v ) are 
performed in a s i n g l e memory c y c l e , the per fo rm­
ance of p a r a l l e l hashing is g iven in number of 
memory cyc les used u n t i l the complet ion of the 
probe c y c l e s . F igure 3 shows tha t the average 
number of memory cyc les in a success fu l search , 
( f i n d i n g a key in the t a b l e ) in the worst case1 9 
We presume the worst average performance in the 
performance eva lua t i on when key d e l e t i o n and i n ­
s e r t i o n are repeated a l t e r n a t e l y . I t shows tha t 
the basic hash opera t ions can be performed in a 
t ime comparable to an i n d i r e c t addressing oper­
a t i o n s , e . g . f o r J = 16 and the load f a c t o r of a 
hash t a b l e a * 0 .9 . Note tha t the hashing h a r d ­
ware handles a f i x e d leng th key at a t ime . For 
hand l ing v a r i a b l e leng th s t r i n g s , a r b i t r a r i l y 
long i n t ege rs and l i s t s , a shared l i nked l i s t 
above mentioned is used w i t h the p a r a l l e l hashing 
hardware. 
3.3 Hardware support f o r l i s t processing 
The hardware mechanisms e s s e n t i a l to the speed-
up of L isp are f o l l o w i n g ; 
(1) run t ime data type check ing, 
(2) hardware s tack , 
(3) h igh memory bandwidth 
(4) segmented memory space w i t h automatic bound­
ary checking f o r arrays e t c . , and 
(5) i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r L isp p r i m i t i v e s , such as 
ca r , cd r , cons and atom. 
Note tha t the tagged a r c h i t e c t u r e g iven in 3 .1 
i s a s o l u t i o n to po in t ( 1 ) . 
As f o r po i n t ( 2 ) , we incorpora te in FLATS both 
general ( g l oba l ) r e g i s t e r and stack frame machine 
a r c h i t e c t u r e . The basic op codes cons is t of four 
8 b i t f i e l d s as (op, r 1 r 2 , r 3 ) , where r 1 , r 2 , r 3 
are r e g i s t e r addresses each spec i f y i ng e i t h e r one 
of 128 g l oba l r e g i s t e r s or one of 128 r e g i s t e r s 
on the cu r ren t s tack frame. While the g loba l 
r e g i s t e r s are used to hold g l oba l e n t i t i e s , the 
stack r e g i s t e r s are used f o r l o c a l e n t r i e s and 
f o r ( recu rs i ve ) subrout ine l i n k a g e . 
In con t ras t to the two r e g i s t e r address oper­
a t i o n s , r1 : ■ o p ( r 1 , r 2 ) no tab ly used in IBM 
360/370, th ree r e g i s t e r address operat ions 
r 3 : = o p ( r 1 , r 2 ) are used in FLATS. The three 
r e g i s t e r scheme would g r e a t l y reduce the number 
o f r e g i s t e r to r e g i s t e r t r a n s f e r opera t ions . For 
example, wh i l e no r e g i s t e r to r e g i s t e r t r a n s f e r s 
are needed in the three r e g i s t e r scheme f o r the 
f o l l o w i n g codes 
a : = a d d ( x , y ) ; 
b : = s u b ( x , y ) ; 
c := rau l ( x , y ) ; 
d : - d i v ( x , y ) ; , 
50% of the corresponding codes would be r e g i s t e r 
to r e g i s t e r t r a n s f e r s in the two r e g i s t e r scheme 
as i n 
a = x ; a ;=add (a , y ) ; 
b :=x; b : - s u b ( b , y ) ; 
c : - x ; c : - m u l ( c f y ) ; 
d : - x ; d : - d i v ( d , y ) ; . 
The u n i t of memory banking used in hashing is 
a c t u a l l y taken to be the b i t w id th of a s i n g l e 
l i s t c e l l (64 b i t s ) . Expansion o f memory t o i n ­
crease the degree o f p a r a l l e l i s m ( i . e . t o i n ­
crease J) w i l l speed up hashing operat ions as 
shown in F i g . 3; t h i s does not imply the r e q u i r e ­
ment of h igher memory bandwidth s ince the com­
para to rs are provided in the memory u n i t s . 
Need f o r segmentation is c lea r s ince the main 
memory is conceptua l l y d i v ided i n t o severa l seg­
ments; AMT's, CAT's, a r rays , l i s t areas, program 
space and so on. 
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4. Concluding Remarks 
At a users 1 l e v e l , FLATS is a machine both f o r 
numer ica l processing and f o r formula manipula­
t i o n . Ins tead o f dev i s i ng yet another language, 
we prov ide the f a c i l i t i e s in the framework of 
e x i s t i n g languages, Fo r t ran and L isp (REDUCE is 
to be used f o r the user i n t e r f a c e language) . 
New compi lers f o r Fo r t ran and L isp are under 
development, which i nco rpo ra te the f a c i l i t i e s 
f o r a s s o c i a t i v e process ing and over f low f ree 
and v a r i a b l e p r e c i s i o n a r i t h m e t i c , at the same 
t ime to accept programs w r i t t e n in L isp and 
F o r t r a n , which have been accumulated in l i b r a ­
r i e s o f s c i e n t i f i c a p p l i c a t i o n packages. The 
unde r l y i ng techniques inc lude hardware hash ing, 
tag mechanism, and hardware l i s t process ing 
( i n c l u d i n g hardware garbage c o l l e c t i o n ) . Con­
cu r ren t garbage c o l l e c t i o n i s not cons idered, 
s ince FLATS is not intended to be used f o r r e a l 
t ime a p p l i c a t i o n s . FLAT is to be used as a 
back-end processor to a conven t iona l computer 
system; hence the average performance, i . e . 
th roughput , is a more impor tant f a c t o r than 
responsiveness. For the same reason, hashing is 
best su i t ed f o r the a s s o c i a t i v e process ing d i s ­
cussed. 
The a s s o c i a t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s of FLATS would a lso 
be su i t ed f o r some opera t ions f o r data base man­
agement . 
Implementat ion of u n i f i e d memory management of 
secondary and main memories us ing v i r t u a l t apes 2 2 
i s under c o n s i d e r a t i o n . 
Subs tan t i a l amount of sof tware f o r FLATS has 
a l ready been w r i t t e n and has been runn ing under 
a FLATS s i m u l a t o r . A r c h i t e c t u r a l design of FLATS 
is an outcome of the experiences w i t h the develop 
ment of the sof tware system HLISPf ' 1 6 REDUCE is 
now running under HLISP system and are used f o r 
va r ious a p p l i c a t i o n s . A v e r s i o n of BFORT men­
t ioned before which t r a n s l a t e s the extended 
Fo r t r an i n t o HLISP has a l ready been runn ing . 
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UTTERANCE AND OBJECTIVE: 
ISSUES IN NATURAL LANGUAGE COMMUNICATION 
Barbara J . Grosz 
A r t i f i c i a l I n t e l l i g e n c e Center 
SRI I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Menlo Park , C a l i f o r n i a 94025 USA 
Communication in n a t u r a l language r e q u i r e s a combina t ion of l a n g u a g e - s p e c i f i c and genera l 
common-sense reason ing c a p a b i l i t i e s , the a b i l i t y to rep resen t and reason about the b e l i e f s , 
g o a l s , and p lans o f m u l t i p l e agen t s , and the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t u t t e rances are m u l t i f a c e t e d . Th is 
paper eva lua tes the c a p a b i l i t i e s o f n a t u r a l language p rocess ing systems a g a i n s t these 
requ i rements and i d e n t i f i e s c r u c i a l areas f o r f u t u r e research i n language p r o c e s s i n g , common-
sense r e a s o n i n g , and t h e i r c o o r d i n a t i o n . 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Two p rem ises , r e f l e c t e d i n the t i t l e , u n d e r l i e 
t he p e r s p e c t i v e f rom which I w i l l cons ide r 
resea rch i n n a t u r a l language p rocess ing i n t h i s 
p a p e r . 1 F i r s t , p rog ress o n b u i l d i n g computer 
systems t h a t process n a t u r a l languages in any 
mean ing fu l sense ( i . e . , systems t ha t i n t e r a c t 
reasonab ly w i t h people i n n a t u r a l language) 
r e q u i r e s c o n s i d e r i n g language as p a r t of a 
l a r g e r communicat ive s i t u a t i o n . I n t h i s l a r g e r 
s i t u a t i o n , the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a c o n v e r s a t i o n 
and t h e i r s t a t e s o f mind are as impor tan t to the 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f an u t t e r a n c e as the l i n g u i s t i c 
exp ress i ons f rom which i t i s fo rmed. A c e n t r a l 
concern when language is cons idered as 
communicat ion i s i t s f u n c t i o n i n b u i l d i n g and 
u s i n g shared models o f the w o r l d . 2 
Second, as the phrase " u t t e r a n c e and o b j e c t i v e " 
sugges ts , r e g a r d i n g language as communicat ion 
r e q u i r e s c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f what i s s a i d 
( l i t e r a l l y ) , what i s i n t e n d e d , and the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two. R e c e n t l y , the 
* The emphasis in t h i s paper w i l l be on research 
concerned w i t h the development o f t h e o r e t i c a l 
models of language use . Because of space 
l i m i t a t i o n s , I w i l l not d i scuss a second major 
d i r e c t i o n o f c u r r e n t research i n n a t u r a l 
language p r o c e s s i n g , t h a t concerned w i t h the 
c o n s t r u c t i o n o f n a t u r a l language i n t e r f a c e s . 
The major d i f f e r e n c e between the two k inds of 
e f f o r t s i s t h a t research o n i n t e r f a c e s has ( t o 
t h i s p o i n t , though i t need n o t ) separated 
language p r o c e s s i n g f rom the r e s t o f the system 
whereas one of the major concerns of research in 
t h e more t h e o r e t i c a l d i r e c t i o n i s the 
i n t e r a c t i o n between l a n g u a g e - s p e c i f i c and 
g e n e r a l knowledge and reason ing in the con tex t 
o f communica t ion . 
2 I ndeed , the n o t i o n of a shared model is 
i n h e r e n t i n the word "communica te , " which i s 
d e r i v e d f rom the L a t i n communicare, " t o make 
common". 
emphasis i n research i n n a t u r a l language 
p rocess i ng has begun to s h i f t f rom an a n a l y s i s 
o f u t t e r a n c e s as i s o l a t e d l i n g u i s t i c phenomena 
to a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of how people use u t t e r a n c e s 
t o ach ieve c e r t a i n o b j e c t i v e s . B u t , i n 
c o n s i d e r i n g o b j e c t i v e s , i t i s impo r tan t not t o 
i gno re the u t t e rances themse lves . A 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of a speaker ' s3 u n d e r l y i n g goals 
and m o t i v a t i o n s i s c r i t i c a l , b u t so i s an 
a n a l y s i s o f the p a r t i c u l a r way in which tha t 
speaker expresses h i s t h o u g h t s . The cho ice of 
exp ress ion has i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r such t h i n g s as 
what o t h e r e n t i t i e s may be d iscussed in the 
ensuing d i s c o u r s e , what the speake r ' s u n d e r l y i n g 
b e l i e f s ( i n c l u d i n g h i s b e l i e f s about the h e a r e r ) 
a r e , and what s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p the speaker 
and heare r have. The reason f o r c o n j o i n i n g 
" u t t e r a n c e " and " o b j e c t i v e " i n the t i t l e o f t h i s 
paper is to emphasize the importance of 
c o n s i d e r i n g b o t h . 
In the remainder of t h i s paper I want to examine 
t h r e e consequences o f these c la ims f o r the s o r t s 
of language p rocess ing t h e o r i e s we develop and 
the k i nds of language p rocess ing systems we 
b u i l d . 
I w i l l use "speaker " and " h e a r e r " to r e f e r 
r e s p e c t i v e l y to the producer o f an u t t e r a n c e and 
the i n t e r p r e t e r o f t h a t u t t e r a n c e . A l though the 
p a r t i c u l a r communicat ive environment c o n s t r a i n s 
the se t o f l i n g u i s t i c and n o n l i n g u i s t i c dev ices 
a speaker may use (Rub in , 1977) , I w i l l i gno re 
the d i f f e r e n c e s and concen t ra te on those 
problems t h a t are common across env i ronmen ts . 
* The s i m i l a r i t y to Word and Ob jec t 
(Qu ine , 1960) i s no t e n t i r e l y a c c i d e n t a l . I t i s 
i n tended t o h i g h l i g h t a major s h i f t i n the 
con tex t in wh ich ques t i ons about language and 
meaning shou ld be c o n s i d e r e d . I b e l i e v e the 
i ssues Quine r a i s e d can be addressed e f f e c t i v e l y 
n l y i n t h i s l a r g e r c o n t e x t . 
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* Language p rocess ing r e q u i r e s a 
comb ina t i on o f l a n g u a g e - s p e c i f i c 
mechanisms and gene ra l common-sense 
reason ing mechanisms* S p e c i f y i n g these 
mechanisms and t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n s 
c o n s t i t u t e s a major research a r e a . 
* Because d i s c o u r s e i n v o l v e s m u l t i p l e 
separa te agents w i t h d i f f e r i n g 
concep t ions o f the w o r l d , language 
systems must be ab le to rep resen t the 
b e l i e f s and knowledge o f m u l t i p l e 
I n d i v i d u a l a g e n t s . The reason ing 
procedures t h a t opera te on these 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s must be ab le to handle 
such separa te b e l i e f s . Fu r the rmore , 
they must be ab le to opera te on 
Incomple te and sometimes i n c o n s i s t e n t 
i n f o r m a t i o n . 
* U t t e rances are m u l t l f a c e t e d ; they must 
be v iewed as hav ing e f f e c t s a long 
m u l t i p l e d imens ions . As a r e s u l t , 
common-sense reason ing ( e s p e c i a l l y 
p l a n n i n g ) procedures must be ab le to 
hand le s i t u a t i o n s t h a t i n v o l v e a c t i o n s 
h a v i n g m u l t i p l e e f f e c t s . 
2 MONKEYS, BANANAS, AND COMMUNICATION 
To i l l u s t r a t e some of the c u r r e n t problems in 
n a t u r a l language p r o c e s s i n g , I want to look at a 
v a r i a n t of the "monkey and bananas" prob lem 
(McCarthy, 1968), the o r i g i n a l v e r s i o n o f wh ich 
is s u b s t a n t i a l l y as f o l l o w s : There is a monkey 
In a room t h a t a l s o c o n t a i n s a bunch of bananas 
hang ing f rom the c e l l i n g , out o f reach o f the 
monkey. There is a l s o a box in one co rner of 
t he room. The monkey's prob lem is to f i g u r e out 
what sequence o f a c t i o n s w i l l get h im the 
bananas. For a w h i l e a t l e a s t , t h i s prob lem was 
a f a v o r i t e t e s t case f o r au tomat ic problem 
s o l v e r s , and t h e r e a re s e v e r a l d e s c r i p t i o n s o f 
how i t can be so l ved by machine ( e . g . , see 
N l l s s o n , 1971). The v a r i a t i o n I want to d i scuss 
i n t r o d u c e s a second monkey, the need f o r some 
communicat ion to take p l a c e , and a change of 
scene to a t r o p i c a l f o r e s t c o n t a i n i n g banana 
t r e e s . To b e g i n , I want to leave u n s p e c i f i e d 
t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two monkeys and 
c o n s i d e r a s h o r t segment of h y p o t h e t i c a l 
d i a l o g u e : 
( 1 ) monkeyl ( l o o k i n g l o n g i n g l y a t bananas h i g h 
above h i m ) : I ' m hung ry . 
(2 ) monkey2: The re ' s a s t i c k under the o l d 
rubber t r e e . 
I f monkeyl I n t e r p r e t s monkey2's response as most 
A r t i f i c i a l I n t e l l i g e n c e (A I ) n a t u r a l language 
p r o c e s s i n g systems w o u l d , he might respond w i t h 
someth ing l i k e : " I c a n ' t eat a s t i c k " o r " I 
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know, so wha t? " and , un less monkey2 he lped him 
o u t , monkeyl would go hung ry . A l though the re 
a re a few systems now t h a t m i g h t , w i t h s u i t a b l e 
t w e a k i n g , be ab le to get f a r enough f o r a 
response t h a t i n d i c a t e s they have f i g u r e d out 
t h a t monkey2 i n tends f o r the s t i c k to be used to 
knock down the bananas, t he re a re no programs 
y e t t h a t wou ld be ab le to unders tand most o f the 
nuances o f t h i s response. For example, i t 
i m p l i e s not o n l y t h a t monkey2 has a p l a n f o r 
u s i n g the s t i c k , but a l s o t h a t he expects 
monkeyl e i t h e r to have a s i m i l a r p l a n or to be 
ab le to f i g u r e one out once he has been t o l d 
about the s t i c k . 
I f w e comp l i ca te the scenar io j u s t s l i g h t l y , 
then our programs wou ld a l l be s t u c k . I n 
p a r t i c u l a r , suppose t h a t the t r e e the s t i c k i s 
under is no t a rubber t r e e , bu t r a t h e r a 
d i f f e r e n t s o r t o f t r e e . Monkey2 might s t i l l use 
the phrase " t h e rubber t r e e " , e i t h e r by mis take 
o r d e s i g n , i f h e b e l i e v e s the phrase w i l l 
s u f f i c e t o enable monkeyl t o i d e n t i f y the t r e e 
( c f . D o n n e l l a n , 1977) . No c u r r e n t A I n a t u r a l 
language p rocess ing system wou ld be ab le to 
f i g u r e ou t where the s t i c k i s . The i r responses , 
a t b e s t , would be l i k e monkeyl s a y i n g , 
"Whaddayamean? There a r e n ' t any rubber t r e e s in 
t h i s f o r e s t . " But r e f e r r i n g express ions t h a t d o 
no t a c c u r a t e l y desc r i be the e n t i t i e s they a re 
i n t ended t o i d e n t i f y are t y p i c a l o f the s o r t o f 
t h i n g t h a t occurs a l l the t ime i n conve rsa t i ons 
between humans. The q u e s t i o n i s what I t w i l l 
take to get computer systems c l o s e r to be ing 
ab le to handle these s o r t s o f phenomena. 
In the remainder o f t h i s paper I want to l ook a t 
some of the research Issues t h a t need to be 
addressed to b r i n g us c l o s e r to unde rs tand ing 
why t a l k i n g monkeys d o n ' t go hung ry . I b e l i e v e 
many c r i t i c a l language p rocess i ng issues a r i s e 
f rom our l i m i t e d knowledge of how common-sense 
reason ing — wh ich i n c l u d e s d e d u c t i o n , p l a u s i b l e 
r e a s o n i n g , p l a n n i n g , and p l a n r e c o g n i t i o n — can 
be captured in a compu ta t i ona l sys tem. 
Consequent ly , research i n n a t u r a l language 
p rocess ing and common-sense reason ing must be 
t i g h t l y c o o r d i n a t e d i n the nex t few y e a r s . The 
r o o t o f the p rob lem, I suspec t , i s the f o l l o w i n g 
d i s c r e p a n c y . Research in p rob lem s o l v i n g and 
deduc t i on has focused a lmost e x c l u s i v e l y on 
problems t ha t a s i n g l e agent c o u l d so l ve a l o n e . 
The need f o r communicat ion a r i s e s w i t h those 
problems t h a t r e q u i r e the resources o f m u l t i p l e 
agen ts , problems t ha t a s i n g l e agent has 
i n s u f f i c i e n t power to s o l v e a l o n e . As a r e s u l t , 
language p rocess ing i s t y p i c a l l y a n i ssue i n 
There Is an equa l amount of s o p h i s t i c a t e d 
knowledge in monkey l ' s us i ng the s ta tement " I am 
hung ry " t o ask f o r he lp f rom monkey2 i n s o l v i n g 
h i s p rob lem. 
j u s t those con tex t s where the a i d o f another 
agent i s e s s e n t i a l . To o b t a i n t h a t a i d , the 
f i r s t agent must take i n t o account the 
knowledge, c a p a b i l i t i e s , and goa ls o f the 
second. In exchange f o r not needing q u i t e as 
much knowledge or c a p a b i l i t y in the problem 
domain, the agent must have a d d i t i o n a l 
communicat ion c a p a b i l i t i e s . For such prob lems, 
t he o p t i o n o f p roceed ing w i t h o u t c o n s i d e r i n g the 
independence of o the r agents and the need to 
communicate w i t h them i s no t f e a s i b l e . 
3 THE PROCESSES OF INTERPRETATION 
To i l l u s t r a t e how l a n g u a g e - s p e c i f i c processes 
combine w i t h gene ra l c o g n i t i v e processes ( i . e . , 
common-sense reason ing ) i n the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f 
an u t t e r a n c e , I want to cons ider the monkeys and 
bananas example i n more d e t a i l . I t w i l l b e 
u s e f u l t o v iew n a t u r a l language i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
as be ing d i v i d e d i n t o two major i n t e r a c t i n g 
l e v e l s . O n the f i r s t , the l i n g u i s t i c a n a l y s i s 
l e v e l , the fo rm o f an u t t e r a n c e i s analyzed to 
de te rmine i t s con tex t - i ndependen t a t t r i b u t e s . 
On the second, the a s s i m i l a t i o n l e v e l , common-
sense reason ing processes o p e r a t i n g in the 
c o n t e x t o f the c u r r e n t c o g n i t i v e s t a t e o f the 
hea re r —which i n c l u d e s such t h i n g s as a focus 
of a t t e n t i o n , a se t of goals to be ach ieved or 
ma in ta ined and p lans f o r a c h i e v i n g them, 
knowledge about the domain of d i s c o u r s e , 
knowledge about how language is used, and 
b e l i e f s about the c o g n i t i v e s t a t e s o f o the r 
a g e n t s , i n c l u d i n g o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the 
c u r r e n t c o n v e r s a t i o n — use these a t t r i b u t e s to 
update the c o g n i t i v e s t a t e and to determine what 
response t o the u t t e r a n c e i s r e q u i r e d , i f any . 
I b e l i e v e t h i s o p t i o n i s becoming less 
f e a s i b l e as w e l l f o r problem s o l v i n g and 
d e d u c t i o n components used f o r o the r purposes 
w i t h i n A I . S i t u a t i o n s i n which m u l t i p l e robo ts 
must cooperate i n t r o d u c e s i m i l a r comp lex i t y even 
i f the communicat ion i t s e l f can be c a r r i e d ou t 
in a f o r m a l language. S a c e r d o t i (1978) 
d i scusses the use fu lness o f research i n n a t u r a l 
language p rocess ing f o r the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f 
d i s t r i b u t e d a r t i f i c i a l i n t e l l i g e n c e systems. 
The issues be ing r a i s e d i n t h i s paper are 
c e n t r a l A I i s s u e s ; they p r o v i d e ev idence o f the 
i n te r connec tedness o f n a t u r a l language 
p r o c e s s i n g research and o t h e r research i n A I . 
7 Th i s s e p a r a t i o n i s u s e f u l f o r c o n s i d e r i n g the 
k i n d s o f processes i n v o l v e d i n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
The process o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i t s e l f , o f c o u r s e , 
e n t a i l s a g rea t dea l of i n t e r a c t i o n among the 
processes i n the d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s . There a re 
major research issues concerned w i t h t h e i r 
c o o r d i n a t i o n . 
To i l l u s t r a t e these l e v e l s , l e t us r e t u r n t o the 
example and cons ide r the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
monkey2's response ( 2 ) , "The re ' s a s t i c k under 
the o l d rubber t r e e , " to monkey 1*8 i n d i r e c t 
reques t ( 1 ) . 
3 . 1 . L i n g u i s t i c A n a l y s i s 
A t t h i s l e v e l , the pa r s i ng process t h a t ass igns 
s y n t a c t i c s t r u c t u r e t o the u t t e r a n c e a l s o 
ass igns a t t r i b u t e s t o the v a r i o u s s y n t a c t i c 
subphrases in the u t t e r a n c e and to the u t t e r a n c e 
as a who le . Many of these a t t r i b u t e s are of a 
semant ic n a t u r e . For example, the a t t r i b u t e s o f 
the phrase " t he o l d rubber t r e e " might i n c l u d e 
The phrase is of s y n t a c t i c c l ass NP (noun 
phrase) 
The phrase i s d e f i n i t e l y determined 
The phrase descr ibes a t such tha t TREE(t) 
and OLD( t ) , where OLD and TREE are 
Q 
p r e d i c a t e symbols0 
A t t r i b u t e s of u t t e r a n c e (2) as a whole i n c l u d e 
i t s s y n t a c t i c s t r u c t u r e and such p r o p e r t i e s a s : ^ 
The u t t e r a n c e presupposes t h a t the re e x i s t s 
a t such t h a t OLD(t) and TREE(t ) , and 
t h a t the d e s c r i p t i o n "OLD(t) & TREE( t ) " 
shou ld a l l o w t to be determined un ique ly 
i n the c u r r e n t c o n t e x t . 
The u t t e r a n c e asse r t s t ha t t h e r e e x i s t s an 
s such t h a t STICK(s) . 
The u t t e r a n c e a s s e r t s t h a t UNDER(s t ) . 
3 . 2 . A s s i m i l a t i o n 
As a t t r i b u t e s are e x t r a c t e d through the pa rs i ng 
process a t the l i n g u i s t i c a n a l y s i s l e v e l , 
common-sense reason ing processes beg in to ac t on 
those a t t r i b u t e s a t the a s s i m i l a t i o n l e v e l . Two 
major a c t i v i t i e s are i n v o l v e d : comp le t ing the 
l i t e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f a n u t t e r a n c e i n 
c o n t e x t , and drawing i m p l i c a t i o n s f rom tha t 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n to d i s cove r the in tended meaning. 
How much semantic s p e c i f i c i t y shou ld be 
imposed a t the l i n g u i s t i c l e v e l i s an open 
research q u e s t i o n . I n p a r t i c u l a r , I have l e f t 
open the q u e s t i o n of what happens w i t h the 
m o d i f i e r " r u b b e r " ; s u f f i c e i t t o say , the 
q u e s t i o n of how i t mod i f i es cannot be reso l ved 
s o l e l y a t the l i n g u i s t i c l e v e l . A l s o , i n a more 
complete a n a l y s i s , the p r e d i c a t e OLD would 
i n d i c a t e the se t w i t h respec t to which age i s 
e v a l u a t e d . 
7 What an u t t e r a n c e presupposes and asse r t s a re 
no t n e c e s s a r i l y components of the i n tended 
meaning, bu t the r e c o g n i t i o n o f p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s 
and a s s e r t i o n s i s p r e r e q u i s i t e t o the 
a s s i m i l a t i o n l e v e l o f p r o c e s s i n g . 
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For the example u t t e r a n c e ( 2 ) , comp le t i ng the 
l i t e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n c o n t e x t i n v o l v e s the 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f the r e f e r e n t o f the d e f i n i t e 
noun ph rase , " t h e o l d rubber t r e e " . The f i r s t 
a t t r i b u t e above i n d i c a t e s t h a t a un ique t r e e 
shou ld be e a s i l y i d e n t i f i e d i n c o n t e x t - Those 
o b j e c t s c u r r e n t l y i n monkey l 's focus o f 
a t t e n t i o n are examined (perhaps r e q u i r i n g 
s o p h i s t i c a t e d common-sense reason ing ) to 
de te rm ine whether t h e r e is such a t r e e among 
them* Assume t h a t none is found* It may be 
t h a t o n l y two k i n d s o f t r e e s are present i n t h i s 
f o r e s t , and t h a t one k i n d , say gumgum t r e e s , 
resemble rubber t r e e s , and t h a t o f a l l the t r e e s 
near the two monkeys on l y one is a gumgum t r e e . 
Monekyl may t e n t a t i v e l y assume t h a t " rubber 
t r e e " matches "gumgum t r e e " c l o s e l y enough to 
se rve t o i d e n t i f y t h i s t r e e . 
The sentence says t h e r e ' s a s t i c k under the 
t r e e , so monkeyl might look under the t r e e and 
d i s c o v e r t h a t , i n d e e d , t h e r e i s e x a c t l y one 
s t i c k t h e r e . That s t i c k must be the s t i c k whose 
e x i s t e n c e monkey2 was i n f o r m i n g him o f . The 
l i t e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the u t t e r a n c e i s seen 
to be t h a t t he newly found s t i c k i s under the 
gumgum t r e e . ° 
Knowing t h a t the sentence presupposed the 
e x i s t e n c e of a rubber t r e e and asse r ted the 
e x i s t e n c e of a s t i c k , monkeyl may i n f e r t h a t 
monkey2 b e l i e v e s these p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . Thus, 
monkeyl comes to b e l i e v e s e v e r a l new t h i n g s 
about monkey2's b e l i e f s : i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h a t h e 
b e l i e v e s these two e n t i t i e s e x i s t , and t h a t he 
t h i n k s the gumgum t r e e is a rubber t r e e , or a t 
l e a s t t h i n k s t h a t t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n can be used 
to i d e n t i f y the t r e e . Th is f a c t may be 
i m p o r t a n t i n f u r t h e r communicat ions. Monkeyl 
may a l s o i n f e r t h a t because monkey2 has j u s t 
ment ioned the s t i c k and the t r e e , they a re i n 
h i s focus o f a t t e n t i o n and t h a t he (monkey2), 
t o o , shou ld pay s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n t o these 
o b j e c t s . The s t i c k may be of p a r t i c u l a r 
impor tance because i t was the sub jec t of a 
t h e r e - i n s e r t i o n sentence ( a s y n t a c t i c p o s i t i o n 
of prominence) and has been newly i n t r o d u c e d 
i n t o h i s focus o f a t t e n t i o n . 
The second major process o f a s s i m i l a t i o n is to 
use common-sense reason ing to determine how the 
u t t e r a n c e f i t s i n t o the c u r r e n t se t o f p lans and 
g o a l s . I n g e n e r a l , t h i s i s a h i g h l y complex 
p r o c e s s . For the p a r t i c u l a r example o f 
i n t e r p r e t i n g u t t e r a n c e (2) i n the con tex t 
1 0 For more complex u t t e r a n c e s , the process of 
c o m p l e t i n g the l i t e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n can 
i n v o l v e d e t e r m i n i n g the scopes o f q u a n t i f i e r s 
and r e s o l v i n g v a r i o u s types o f a m b i g u i t i e s . 
1 1 C f . t he a n a l y s i s o f a se t o f t h e r a p e u t i c 
i n t e r v i e w s in Labov and Fanshel ( 1977 ) . 
i m p l i e d by u t t e r a n c e ( 1 ) , monkeyl must de termine 
wha t , " T h e r e ' s a s t i c k under the rubber t r e e , " 
has to do w i t h h i s problem of g e t t i n g something 
to e a t . B r i e f l y , he must see t h a t the sentence 
emphasizes the s t i c k and must know (or i n f e r ) 
t h a t such s t i c k s are o f t e n u s e f u l t o o l s f o r 
g e t t i n g t h i n g s ou t o f t r e e s . He must i n f e r t h a t 
r a o n k e y 2 i n tends f o r him t o use t h i s s t i c k i n 
c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h a s tandard p l a n f o r knock ing 
down t h i n g s to a c q u i r e some bananas and 
accompl ish h i s ( i m p l i c i t l y s t a t e d ) goa l o f no t 
be ing hungry . 
THE MULTIFACETED NATURE OF UTTERANCES 
To determine what o b j e c t i v e an u t t e r a n c e is 
i n tended to ach ieve r e q u i r e s d e t e r m i n i n g where 
t h a t u t t e r a n c e f i t s i n the speake r ' s p l a n s . 
That i s , j u s t as an agent may pe r fo rm p h y s i c a l 
a c t i o n s in tended t o a l t e r the p h y s i c a l s t a t e o f 
h i s env i ronment , he may pe r fo rm l i n g u i s t i c 
a c t i o n s ( u t t e r sentences) in tended t o a l t e r the 
c o g n i t i v e s t a t e o f the h e a r e r . (Whatever e f f e c t 
an u t t e r a n c e e v e n t u a l l y has on the o u t s i d e 
w o r l d , i t s immediate e f f e c t i s o n the h e a r e r ' s 
s t a t e . ) But because a s i n g l e u t t e r a n c e may be 
used t o ach ieve m u l t i p l e e f f e c t s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , 
the problem is more complex than t h i s analogy 
(o r the p reced ing example) a t f i r s t seems to 
sugges 
e D 
t . x 
The d i s c u s s i o n so f a r has concen t ra ted on a 
s i n g l e d imension o f e f f e c t : the use o f an 
u t t e r a n c e to achieve what I w i l l c a l l a domain 
g o a l , t ha t i s , t o convey i n f o r m a t i o n about the 
domain o f d i s c o u r s e . In t h i s s e c t i o n I want to 
d i scuss two o ther d imensions a long which an 
u t t e r a n c e can have e f f e c t s — the s o c i a l and the 
d i scou rse — and look at some of the problems in 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and g e n e r a t i o n t h a t a r i s e f rom 
the m u l t i f a c e t e d n a t u r e o f u t t e r a n c e s . 3 
The s o c i a l d imension i n c l u d e s those aspects o f 
an u t t e r a n c e t h a t concern the es tab l i shmen t and 
maintenance o f i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 
Th i s d imension o f u t t e r a n c e ( 1 ) , " I ' m h u n g r y , " 
12 
P h y s i c a l a c t i o n s may a l s o have e f f e c t s a long 
• m u l t i p l e dimensions a l t h o u g h they are not 
u s u a l l y though t of as do ing s o . For example, a 
b a l l e t dancer i n l e a p i n g ( r a t h e r than w a l k i n g 
s l o w l y ) not o n l y changes p o s i t i o n , but a l s o 
conveys a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e o f mind f o r the 
c h a r a c t e r be ing p o r t r a y e d and a p a r t i c u l a r l e v e l 
o f c a p a b i l i t y . 
13 
These dimensions p a r a l l e l the t h ree f u n c t i o n s 
o f language — i d e a t i o n a l , i n t e r p e r s o n a l , and 
t e x t u a l — in H a l l i d a y (1970 ) , bu t the 
p e r s p e c t i v e I take on them is c l o s e r to t h a t 
p resen ted i n Levy (1978 ) . 
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i s e a s i l y seen when i t i s compared w i t h such 
cho ices as 
(3) "How can I ge t some of those 
b l a s t e d bananas?" 
(4 ) "Can you he lp me get some bananas down?" 
(5) "Get me a banana. " 
Each of these ach ieves the same domain g o a l , 
i n f o r m i n g monkey2 o f monkey l 's d e s i r e to o b t a i n 
some bananas, but u t t e r a n c e (1) does not convey 
t h e same f a m i l i a r i t y as u t t e r a n c e (3) or the 
same l e v e l o f f r u s t r a t i o n . S i m i l a r l y , u t t e r a n c e 
(4 ) makes the same request as u t t e rance (5) but 
does so i n d i r e c t l y and, t h e r e f o r e , can be used 
w i t h s o c i a l e q u a l s . The s o c i a l dimension i s 
p resen t i n every d i s c o u r s e 1 ^ and p r e v a i l s i n 
some ( e . g . , Hobbs, 1979). I t has been l a r g e l y 
i gno red i n n a t u r a l language p rocess ing research 
to d a t e . The assumpt ion has been tha t some s o r t 
o f n e u t r a l s tance i s p o s s i b l e . But not choosing 
i s choos ing not to choose ( c f . Goffman, 1978), 
and , a l t hough t he re are some se r i ous 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l i ssues r a i s e d by t h i s d imension o f 
u t t e r a n c e s when c o n s i d e r i n g communication 
between people and computers , I do not t h i n k we 
can con t i nue t o i gno re i t . 
The d i scou rse d imension i nc l udes those aspects 
o f an u t t e r a n c e t h a t d e r i v e f rom i t s 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n in a coherent d i scourse — how the 
u t t e r a n c e r e l a t e s t o the u t t e r a n c e s t h a t 
preceded i t and t o what w i l l f o l l o w . T y p i c a l l y 
t he i n f o r m a t i o n a speaker wishes to convey 
r e q u i r e s s e v e r a l u t t e r a n c e s . As a r e s u l t the 
i n d i v i d u a l u t t e r a n c e s must con ta i n i n f o r m a t i o n 
t h a t p r o v i d e s l i n k s to what went be fo re and 
p r o p e r l y se t the s tage f o r what f o l l o w s . 
U t t e rances t h a t convey the same p r o p o s i t i o n a l 
con ten t may d i f f e r w i d e l y in such th ings as the 
e n t i t i e s they i n d i c a t e a speaker is focused on 
and hence may r e f e r to l a t e r . As an extreme 
example, no te t h a t the p r o p o s i t i o n a l con ten t o f 
"Not every s t i c k i s n ' t under the rubber t r e e " i s 
e q u i v a l e n t t o t h a t o f u t t e r a n c e ( 2 ) , but because 
i t does no t ment ion any i n d i v i d u a l s t i c k , i t 
does not a l l o w whoever speaks next to make any 
r e f e r e n c e to the s t i c k t h a t i s under the gumgum 
t r e e . 1 5 
l * P i t t e n g e r e t a l . (1960) p o i n t out t h a t "no 
m a t t e r what e l s e human be ings may be 
communicat ing abou t , or may t h i n k they are 
communicat ing abou t , they are always 
communicat ing about themse lves , about one 
a n o t h e r , and about the immediate con tex t of the 
commun ica t i on . " 
15 Th i s example is based on one suggested by 
Barbara Par tee f o r the S loan Workshop a t the 
U n i v e r s i t y of Massachuset ts , December, 1978. A 
d i s c u s s i o n o f her example i s i n c l u d e d in Grosz 
and H e n d r i x , 1978. 
There are two c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of these 
dimensions and the m u l t i f a c e t e d na tu re o f 
u t t e r a n c e s t h a t i n t r o d u c e comp l i ca t i ons i n t o 
n a t u r a l language p r o c e s s i n g . F i r s t , as 
H a l l i d a y (1977) has p o i n t e d o u t , the u n i t s i n 
wh ich the i n f o r m a t i o n i s conveyed a long these 
o the r dimensions of meaning do not f o l l o w the 
c o n s t i t u e n t s t r u c t u r e o f sentences n e a r l y so 
n i c e l y as do the u n i t s conveying p r o p o s i t i o n a l 
c o n t e n t . I n p a r t i c u l a r , the s o c i a l i m p l i c a t i o n s 
o f a n u t t e r a n c e are t y p i c a l l y r e f l e c t e d i n 
cho ices s c a t t e r e d th roughout i t ; f o r example, 
they are r e f l e c t e d i n the cho ice o f u t t e r a n c e 
type (a request v s . a command) and in the 
cho ice o f l e x i c a l i t e m s . 
Second, an u t t e r a n c e may r e l a t e to p lans and 
goals a long any number of these d imens ions . I t 
may be a comment on the preced ing u t t e rance 
i t s e l f , i t s s o c i a l i m p l i c a t i o n s (o r b o t h , a s i s 
u s u a l l y the case w i t h " I s h o u l d n ' t have sa id 
t h a t " ) , or on some p a r t of the domain content of 
the u t t e r a n c e . I t i s not s imp ly a mat ter o f 
de te rm in ing where an u t t e r a n c e f i t s i n t o a 
speaker ' s p l a n , bu t o f de te rm in ing which p l a n o r 
p lans —domain , s o c i a l , o r communicative — the 
u t t e r a n c e f i t s i n t o . A one d imens iona l a n a l y s i s 
o f an u t t e r a n c e i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o cap tu re the 
d i f f e r e n t e f f e c t s ( c f . Goffman, 1978). 
The m u l t i f a c e t e d n a t u r e of u t t e rances poses 
problems f o r language gene ra t i on as w e l l . A 
speaker t y p i c a l l y must coo rd ina te goals a long 
each of these d imens ions . He must des ign an 
u t t e r a n c e t h a t conveys i n f o r m a t i o n l i n k i n g i t t o 
the p reced ing d i scou rse and ma in ta ins the s o c i a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p he has w i t h the h e a r e r ( s ) (or 
e s t a b l i s h e s one) as w e l l as conveying domain-
1 C 
s p e c i f i c i n f o r m a t i o n . 1 0 The speaker 's task is 
f u r t h e r compl icated because he has only 
incomplete knowledge of the intended heare r ' s 
goa ls , p l ans , and b e l i e f s . 
5 STATE OF THE ART 
I w i l l use our work in na tu ra l language 
process ing at SRI I n t e r n a t i o n a l (Robinson, 1978; 
Walker, 1978) as an exemplar f o r d iscuss ing the 
cu r ren t s t a t e o f research in t h i s a rea, both 
because I am most f a m i l i a r w i t h it and because I 
t h i n k the framework i t provides is a u s e f u l one 
f o r seeing not on ly where the f i e l d s tands, but 
a lso where the next several years e f f o r t might 
best be expended. The system coord inates 
m u l t i p l e sources of language-spec i f i c knowledge 
and combines them w i t h c e r t a i n general knowledge 
and common-sense reasoning s t r a t e g i e s in 
1D Levy (1978) discusses how the m u l t i p l e l e v e l s 
a long which a speaker plans are r e f l e c t e d in 
what he says and the s t r u c t u r e of h i s d iscourse . 
1071 
a r r i v i n g a t a l i t e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f an 
u t te rance in the context o f an ongoing t a s k -
o r i e n t e d d ia logue* A major f ea tu re of the 
system is the t i g h t coup l ing o f s y n t a c t i c form 
and semantic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n * In the 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f an u t t e r a n c e , i t associates 
c o l l e c t i o n s o f a t t r i b u t e s w i t h each phrase. For 
example, noun phrases are annotated w i t h values 
f o r the a t t r i b u t e ' d e f i n i t e n e s s ' , a p roper ty 
t h a t i s re levan t f o r drawing in fe rences about 
focus ing (Grosz, 1977a, 1977b, 1978) and about 
p resuppos i t i ons of ex is tence and mutual 
knowledge (Clark and M a r s h a l l , 1978). 
I n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s performed i n m u l t i p l e stages 
under c o n t r o l of an execut ive and in accordance 
w i t h the s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of a language d e f i n i t i o n 
t h a t coord inates m u l t i p l e "knowledge sources" 
f o r i n t e r p r e t i n g each phrase. Two so r t s of 
processes take p a r t in the l i n g u i s t i c l e v e l o f 
ana l ys i s * F i r s t , there are processes that 
i n t e r p r e t the inpu t "bot tom up" ( i . e . , words -> 
phrases -> l a r g e r phrases -> sentences) . In the 
ana l ys i s of u t te rance (2 ) , these processes would 
p rov ide a t t r i b u t e s s p e c i f y i n g tha t the phrase "a 
s t i c k " i s i n d e f i n i t e and i n the subject p o s i t i o n 
of a t h e r e - i n i t i a l sentence and the phrase " the 
rubber t r e e " is d e f i n i t e and presupposes the 
ex is tence o f a un ique ly i d e n t i f i a b l e e n t i t y . 
Second, there are processes tha t r e f i n e the 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a phrase in the context of the 
l a r g e r phrases tha t con ta in i t , doing such 
th ings as e s t a b l i s h i n g a r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
s y n t a c t i c u n i t s and d e s c r i p t i o n s of (se ts o f 
p r o p o s i t i o n s about) ob jec ts in the domain model . 
For example, the s t r u c t u r e f o r " the rubber t r e e " 
would Inc lude p r e d i c a t i o n s of ex is tence and 
t reeness . 
The a s s i m i l a t i o n l e v e l in the cu r ren t system 
on ly goes so f a r as determin ing a l i t e r a l 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n in c o n t e x t . The major tasks 
performed here inc lude d e l i m i t i n g the scope of 
q u a n t i f i e r s and a s s o c i a t i n g references to 
ob jec t s w i t h p a r t i c u l a r e n t i t i e s i n the domain 
model, t a k i n g i n t o account the o v e r a l l d ia logue 
Several o ther systems are capable of f a i r l y 
s o p h i s t i c a t e d ana lys i s and process ing at the 
l e v e l o f coo rd ina t i ng d i f f e r e n t k inds o f 
l anguage-spec i f i c c a p a b i l i t i e s ( e . g . , Sager and 
Grishman, 1975; Landsbergen, 1976; P l a t h , 1976; 
Woods et a l . , 1976; Bobrow et a l . , 1977; Reddy 
et a l . 1977) and of t a k i n g i n t o account some of 
the ways in which context a f f e c t s meaning 
through the a p p l i c a t i o n o f l i m i t e d a c t i o n 
scenar ios (Schank et a l . , 1975; Novak, 1977) or 
by cons ider ing ( e i t h e r independent ly o r in 
con junc t i on w i t h such scenar ios) language-
s p e c i f i c mechanisms t ha t re ference context 
(Hobbs, 1976; R ieger , 1975; Hayes, 1978; Mann et 
a l . , 1977; S idner , 1979). 
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and task context* In the case of our two 
monkeys, the system would determine whether 
there was a unique rubber t ree i n , or near , the 
focus of a t t e n t i o n of the monkey (more on t h i s 
s h o r t l y ) and then p o s i t , or check, the ex is tence 
of a s t i c k under i t * The system does make some 
in ferences based on the i n f o r m a t i o n e x p l i c i t l y 
contained i n an u t te rance and i t s l i t e r a l 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . To see the so r t s of in fe rences 
i t w i l l make, cons ider the sequence: 
(6) monkey 1: I 'm going out to get some bananas. 
Where is the s t i c k ? 
(7) monkey2: I t ' s under the gumgum t r e e . 
I f the system (p lay ing the r o l e of monkey2) 
knows of some p lan f o r g e t t i n g bananas f rom a 
t r e e that i nvo lves the use of a p a r t i c u l a r 
s t i c k , i t would be able to make sense of 
monkeyl 's reques t , i n c l u d i n g i d e n t i f y i n g " the 
s t i c k " as the one tha t is u s u a l l y used to knock 
bananas out of t r e e s . Fur thermore, i f the p lan 
inc luded steps p r e r e q u i s i t e to g e t t i n g a s t i c k 
( e . g . , g e t t i n g a knapsack f o r ca r r y i ng the 
re levan t t o o l s and the gathered bananas), the 
system would i n f e r tha t they too had been 
per formed. 
I n i t i a l progress has been made in overcoming the 
l i m i t a t i o n s o f l i t e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and 
i n c l u d i n g a cons ide ra t i on of a speaker 's plans 
and goals in the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of an u t t e r a n c e . 
Recent research on the r o l e of p lann ing in 
language process ing Inc ludes tha t of 
Cohen (1978), Wilensky (1978) , Carbone l l (1979) , 
and A l l e n (1979) . Cohen (1978) views speech 
acts (Sear le , 1969) as one k ind of g o a l - o r i e n t e d 
a c t i v i t y and descr ibes a system that uses 
mechanisms p rev ious l y used f o r p lann ing 
n o n l i n g u l s t i c ac t i ons to p lan i n d i v i d u a l speech 
ac ts (on the l e v e l of reques t ing and in fo rming) 
intended to s a t i s f y some goals i n v o l v i n g the 
speaker 's or hea re r ' s knowledge. In Wi lensky 's 
work on s t o r y understanding (see a lso Schank and 
Abelson, 1977), the speaker 's o v e r a l l plans and 
goa l s , some of which are i m p l i c i t , are i n f e r r e d 
from substeps and in te rmed ia te or t r i g g e r i n g 
s t a t e s ( e . g . , i n f e r r i n g from "John was hungry. 
He got in h i s c a r . " t ha t John was going to get 
something to e a t . ) Carbone l l (1979) descr ibes a 
system const ruc ted to i n v e s t i g a t e how two agents 
w i t h d i f f e r e n t goals i n t e r p r e t an inpu t 
d i f f e r e n t l y ; i t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned w i t h 
the e f f e c t o f c o n f l i c t i n g plans on 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . A l l e n (1979) descr ibes a system 
based on a model in which speech acts are 
The system a c t u a l l y works on d ia logues f o r 
assembling mechanical equipment. The plans i t 
knows about are p a r t i a l l y ordered (and not 
l i n e a r ) , and the s t r u c t u r e s I t uses a l l o w f o r 
desc r i b i ng plans a t m u l t i p l e l e v e l s o f 
a b s t r a c t i o n . 
d e f i n e d in terms o f " t h e p l a n the hearer 
b e l i e v e s the speaker i n tended him to recognize1 1 
and has perhaps gone f u r t h e s t in de te rm in ing 
mechanisms by which a speaker ' s goals and p lans 
can be taken i n t o account i n the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of an u t t e r a n c e * 
These e f f o r t s have demonstrated the f e a s i b i l i t y 
o f i n c o r p o r a t i n g p l a n n i n g and p l a n r e c o g n i t i o n 
i n t o the common-sense reason ing component of a 
n a t u r a l language p rocess ing system, bu t t h e i r 
l i m i t a t i o n s h i g h l i g h t the need f o r more robus t 
c a p a b i l i t i e s i n o rde r t o ach ieve the i n t e g r a t i o n 
of l a n g u a g e - s p e c i f i c and gene ra l common-sense 
reason ing c a p a b i l i t i e s r e q u i r e d f o r f l u e n t 
communicat ion in n a t u r a l language. No system 
combines a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of m u l t i p l e agents 
h a v i n g d i f f e r e n t goa ls w i t h a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f 
t he problems t h a t a r i s e f rom m u l t i p l e agents 
h a v i n g separa te b e l i e f s and each hav ing on ly 
i ncomp le te knowledge about the o the rs a g e n t ' s 
p lans and g o a l s . 1 9 Fu r the rmore , on l y s imp le 
sequences of a c t i o n s have been c o n s i d e r e d , and 
no a t tempt has been made to t r e a t h y p o t h e t i c a l 
w o r l d s . 
One of the major weaknesses in cu r ren t AI 
systems and t h e o r i e s (and the l i m i t a t i o n o f 
c u r r e n t systems t h a t I f i n d of most concern) is 
t h a t they cons ide r u t t e r a n c e s as hav ing a s i n g l e 
meaning o r e f f e c t . Ana logous l y , a c r i t i c a l 
om iss ion in work on p l a n n i n g and language is 
t h a t i t f a i l s t o cons ide r the m u l t i p l e 
d imensions on which an u t t e r a n c e can have 
e f f e c t s . I f u t t e r a n c e s are cons idered ope ra to rs 
(where " o p e r a t o r " i s meant in the genera l sense 
of something t h a t produces an e f f e c t ) , they must 
be viewed as conglomerate o p e r a t o r s . 
A l though i t does not ye t go beyond l i t e r a l 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n (except b y f i l l i n g i n unmentioned 
i n t e r m e d i a t e s teps i n the task be ing pe r f o rmed ) , 
t he SRI language system does account f o r two 
k i n d s o f e f f e c t s o f a n u t t e r a n c e . I n a d d i t i o n 
to d e t e r m i n i n g the p r o p o s i t i o n a l con ten t o f an 
u t t e r a n c e (and what i t l i t e r a l l y conveys about 
t he s t a t e o f the w o r l d ) , the system determines 
whether the u t t e r a n c e i n d i c a t e s t h a t the 
speake r ' s focus o f a t t e n t i o n has s h i f t e d 
(Grosz, 1977a,b, 1978; S idne r , 1 9 7 9 ) . 2 0 
To summarize t h e n , one or more of the f o l l o w i n g 
c r u c i a l l i m i t a t i o n s i s ev iden t i n every n a t u r a l 
1 9 Moore (1979) d iscusses problems of reason ing 
about knowledge and b e l i e f . 
2 0 Grosz and Hendr ix (1978) d iscuss f o c u s i n g as 
one o f the elements o f c o g n i t i v e s t a t e c r u c i a l 
t o the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f bo th d e f i n i t e and 
i n d e f i n i t e r e f e r r i n g e x p r e s s i o n s , and 
Grosz (1978) d iscusses s e v e r a l open problems in 
mode l ing the f o c u s i n g p rocess . 
language p rocess ing system c o n s t r u c t e d to da te 
(a l though most of these problems have been 
addressed to some ex ten t in the research 
descr ibed above and e l sewhere ) : 
* I n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s l i t e r a l (on ly 
p r o p o s i t i o n a l con ten t i s de te rm ined ) . 
* The knowledge and b e l i e f s of a l l 
p a r t i c i p a n t s in a d i scourse are assumed 
t o b e i d e n t i c a l . 
* The p lans and goa ls o f a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s 
are cons idered to be i d e n t i c a l . 
* The m u l t i f a c e t e d na tu re of u t t e r a n c e s is 
not c o n s i d e r e d . 
To move beyond t h i s s t a t e , the major problems to 
be faced a t the l e v e l o f l i n g u i s t i c a n a l y s i s 
concern de te rm in ing how d i f f e r e n t l i n g u i s t i c 
c o n s t r u c t i o n s a re used to convey i n f o r m a t i o n 
about such t h i ngs as the speaker ' s ( i m p l i c i t ) 
assumptions about the h e a r e r ' s b e l i e f s , what 
e n t i t i e s the speaker i s f o c u s i n g o n , and the 
speaker ' s a t t i t u d e toward the hea re r . The 
problems to be faced a t the a s s i m i l a t i o n l e v e l 
a re more fundamenta l . In p a r t i c u l a r , we need to 
determine common-sense reason ing mechanisms tha t 
can d e r i v e complex connect ions between p lans and 
goals — connect ions t h a t are not e x p l i c i t 
e i t h e r in the d ia logue o r in the p lans and goa ls 
themselves — and to reason about these 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s in an environment where the 
prob lem s o l v e r ' s knowledge i s n e c e s s a r i l y 
i n c o m p l e t e . Th is is not j u s t a mat te r o f 
s p e c i f y i n g more d e t a i l s o f p a r t i c u l a r 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s , but o f s p e c i f y i n g new k inds o f 
problem s o l v i n g and reasoning s t r u c t u r e s and 
procedures t h a t operate in the k i n d o f 
envi ronment i n which n a t u r a l language 
communicat ion u s u a l l y occu rs . 
COMMON-SENSE REASONING IN NATURAL LANGUAGE 
PROCESSING 
The p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n s of t h i s paper have 
suggested s e v e r a l c o m p l e x i t i e s in the common-
sense reason ing needs of n a t u r a l language 
communicat ion. A p a r t i c i p a n t in a communicat ive 
s i t u a t i o n t y p i c a l l y has incomple te i n f o r m a t i o n 
about o the r p a r t i c i p a n t s . In p a r t i c u l a r he 
cannot assume t h a t t h e i r b e l i e f s , g o a l s , o r 
p lans are i d e n t i c a l . Communication i s 
i n h e r e n t l y i n t e r p e r s o n a l . Fur thermore , the 
i n f o r m a t i o n a speaker conveys t y p i c a l l y r e q u i r e s 
a sequence of u t t e r a n c e s . As a r e s u l t , 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r e q u i r e s r e c o g n i t i o n o f d i f f e r e n t 
k i nds o f p l a n s , and g e n e r a t i o n r e q u i r e s the 
a b i l i t y t o c o o r d i n a t e m u l t i p l e k i nds o f a c t i o n s 
t o s a t i s f y goals a long m u l t i p l e d imens ions . 
Other c o m p l i c a t i o n s a re i n t r oduced by the 
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i n t e r a c t i o n s among p lans o f d i f f e r e n t agents 
(Bruce and Newman, 1978; Hobbs and 
Robinson (1978) d i scuss some of the comp lex i t y 
of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between an u t t e r a n c e and 
domain s p e c i f i c p l a n s ) . 
From t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , the c u r r e n t deduc t ion and 
p l a n n i n g systems i n A l a re d e f i c i e n t i n s e v e r a l 
areas c r i t i c a l f o r n a t u r a l language p r o c e s s i n g . 
A rev iew o f the c u r r e n t s t a t e o f the a r t i n p l a n 
g e n e r a t i o n and r e c o g n i t i o n shows t h a t the most 
advanced systems have one or another (but no t 
b o t h ) o f the f o l l o w i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s : * 1 p lans f o r 
p a r t i a l l y o rdered sequences of a c t i o n s can be 
genera ted d e t a i l ( S a c e r d o t i , 1977) and 
recogn ized (Genesere th , 1978; Schmidt and 
S r i d h a r a n , 1977) a t m u l t i p l e l e v e l s o f d e t a i l i n 
a r e s t r i c t e d s u b j e c t a r e a . However, these 
programs on l y cons ide r s i n g l e agen t s , assume the 
sys tem 's v iew o f the w o r l d i s " t h e c o r r e c t " one, 
and p l a n f o r a c t i o n s t h a t produce a s t a t e change 
c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a s i n g l e p r ima ry e f f e c t . 
The most impo r tan t d i r e c t i o n s in which these 
c a p a b i l i t i e s must be extended and i n t e g r a t e d f o r 
use in the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and gene ra t i on o f 
language are the f o l l o w i n g : 
* I t must be p o s s i b l e to p l a n in a dynamic 
envi ronment t h a t i n c l u d e s o t h e r a c t i v e 
a g e n t s , g i ven incomp le te i n f o r m a t i o n . 
* I t must be p o s s i b l e to c o o r d i n a t e 
d i f f e r e n t types o f a c t i o n s and p l an to 
ach ieve m u l t i p l e p r imary e f f e c t s 
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . 
* I t must be p o s s i b l e to recogn ize 
p r e v i o u s l y u n a n t i c i p a t e d p l a n s . 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
Common-sense r e a s o n i n g , e s p e c i a l l y p l a n n i n g , i s 
a c e n t r a l i ssue in language r e s e a r c h , no t on ly 
w i t h i n a r t i f i c i a l i n t e l l i g e n c e , bu t a l s o i n 
l i n g u i s t i c s ( e . g . , Chafe, 1978; Morgan 1978) , 
s o c i o l i n g u i s t i c s ( e . g . , Goffman, 1974; Labov and 
F a n s h e l , 1977), and ph i losophy ( e . g . , 
Kasher , 1978) . The l i t e r a l con ten t o f an 
u t t e r a n c e must be i n t e r p r e t e d w i t h i n the con tex t 
o f t he b e l i e f s , g o a l s , and p lans o f the d ia l ogue 
p a r t i c i p a n t s , so t h a t a hearer can move beyond 
l i t e r a l con ten t t o the i n t e n t i o n s t h a t l i e 
beh ind the u t t e r a n c e . Fu r the rmore , i t i s 
i n s u f f i c i e n t to cons i de r an u t t e r a n c e as be ing 
addressed to a s i n g l e pu rpose . T y p i c a l l y , an 
21 E a r l S a c e r d o t i p rov ided me w i t h t h i s 
c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f the c u r r e n t s t a t e o f a f f a i r s 
in A I r esea rch on prob lem s o l v i n g as w e l l as 
w i t h much u s e f u l i n f o r m a t i o n about problem 
s o l v i n g i ssues i n g e n e r a l . 
u t t e r a n c e serves m u l t i p l e purposes : i t 
h i g h l i g h t s c e r t a i n o b j e c t s and r e l a t i o n s h i p s , 
conveys an a t t i t u d e toward them, and p rov ides 
l i n k s t o p r e v i o u s u t t e r a n c e s i n a d d i t i o n t o 
communicat ing some p r o p o s l t i o n a l c o n t e n t . 
Progress toward unders tand ing the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between u t t e r a n c e s and o b j e c t i v e s and i t s e f f e c t 
on n a t u r a l language communicat ion w i l l be bes t 
f u r t h e r e d by c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the fundamenta l 
l i n g u i s t i c , common-sense r e a s o n i n g , and p l a n n i n g 
processes i n v o l v e d in language use and t h e i r 
i n t e r a c t i o n . A merger of research in common-
sense reasoning and language p rocess ing is an 
i m p o r t a n t goa l bo th f o r deve lop ing a 
compu ta t i ona l theory of the communicat ive use of 
language and f o r c o n s t r u c t i n g computer-based 
n a t u r a l language p rocess ing systems. The next 
few years of resea rch on language p rocess ing 
shou ld be concerned to a l a r g e ex ten t w i t h 
i ssues t h a t are at l e a s t as much i ssues of 
common-sense reason ing ( e s p e c i a l l y p l a n n i n g 
i s s u e s ) . Whi le common-sense reason ing research 
cou ld con t i nue w i t h o u t any regard f o r language, 
t h e r e is some evidence t h a t the p e r s p e c t i v e of 
language p rocess ing w i l l p r o v i d e i n s i g h t s i n t o 
fundamenta l issues i n p l a n n i n g t h a t c o n f r o n t A I 
more g e n e r a l l y . 
F i n a l l y , I want to emphasize the l o n g - t e r m 
na tu re o f the problems t h a t c o n f r o n t n a t u r a l 
language p rocess ing research i n A I . I b e l i e v e 
we shou ld s t a r t by add ing communicat ion 
c a p a b i l i t i e s to systems t ha t have s o l i d 
c a p a b i l i t i e s i n s o l v i n g some prob lem 
( c o n s t r u c t i n g such systems f i r s t i f necessary ; 
c f . McDermott, 1976). A l though i t may 
i n i t i a l l y take longer t o c r e a t e f u n c t i o n i n g 
sys tems, the systems t h a t r e s u l t w i l l b e u s e f u l , 
not t o y s . People w i l l have a reason to 
communicate w i t h such sys tems. Monkey2 can he lp 
monkeyl get something to eat on l y i f he h i m s e l f 
has a r e a l i s t i c concep t i on of the c o m p l e x i t i e s 
o f monkey l 's w o r l d . 
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PROBLEM SOLVING TACTICS 
E a r l D . S a c e r d o t i 
A r t i f i c i a l I n t e l l i g e n c e Center 
SRI I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Menlo Park , C a l i f o r n i a 94025 USA 
Th i s paper desc r ibes the bas i c s t r a t e g i e s of au tomat ic problem s o l v i n g , and then focuses on a 
v a r i e t y o f t a c t i c s f o r improv ing t h e i r e f f i c i e n c y . An a t tempt i s made to p rov ide some 
p e r s p e c t i v e on and s t r u c t u r e to the se t o f t a c t i c s . F i n a l l y , some new d i r e c t i o n s f o r p rob lem-
s o l v i n g research are d i s cussed , and a persona l p e r s p e c t i v e is p rov ided on where the work is 
headed: toward g r e a t e r f l e x i b i l i t y o f c o n t r o l and more i n t i m a t e i n t e g r a t i o n o f p l a n g e n e r a t i o n , 
e x e c u t i o n , and r e p a i r . 
1. AUTOMATIC PROBLEM SOLVING 
For i n t e l l i g e n t computers to be able to i n t e r a c t 
w i t h the r e a l w o r l d , they must be ab le to 
aggregate i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n s i n t o sequences t o 
ach ieve d e s i r e d goa l s . Th is process i s r e f e r r e d 
to as au tomat i c problem s o l v i n g , sometimes more 
c a s u a l l y c a l l e d au tomat i c p l a n n i n g . The 
sequences o f a c t i o n s t h a t are generated are 
c a l l e d p l a n s . 
E a r l y work i n au tomat i c problem s o l v i n g focused 
on what Newe l l [1] has c a l l e d "weak methods . " 
Wh i le these p r o b l e m - s o l v i n g s t r a t e g i e s are q u i t e 
g e n e r a l and a re f o r m a l l y t r a c t a b l e , they a re 
i n s u f f i c i e n t i n p r a c t i c e f o r s o l v i n g problems o f 
any s i g n i f i c a n t c o m p l e x i t y . Dur ing the l a s t 
decade, a number of techn iques have been 
developed f o r improv ing the e f f i c i e n c y o f these 
s t r a t e g i e s * Since these techniques opera te 
w i t h i n the con tex t o f the genera l s t r a t e g i e s , 
they are termed here p r o b l e m - s o l v i n g t a c t i c s * 
The b u l k o f t h i s paper c o n s i s t s o f a d e s c r i p t i o n 
of the p r o b l e m - s o l v i n g s t r a t e g i e s and a 
ca ta l ogue o f t a c t i c s f o r improv ing t h e i r 
e f f i c i e n c y . Th is i s f o l l o w e d by an a t tempt t o 
p r o v i d e some p e r s p e c t i v e on and s t r u c t u r e to the 
m 
se t o f t a c t i c s . F i n a l l y , some new d i r e c t i o n s in 
P r e p a r a t i o n of t h i s paper was suppor ted by the 
Defense Advanced Research P r o j e c t s Agency under 
c o n t r a c t N00039-79-C-0118 w i t h the Naval 
E l e c t r o n i c Systems Command. Barbara Grosz, 
Pe te r H a r t , N i l s N i l s s o n , and Don Walker 
suggested h e l p f u l p r e s e n t a t i o n t a c t i c s . 
p r o b l e m - s o l v i n g research are d i s c u s s e d , and a 
pe rsona l p e r s p e c t i v e is p rov ided on where the 
work i s headed: toward g rea te r f l e x i b i l i t y o f 
c o n t r o l and more i n t i m a t e i n t e g r a t i o n o f p l a n 
g e n e r a t i o n , e x e c u t i o n , and r e p a i r . 
Because problem s o l v i n g i n v o l v e s e x p l o r a t i o n o f 
a l t e r n a t i v e hypo thes ized sequences of a c t i o n s , a 
symbol ic model o f the r e a l w o r l d , r e f e r r e d to as 
a w o r l d model , is used to enable s imp le 
s i m u l a t i o n s o f the c r i t i c a l aspects o f the 
s i t u a t i o n to be run as the p lans are e v o l v e d . 
As w i t h a l l models, the wo r l d models used in 
problem s o l v i n g are a b s t r a c t i o n s o r 
o v e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n s o f the w o r l d they model . 
1 . 1 . What is Needed to Generate Plans 
The genera l f u n c t i o n of an au tomat ic problem 
s o l v i n g sys tem, t h e n , i s to c o n s t r u c t a sequence 
o f a c t i o n s t h a t t rans fo rms one w o r l d model i n t o 
a n o t h e r . There are t h r e e bas ic c a p a b i l i t i e s 
t h a t a problem s o l v i n g system must have. These 
a r e : 
a. Management of S ta te D e s c r i p t i o n Models - A 
s t a t e d e s c r i p t i o n model i s a s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f 
the s t a t e o f the w o r l d a t some t i m e . The f a c t s 
o r r e l a t i o n s t h a t are t r u e a t any p a r t i c u l a r 
t ime can be represen ted as some equ i va l en t of 
p r e d i c a t e c a l c u l u s f o r m u l a s . (We s h a l l r e f e r , 
somewhat l o o s e l y , to these f a c t s and r e l a t i o n s 
as a t t r i b u t e s o f a s t a t e . ) The c r i t i c a l aspect 
o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f o r problem s o l v i n g i s the 
need to rep resen t a l t e r n a t i v e and J i y p o t h e t i c a l 
s i t u a t i o n s , t h a t i s , t o c h a r a c t e r i z e the 
aggregate e f f e c t s o f a l t e r n a t i v e sequences o f 
a c t i o n s as the problem s o l v e r searches f o r a 
s o l u t i o n . 
1077 
Three methods have t y p i c a l l y been used f o r 
r e p r e s e n t i n g these a l t e r n a t i v e s . One method has 
been t o i n c l u d e a n e x p l i c i t s t a t e s p e c i f i c a t i o n 
i n each l i t e r a l o r a s s e r t i o n (as suggested by 
McCarthy and Hayes [2] and implemented by Green 
[ 3 ] ) . Another a l t e r n a t i v e i s t o assoc ia te each 
l i t e r a l w i t h a n i m p l i c i t data con tex t t h a t can 
be e x p l i c i t l y r e fe renced (as in QA4 [ 4 ] ) . A 
t h i r d cho ice i s t o have a l l the l i t e r a l s t h a t 
d e s c r i b e the s t a t e s e x p l i c i t l y t i e d u p i n the 
c o n t r o l s t r u c t u r e o f the problem s o l v e r ( a s , f o r 
example, i n most prob lem s o l v e r s w r i t t e n i n 
CONNIVER [ 5 ] ) . 
b. Deduc t i ve Machinery - A s t a t e d e s c r i p t i o n 
mode l , t h e n , c o n t a i n s a l l the i n f o r m a t i o n needed 
to c h a r a c t e r i z e a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e o f the w o r l d . 
The i n f o r m a t i o n w i l l no t a l l b e e x p l i c i t l y 
encoded, however, so a deduc t i ve engine of some 
s o r t must be p r o v i d e d to a l l o w needed 
I n f o r m a t i o n to be e x t r a c t e d f rom a mode l . The 
deduc t i ons are o f two t y p e s : w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r 
s t a t e ( t h i s i s where t r a d i t i o n a l , f tmonoton ic" 
d e d u c t i o n systems are used ) , and across s t a t e s 
( t h a t i s , reason ing about the e f f e c t s o f p r i o r 
a c t i o n s in a sequence) . The deduc t i ve machinery 
can be v iewed as a ques t i on -answer i ng system 
t h a t a l l o w s the prob lem s o l v e r t o r e t r i e v e 
i n f o r m a t i o n about a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e o f the 
w o r l d f rom the s t a t e d e s c r i p t i o n model . 
c . A c t i o n Models - I n a d d i t i o n to s t a t e 
d e s c r i p t i o n models and a means of que ry i ng them, 
a prob lem s o l v e r must have a way of m o d e l l i n g 
what changes when an a c t i o n is a p p l i e d in an 
a r b i t r a r y s t a t e . Thus, a n a c t i o n i s desc r i bed 
by a mapping f rom one s t a t e d e s c r i p t i o n to 
a n o t h e r . Such a mapping is u s u a l l y r e f e r r e d to 
as an o p e r a t o r . The mapping may be s p e c i f i e d 
e i t h e r by p r o c e d u r e s , as in the problem s o l v e r s 
based on s o - c a l l e d A I languages [ 6 ] , o r by 
d e c l a r a t i v e data s t r u c t u r e s . I n any case, they 
must s p e c i f y a t l e a s t the express ions t h a t the 
a c t i o n w i l l make t r u e i n the w o r l d model and the 
exp ress ions t h a t i t s e x e c u t i o n w i l l make un t rue 
i n the w o r l d mode l . U s u a l l y , t o he lp guide the 
h e u r i s t i c search f o r a c t i o n s t h a t a re r e l e v a n t 
to ach ieve p a r t i c u l a r g o a l s , one o f the 
exp ress ions to be made t r u e by each ope ra to r is 
des igna ted in some way as i t s "p r imary e f f e c t ' . " 
l - 2 * The Bas ic C o n t r o l S t r a tegy f o r P lan 
Gene ra t i on 
The process of g e n e r a t i n g a p l a n of a c t i o n t h a t 
ach ieves a d e s i r e d goa l s t a t e f rom a g i v e n 
i n i t i a l s t a t e t y p i c a l l y i n v o l v e s a e x t e n s i v e 
search among a l t e r n a t i v e sequences* A number of 
c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s f o r t r e e search c o n s t i t u t e 
t h e b a s i c t o o l s o f a l l prob lem s o l v i n g systems. 
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Problem s o l v i n g systems u s u a l l y work backward 
f rom the goa l s t a t e to f i n d a sequence of 
a c t i o n s t h a t cou ld l ead t o i t f rom the i n i t i a l 
s t a t e . Th i s p rocedure generates a t r e e o f 
a c t i o n sequences, w i t h the goa l s t a t e a t the 
r o o t , ins tances o f ope ra to rs d e f i n i n g the 
branches, and i n t e r m e d i a t e s t a t e s d e f i n i n g the 
nodes. A t r e e search process of some s o r t is 
used to f i n d a pa th to a node t h a t corresponds 
t o the i n i t i a l s t a t e . The pa th f rom i n i t i a l 
s t a t e to goa l then de f i nes the p l a n . Two 
p a r t i c u l a r t r e e search s t r a t e g i e s are d iscussed 
here s ince they are so commonly used . 
The f i r s t o f these i s means-ends a n a l y s i s , which 
was the c e n t r a l search a l g o r i t h m used by GPS 
[7] and STRIPS [ 8 ] . Th i s s t r a t e g y works as 
f o l l o w s . The " d i f f e r e n c e " between the i n i t i a l 
and goa l s t a t e s is de te rm ined , and t ha t i ns tance 
o f the p a r t i c u l a r o p e r a t o r t h a t would most 
reduce the d i f f e r e n c e i s chosen. 
I f t h i s ope ra to r i s a p p l i c a b l e i n the i n i t i a l 
s t a t e , i t i s a p p l i e d , c r e a t i n g a new 
i n t e r m e d i a t e s t a t e . I f the goal i s s a t i s f i e d i n 
the new s t a t e , the search is comple ted . 
O the rw i se , the d i f f e r e n c e between the new s t a t e 
and the goa l s t a t e i s de te rm ined , an o p e r a t o r to 
most reduce the new d i f f e r e n c e is chosen, and 
the process c o n t i n u e s . 
I f the chosen o p e r a t o r i s not a p p l i c a b l e , i t s 
p r e c o n d i t i o n s are e s t a b l i s h e d as a new 
i n t e r m e d i a t e s u b g o a l . An a t tempt is made, u s i n g 
the search s t r a t e g y r e c u r s i v e l y , t o f i n d a 
sequence of ope ra to rs to ach ieve the subgoal 
s t a t e . I f t h i s can be done, the chosen o p e r a t o r 
is now a p p l i c a b l e and the search proceeds as 
desc r ibed above. I f the new subgoal cannot be 
ach ieved , a new i ns tance of an ope ra to r to 
reduce the d i f f e r e n c e is chosen and the process 
con t i nues as b e f o r e . 
A second impor tan t search s t r a t e g y , used in 
s imp le problem s o l v e r s w r i t t e n i n the s o - c a l l e d 
A I languages [ 6 ] , i s b a c k t r a c k i n g , which works 
i n the f o l l o w i n g manner. I f the goa l i s 
s a t i s f i e d i n the i n i t i a l s t a t e , a t r i v i a l 
s o l u t i o n has been f o u n d . I f n o t , an o p e r a t o r 
t h a t , i f a p p l i e d , would ach ieve the goa l I s 
s e l e c t e d . I f i t i s a p p l i c a b l e i n the i n i t i a l 
s t a t e , I t i s a p p l i e d and a s o l u t i o n has been 
f o u n d . I f the chosen o p e r a t o r i s not 
a p p l i c a b l e , ope ra to r s t h a t would ach ieve i t s 
p r e c o n d i t i o n s are f ound , and the search proceeds 
as b e f o r e to f i n d p lans to render them 
a p p l i c a b l e . I f the search f a l l s , a d i f f e r e n t 
cand ida te o p e r a t o r la chosen and the process 
r e p e a t s . 
Th i s s t r a t e g y f o l l o w s a l i n e o f a c t i o n out f u l l y 
be fo re r e j e c t i n g i t . I t thus p e r m i t s the search 
t r e e t o b e rep resen ted e l e g a n t l y ; a l l the a c t i v e 
p a r t s of the search t r e e can be encoded by the 
c o n t r o l s tack o f the search procedure i t s e l f , 
and a l l t he i n a c t i v e p a r t s o f the search t r e e 
need not be encoded a t a l l . Because o f the f u l l 
search a t each c y c l e o f the p rocess , i t i s 
c r i t i c a l t h a t the c o r r e c t ope ra to r be chosen 
f i r s t a lmost a lways . O the rw ise , the s i m p l i c i t y 
o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f f e r e d b y t h i s s t r a t e g y w i l l 
be amply r e p a i d by the i n e f f i c i e n c y of the 
s e a r c h . 
As was d iscussed above, these s t r a t e g i e s are 
i n s u f f i c i e n t i n p r a c t i c e f o r s o l v i n g problems o f 
any s i g n i f i c a n t c o m p l e x i t y . I n p a r t i c u l a r , one 
o f the most c o s t l y behav io rs o f the bas ic 
p rob lem s o l v i n g s t r a t e g i e s i s t h e i r i n e f f i c i e n c y 
i n d e a l i n g w i t h goa l d e s c r i p t i o n s t h a t i n c l u d e 
c o n j u n c t i o n s - Because t h e r e is u s u a l l y no good 
reason f o r the problem s o l v e r t o p r e f e r t o 
a t t a c k one con junc t be fo re ano the r , an i n c o r r e c t 
o r d e r i n g w i l l o f t e n be chosen. Th i s can lead to 
an e x t e n s i v e search f o r a sequence of a c t i o n s to 
t r y t o ach ieve subgoals i n an unach ievab le 
o r d e r . 
2. TACTICS FOR EFFICIENT PROBLEM SOLVING 
2.1. H i e r a r c h i c a l P lann ing 
The g e n e r a l s t r a t e g i e s desc r i bed above app ly a 
u n i f o r m procedure to the a c t i o n d e s c r i p t i o n s and 
s t a t e d e s c r i p t i o n s t h a t they are g i v e n . Thus, 
they have no i n h e r e n t a b i l i t y t o d i s t i n g u i s h 
what i s impo r tan t f rom what i s a d e t a i l . 
However, some aspects of a lmost any problem are 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y more impor tan t than o t h e r s . By 
employ ing a d d i t i o n a l knowledge about the rank ing 
in impor tance o f aspects o f the problem 
d e s c r i p t i o n , a problem s o l v e r can concen t ra te 
i t s e f f o r t s o n the d e c i s i o n s t h a t are c r i t i c a l 
w h i l e spend ing l ess e f f o r t on those t h a t are 
r e l a t i v e l y u n i m p o r t a n t . 
I n f o r m a t i o n about impor tance can be used in 
s e v e r a l ways. F i r s t , the s tandard s t r a t e g i e s 
can be m o d i f i e d to dea l w i t h the most impo r tan t 
(and most d i f f i c u l t t o ach ieve) subgoals f i r s t . 
The s o l u t i o n to the most impor tan t subgoals 
o f t e n leaves the w o r l d model in a s t a t e f rom 
wh ich the l ess impo r tan t subgoals are s t i l l 
a c h i e v a b l e ( i f n o t , the weaker search s t r a t e g i e s 
must be employed as a l a s t r e s o r t ) . The l e s s 
i m p o r t a n t subgoals cou ld presumably be so lved in 
many ways, some of which would be i n c o m p a t i b l e 
w i t h the e v e n t u a l s o l u t i o n t o the impo r t an t 
s u b g o a l s . Thus, t h i s approach c o n s t r a i n s the 
search where the c o n s t r a i n t s are i m p o r t a n t , and 
a v o i d s o v e r c o n s t r a i n i n g i t by making premature 
cho ices about how to so l ve less impo r tan t 
aspec ts o f t he p rob lem. S i k l ossy and D reuss i 
[9 ] used an e x p l i c i t o r d e r i n g of types of 
subgoals to guide sea rch . 
Another way to focus on the c r i t i c a l dec i s i ons 
f i r s t i s t o a b s t r a c t the d e s c r i p t i o n s o f the 
a c t i o n s , thereby c r e a t i n g a s i m p l e r p rob lem. 
Th is a b s t r a c t e d problem can be s o l v e d , p roduc ing 
a sequence of a b s t r a c t e d a c t i o n s , and t h i s p l a n 
can then be used as a s k e l e t o n , i d e n t i f y i n g 
c r i t i c a l subgoals a long the way to a s o l u t i o n , 
around which t o c o n s t r u c t a f u l l y d e t a i l e d p l a n . 
Th is t a c t i c was used in c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h an 
e a r l y v e r s i o n of GPS by N e w e l l , Shaw, and Simon 
[7] t o f i n d p r o o f s i n symbol ic l o g i c (us ing 
a b s t r a c t e d opera to rs and s t a t e d e s c r i p t i o n s t h a t 
ignored the connec t i ves and the o r d e r i n g of 
symbo ls ) . 
F i n a l l y , a b s t r a c t i o n can be extended to i n v o l v e 
m u l t i p l e l e v e l s , l ead ing to a h i e r a r c h y o f 
p l a n s , each s e r v i n g as a s k e l e t o n f o r the 
problem s o l v i n g process a t the next l e v e l o f 
d e t a i l . The search process a t each l e v e l o f 
d e t a i l can thus be reduced to a sequence of 
r e l a t i v e l y s imple subproblems o f a c h i e v i n g the 
p r e c o n d i t i o n s o f the next s tep in the s k e l e t o n 
p l a n f rom an i n i t i a l s t a t e i n which the p rev ious 
s tep in the s k e l e t o n p l a n has j u s t been 
ach ieved . In t h i s way, r a t h e r complex problems 
can be reduced to a sequence of much s h o r t e r , 
s i m p l e r subproblems. Sace rdo t i a p p l i e d t h i s 
t a c t i c to robo t n a v i g a t i o n tasks [10] and to 
more complex tasks i n v o l v i n g assembly of machine 
components [ 1 1 ] . 
2 . 2 . H i e r a r c h i c a l P lan Repair 
A s i d e - e f f e c t o f h i e r a r c h i c a l p l ann ing i s t h a t 
p lans can p o s s i b l y be c rea ted t h a t appear to be 
workab le a t a h igh l e v e l o f a b s t r a c t i o n but 
whose d e t a i l e d expansions t u r n out to be 
i n v a l i d . The bas ic idea behind the p l a n r e p a i r 
t a c t i c i s to check, as a h i g h e r l e v e l p l a n i s 
be ing expanded, t h a t a l l the in tended e f f e c t s o f 
the sequence o f h i g h e r - l e v e l a c t i o n s are indeed 
be ing ach ieved by the c o l l e c t i o n of subsequences 
o f l o w e r - l e v e l a c t i o n s . By e x p l o i t i n g the 
h i e r a r c h i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f the p l a n , on ly a s m a l l 
number of e f f e c t s need to be checked f o r . 
Var ious methods f o r pa t ch i ng up the f a i l e d p l a n 
can then be a p p l i e d . Th is t a c t i c was 
i n c o r p o r a t e d in a runn ing system by Sace rdo t i 
[11] and is ve ry s i m i l a r to a techn ique c a l l e d 
" h i e r a r c h i c a l debugg ing" a r t i c u l a t e d b y 
G o l d s t e i n [12] f o r a program unders tand ing t a s k . 
2.3. Bugging 
Rather than a t tempt to produce p e r f e c t p lans on 
the f i r s t a t t emp t , i t can o f t e n be more 
e f f i c i e n t t o produce a n i n i t i a l p l a n t h a t i s 
approx imate ly c o r r e c t but con ta ins some " b u g s , " 
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and subsequent ly a l t e r the p lan to remove the 
bugs. By employing a d d i t i o n a l knowledge about 
bug c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and debugging, t h i s approach 
a l l ows the dec is ions made dur ing the problem-
s o l v i n g process about which a c t i o n to t r y next 
to be made w i t h less e f f o r t , s ince mistaken 
dec i s i ons can be subsequently f i x e d . 
Sussman, who f i r s t employed t h i s t a c t i c In h i s 
HACKER system [ 1 3 ] , c a l l e d I t "p rob lem-so lv ing 
by debugging a l m o s t - r i g h t p l a n s . " I t I s o f t e n 
r e f e r r e d to In the l i t e r a t u r e as the "debugging 
approach" and, Indeed, I t has spawned 
I n t e r e s t i n g research In techniques f o r debugging 
programs or p lans developed both by machines and 
by people (see, f o r example, Sussman [14] and 
Go lds te in and M i l l e r [ 1 5 ] ) . Debugging, however, 
Is an I n t e g r a l p a r t of the execut ion component 
of any problem s o l v e r . What d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h i s 
approach Is a to le rance f o r I n t r o d u c i n g bugs 
w h i l e genera t ing the p l a n , and thus i t can more 
accu ra te l y be c a l l e d the "bugg ing" approach. 
Th i s t a c t i c works by d e l i b e r a t e l y making 
assumptions t h a t o v e r s i m p l i f y the problem of 
I n t e g r a t i n g m u l t i p l e subplans. These 
assumptions may cause the problem so lve r to 
produce a n i n i t i a l p lan w i t h bugs i n i t . 
However, i f the o v e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n s are designed 
p r o p e r l y , then only bugs of a l i m i t e d number of 
types w i l l be i n t r o d u c e d , and r e l a t i v e l y s imple 
mechanisms can be implemented to remedy each 
expected type of bug. 
2.4# Specia l -Purpose Subplanners 
Once a p a r t i c u l a r subgoal has been generated, i t 
may w e l l be the case tha t i t is of a type f o r 
which a s p e c i a l purpose a l g o r i t h m , a s t ronger 
method than the weak method of the g e n e r a l -
purpose problem s o l v e r , can be brought to bear . 
For example, In a robot problem, the achievement 
of an INROOM goa l can be performed by a r o u t e -
f i n d i n g a l g o r i t h m app l i ed to a c o n n e c t i v i t y 
graph rep resen t i ng the i n t e r connec t i on of rooms, 
r a t h e r than us ing more genera l methods app l ied 
to less d i r e c t rep resen ta t i ons o f the rooms in 
the env i ronment . Such a s p e c i a l purpose problem 
s o l v e r was used by S ik lossy and Dreuss l [9] to 
e f f e c t dramat ic Improvements in the system's 
per formance. 
W i l k l n s [16] employs spec ia l -purpose subplanners 
in a chess problem so l ve r f o r subgoals such as 
moving s a f e l y to a g iven square or checking w i t h 
a g iven p i e c e . 
Each spec ia l -pu rpose subplanner encodes 
a d d i t i o n a l knowledge about i t s s p e c i a l t y . To 
take advantage of I t , the problem so lve r must 
i n c o r p o r a t e i n f o r m a t i o n about how to recognize 
the s p e c i a l s i t u a t i o n as w e l l . 
2 .5 . Cons t ra in t S a t i s f a c t i o n 
Cons t ra in t s a t i s f a c t i o n , the d e r i v a t i o n o f 
g l o b a l l y cons is ten t assignments o f va lues to 
v a r i a b l e s sub jec t t o l o c a l c o n s t r a i n t s , i s not 
usua l l y thought of as a problem s o l v i n g t a c t i c . 
While i t cannot be used to generate a c t i o n 
sequences, i t can p lay a very impor tant r o l e In 
p a r t i c u l a r subproblems, e s p e c i a l l y i n 
determin ing the b ind ing of v a r i a b l e s when there 
is no c lea r l o c a l l y computable reason to p r e f e r 
one va lue over ano ther . From t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , 
c o n s t r a i n t s a t i s f a c t i o n can be thought of as a 
type of spec ia l -purpose subplanner. 
S t e f i k [17] employs c o n s t r a i n t s a t i s f a c t i o n to 
ass ign values to v a r i a b l e s i n genera t ing a c t i o n 
sequences f o r molecular genet ics exper iments . 
2 .6 . Relevant Backt rack ing 
As a co r rec t p l a n is be ing searched f o r , a 
problem so lve r w i l l encounter many choice po in t s 
a t which there are severa l a l t e r n a t i v e steps to 
be taken. Most problem so lvers employ 
s o p h i s t i c a t e d techniques to t r y to make the 
r i g h t choices among the a l t e r n a t i v e a c t i o n 
sequences i n i t i a l l y . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , a problem 
so lve r cou ld focus on s o p h i s t i c a t e d post-mortem 
analyses of the i n f o r m a t i o n gained from ea r l y 
at tempts tha t f a i l . By ana lyz ing the reasons 
f o r the f a i l u r e of a p a r t i c u l a r sequence of 
a c t i o n s , the problem so lve r can determine which 
a c t i o n in the sequence should be m o d i f i e d . Th is 
i s i n con t ras t w i t h the s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d approach 
of back t rack ing to the most recent choice po in t 
and t r y i n g other a l t e r n a t i v e s t h e r e . Fahlman 
[18] developed such a system f o r p lann ing the 
c o n s t r u c t i o n o f complex b lock s t r u c t u r e s . His 
system associated a "g r i pe hand le r " w i t h each 
choice po in t as i t was encountered, and 
developed a c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of each f a i l u r e 
when i t occu r red . When a p a r t i c u l a r l i n e of 
a c t i o n f a i l e d , the g r ipe handlers would be 
invoked in reverse c h r o n o l o g i c a l o rder to see i f 
they could suggest something s p e c i f i c to do 
about the f a i l u r e . The e f f e c t of t h i s mechanism 
is to backtrack not to the most recent choice 
p o i n t , bu t to the re levan t choice p o i n t . 
The t a c t i c o f r e l evan t b a c k t r a c k i n g , which is 
a l so r e f e r r e d to i n the l i t e r a t u r e as 
dependency-directed or non -ch rono log i ca l 
b a c k t r a c k i n g , was a lso used in a problem so lve r 
f o r computer-aided design developed by Latombe 
[ 1 9 ] . 
2 .7 . D isprov ing 
Problem so lvers have t r a d i t i o n a l l y been 
automated o p t i m i s t s . They presume tha t a 
s o l u t i o n to each problem or subproblem can be 
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found i f on l y the r i g h t combina t ion o f p r i m i t i v e 
a c t i o n s can be pu t t o g e t h e r . Thus, the 
i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f a c h i e v i n g a g i ven goa l or 
subgoa l s t a t e can on l y be d iscovered a f t e r an 
e x h a u s t i v e search o f a l l the p o s s i b l e 
combina t ions o f p o t e n t i a l l y r e l e v a n t a c t i o n s . 
I t may w e l l be the case t h a t a p e s s i m i s t i c 
a n a l y s i s o f a p a r t i c u l a r g o a l , deve lop ing 
knowledge a d d i t i o n a l t o t h a t employed i n 
b u i l d i n g a c t i o n sequences, would q u i c k l y show 
t h e f u t i l i t y o f the whole endeavor. Th is 
p rocedure can be o f p a r t i c u l a r va lue in 
e v a l u a t i n g a se t o f c o n j u n c t i v e subgoals to 
a v o i d wo rk i ng on any of them when one can be 
shown to be i m p o s s i b l e . Fu r the rmore , even i f a 
g o a l cannot be shown to be i m p o s s i b l e , the 
a d d i t i o n a l knowledge might suggest an a c t i o n 
sequence t h a t would ach ieve the g o a l . S i k l o s s y 
and Roach [20] developed a system t h a t 
i n t e g r a t e d a t tempts t o ach ieve goals w i t h 
a t t emp ts t o prove t h e i r i m p o s s i b i l i t y . 
2 - 8 . Pseudo-Reduct ion 
One of the most c o s t l y behav io rs of problem 
s o l v i n g systems i s t h e i r i n e f f i c i e n c y i n d e a l i n g 
w i t h goa l d e s c r i p t i o n s t h a t i n c l u d e 
c o n j u n c t i o n s , as was noted at the end of Sec t i on 
1 . O rde r i ng the con junc t s by impor tance , as 
d e s c r i b e d i n the subsec t i on o n h i e r a r c h i c a l 
p l a n n i n g above, can h e l p , but t he re may s t i l l be 
m u l t i p l e con junc t s of the same impor tance . One 
approach to the problem of s e l e c t i n g an o rde r 
f o r the con junc t s i s t o i gno re o r d e r i n g them 
i n i t i a l l y , f i n d i n g a p l an to achieve each 
c o n j u n c t i n d e p e n d e n t l y . Thus, the c o n j u n c t i v e 
prob lem i s reduced t o s e v e r a l s i m p l e r , 
n o n c o n j u n c t i v e prob lems. Of cou rse , the p lans 
to so l ve the reduced problems must then be 
i n t e g r a t e d , u s i n g knowledge about how p l a n 
segments can be i n t e r t w i n e d w i t h o u t d e s t r o y i n g 
t h e i r impo r tan t e f f e c t s . 
T h i s t a c t i c c rea tes p lans t h a t a re not l i n e a r 
o r d e r i n g s o f a c t i o n s w i t h respec t t o t i m e , bu t 
a re r a t h e r p a r t i a l o r d e r i n g s . Th i s renders the 
c r o s s - s t a t e ques t i on -answe r i ng procedure 
d e s c r i b e d in Sec t i on 1.1 more comp l i ca ted than 
f o r o t h e r t a c t i c s . 
By a v o i d i n g premature commitments to p a r t i c u l a r 
o r d e r i n g s o f subgoa l s , t h i s t a c t i c e l i m i n a t e s 
much o f the b a c k t r a c k i n g t y p i c a l o f problem 
s o l v i n g sys tems. Pseudo- reduc t ion was developed 
by Sace rdo t i [11] and has been a p p l i e d to robo t 
p rob lems , assembly o f e l ec t romechan i ca l 
equ ipment , and p r o j e c t p l a n n i n g [ 2 1 ] . 
2 . 9 . Goal Regression 
The p rob l em-so l v i ng t a c t i c s we have d iscussed so 
f a r a l l work by m o d i f y i n g , in one way or 
ano the r , the sequence of a c t i o n s be ing developed 
t o s a t i s f y the g o a l s . Coal r e g r e s s i o n m o d i f i e s 
the goals a s w e l l . I t r e l i e s o n the f a c t t h a t , 
g i ven a p a r t i c u l a r goa l and a p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n , 
i t i s p o s s i b l e t o d e r i v e a new goa l such t h a t i f 
the new goa l i s t r ue be fo re the a c t i o n i s 
execu ted , t hen the o r i g i n a l goal ' w i l l be t r u e 
a f t e r the a c t i o n i s execu ted . The computa t ion 
of the new g o a l , g i ven the o r i g i n a l goa l and the 
a c t i o n , i s c a l l e d r e g r e s s i n g the goa l over the 
a c t i o n . 
As an example, l e t us suppose the o v e r a l l goa l 
c o n s i s t s o f two c o n j u n c t i v e subgoa ls . Th is 
t a c t i c f i r s t t r i e s t o ach ieve the second goa l i n 
a con tex t in which a sequence of a c t i o n s has 
achieved the f i r s t goal ( s i m i l a r l y t o the 
bugging t a c t i c ) . 
I f t h i s f a i l s , the second goa l i s regressed back 
across the l a s t a c t i o n t h a t achieved the f i r s t 
g o a l . Th is process generates a new goa l t h a t 
desc r ibes a s t a t e such t h a t i f the l a s t a c t i o n 
were executed i n i t , would lead t o a s t a t e i n 
which the o r i g i n a l second goa l were t r u e . I f 
the regressed goa l can be achieved w i t h o u t 
d e s t r o y i n g the f i r s t g o a l , the t a c t i c has 
succeeded. I f n o t , the r e g r e s s i o n process 
c o n t i n u e s . 
Th i s t a c t i c r e q u i r e s knowledge o f the i nve rse 
e f f e c t s o f each o p e r a t o r . That i s , i n a d d i t i o n 
to knowing how the subsequent a p p l i c a t i o n of an 
ope ra to r changes a w o r l d model , the system must 
know how the p r i o r a p p l i c a t i o n of the ope ra to r 
a f f e c t s a g o a l . 
The goa l r eg ress i on techn ique was developed 
independent l y by Wald inger [22] and Warren [ 2 3 ] . 
3. WHAT'S GOING ON? 
We have j u s t f i n i s h e d a b r i e f ( h e u r i s t i c a l l y ) 
guided tou r of some of the p rob l em-so l v i ng 
t a c t i c s used r e c e n t l y . They c o n s t i t u t e a 
d i v e r s e bag o f t r i c k s f o r improv ing the 
e f f i c i e n c y o f the problem s o l v i n g p rocess . I n 
t h i s s e c t i o n we focus on the u n d e r l y i n g reasons 
why these techn iques seem to h e l p . 
P rob lem-so l v i ng i s o f t e n descr ibed a s s t a t e -
space sea rch , or as e x p l o r a t i o n of a t r e e of 
p o s s i b l e a c t i o n sequences. We can f i n d some 
s t r u c t u r e f o r the bag o f t a c t i c a l t r i c k s by 
remembering t h a t search o r e x p l o r a t i o n i n v o l v e s 
not on l y movement to new (concep tua l ) l o c a t i o n s , 
but d i scove ry and l e a r n i n g as w e l l . 
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The prob lem s o l v e r begins i t s work w i t h 
i n f o r m a t i o n about on ly the i n i t i a l s t a t e and the 
g o a l s t a t e * I t must a c q u i r e i n f o r m a t i o n about 
t he i n t e r m e d i a t e s t a t e s a s i t exp lo res them. I t 
must summarize t h i s I n f o r m a t i o n f o r e f f i c i e n t 
use d u r i n g the r e s t o f the p r o b l e m - s o l v i n g 
p r o c e s s , and i t must take advantage o f a l l 
p o s s i b l e i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t can be e x t r a c t e d f rom 
each i n t e r m e d i a t e s t a t e . Th is can r e q u i r e 
c o n s i d e r a b l e compu ta t i ona l r e s o u r c e s . I n the 
s i m p l e s t search s t r a t e g i e s , the i n f o r m a t i o n may 
be s imp ly a number r e p r e s e n t i n g the va lue of the 
h e u r i s t i c e v a l u a t i o n f u n c t i o n a p p l i e d a t t h a t 
p o i n t . I t may be much more, however. I t may 
I n c l u d e a d e t a i l e d da ta base d e s c r i b i n g the 
s i t u a t i o n , i n f o r m a t i o n about how to dea l w i t h 
c l a s s e s o f a n t i c i p a t e d subsequent e r r o r s , and 
dependency r e l a t i o n s h i p s among the a t t r i b u t e s 
d e s c r i b i n g the s i t u a t i o n . A l l t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n 
i s t y p i c a l l y s t o r e d i n i n t e r m e d i a t e c o n t e x t s i n 
one o f the forms d iscussed i n the f i r s t s e c t i o n 
o f t h i s paper . 
The i n f o r m a t i o n l ea rned d u r i n g the e x p l o r a t i o n 
p rocess can be broken down i n t o f o u r k inds of 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s among the a c t i o n s in a p l a n . 
These a r e : 
o rde r r e l a t i o n s h i p s - t h e sequencing of the 
a c t i o n s i n the p l a n ; 
h i e r a r c h i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s - t h e l i n k s 
between each a c t i o n at one l e v e l and the 
m e t a - a c t i o n s above i t and the more 
d e t a i l e d a c t i o n s below i t ; 
t e l e o l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s - the purposes 
f o r wh ich each a c t i o n has been p laced in 
the p l a n ; and 
o b j e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p s - the dependencies 
among the o b j e c t s t h a t are be ing 
man ipu la ted (which cor respond to 
dependencies among the parameters or 
v a r i a b l e s i n the o p e r a t o r s ) . 
These r e l a t i o n s h i p s can be e x p l i c a t e d and 
unde rs tood on l y by c a r r y i n g ou t the 
i n s t a n t i a t i o n o f new p o i n t s in the search space. 
I t i s thus o f h i g h va lue t o a problem s o l v e r t o 
i n s t a n t i a t e and l e a r n about new i n t e r m e d i a t e 
s t a t e s . As a s imp le example of a p r o b l e m -
s o l v i n g t a c t i c t h a t d i s p l a y s i n c r e m e n t a l 
l e a r n i n g , cons ide r r e l e v a n t b a c k t r a c k i n g . By 
f o l l o w i n g i n i t i a l pa ths through the search t r e e , 
t he prob lem s o l v e r l ea rns which cho ice p o i n t s 
a re c r i t i c a l . Another c l e a r example i s 
c o n s t r a i n t s a t i s f a c t i o n , i n which r e s t r i c t i o n s 
o n a c c e p t a b l e b i n d i n g s f o r v a r i a b l e s are 
aggregated as search p r o g r e s s e s . 
The d i f f i c u l t y i s t h a t , a s w i t h a l l l e a r n i n g 
sys tems , the a c q u i s i t i o n o f new i n f o r m a t i o n i s 
e x p e n s i v e . The g e n e r a t i o n of each new s t a t e is 
a major t ime consumer in many prob lem s o l v i n g 
sys tems. Fu r the rmore , the g e n e r a t i o n o f each 
i n t e r m e d i a t e s t a t e rep resen ts a commitment to a 
p a r t i c u l a r l i n e o f a c t i o n by the prob lem s o l v e r . 
Since problems of any non- toy l e v e l of 
comp lex i t y tend to generate very bushy search 
t r e e s , a b r e a d t h - f i r s t search s t r a t e g y i s 
imposs ib le to use . T h e r e f o r e , once a l i n e of 
a c t i o n has begun to be i n v e s t i g a t e d , a p r o b l e m -
s o l v i n g system w i l l tend t o con t i nue w i t h i t . 
I t i s thus o f h igh va lue to a problem s o l v e r , 
whenever p o s s i b l e , t o avo id g e n e r a t i n g 
i n t e r m e d i a t e s t a t e s not on the s o l u t i o n p a t h . 
Those s t a t e s t h a t a re generated must rep resen t a 
good investment f o r the problem s o l v e r . 
Thus, the re are two opposing ways to improve the 
e f f i c i e n c y o f a problem s o l v e r . The f i r s t i s to 
employ a r e l a t i v e l y expens ive e v a l u a t i o n 
f u n c t i o n and to work hard to avo id g e n e r a t i n g 
s t a t e s not on the even tua l s o l u t i o n p a t h . The 
second is to use a cheap e v a l u a t i o n f u n c t i o n , to 
e x p l o r e l o t s o f paths t h a t might not work o u t , 
but to a c q u i r e i n f o r m a t i o n about the 
i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s o f the a c t i o n s and o b j e c t s i n 
the w o r l d i n the p r o c e s s . T h i s i n f o r m a t i o n can 
then be used to gu ide ( e f f i c i e n t l y ) subsequent 
s e a r c h . 
Each o f the t a c t i c s desc r ibed in the p r e v i o u s 
s e c t i o n s t r i k e s a p a r t i c u l a r ba lance between the 
v a l u e o f i n s t a n t i a t i n g new i n t e r m e d i a t e s t a t e s 
and the cos t o f commitment to p a r t i c u l a r l i n e s 
of a c t i o n . Whi le none of the t a c t i c s use one 
approach e x c l u s i v e l y , each can be c a t e g o r i z e d by 
the one i t emphasizes. Fu r the rmore , each can be 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d acco rd ing to one o f the f o u r types 
o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s they depend on or e x p l o i t . 
Tab le 1 d i s p l a y s a cand ida te c a t e g o r i z a t i o n . 
None o f the t a c t i c s f i t as n e a t l y i n t o the 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n as the t a b l e sugges t s , because 
they t y p i c a l l y have been embodied in a complete 
problem s o l v i n g system and so must dea l w i t h at 
l e a s t some aspects of many of the c a t e g o r i e s . 
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Approaches f o r d e a l i n g w i t h each of the types o f 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s shown in Table 1 can probab ly be 
s e l e c t e d w i t h o u t major impact on the approaches 
s e l e c t e d f o r the o ther r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Thus, we 
can use Table 1 as a menu of p o s s i b l e t a c t i c s 
f rom which v a r i o u s c o l l e c t i o n s can be 
c o n s t r u c t e d t h a t make sense t o g e t h e r in a 
problem s o l v e r . 
T a c t i c s t h a t emphasize the c l e v e r s e l e c t i o n o f 
new paths to exp lo re in the search space might 
b e d i f f i c u l t t o i n t e g r a t e w i t h t a c t i c s t ha t 
emphasize the l e a r n i n g and summar izat ion of 
i n f o r m a t i o n de r i ved f rom the p o r t i o n o f the 
search space a l ready e x p l o r e d . However, the 
major payo f f in i n t e g r a t i n g t a c t i c s might come 
f rom e x a c t l y t h i s k i n d o f comb ina t i on . 
Deve lop ing a problem s o l v e r t h a t uses bo th k inds 
o f technique when a p p r o p r i a t e w i l l p robab ly 
r e q u i r e the use o f nove l c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s . 
The i n t e r e s t i n g new r e s u l t s f rom such an 
endeavor w i l l d e r i v e f rom e f f o r t s t o employ 
i n f o r m a t i o n developed by one t a c t i c in the 
a p p l i c a t i o n o f o t h e r t a c t i c s . 
4. WHAT'S NEXT? 
The c u r r e n t s t a t e o f the a r t i n p l a n g e n e r a t i o n 
a l l o w s f o r p l a n n i n g i n a b a s i c a l l y h i e r a r c h i c a l 
f a s h i o n , u s i n g a seve re l y l i m i t e d (and 
p rede te rm ined ) subset o f the t a c t i c s enumerated 
above, by and f o r a s i n g l e a c t i v e agent 
s a t i s f y i n g a se t of goa ls c o m p l e t e l y . The 
e l i m i n a t i o n o f these r e s t r i c t i o n s i s a cha l lenge 
t o workers i n A r t i f i c i a l I n t e l l i g e n c e . Th is 
s e c t i o n w i l l d i scuss a number o f these 
r e s t r i c t i o n s b r i e f l y and sugges t , where 
p o s s i b l e , l i n e s o f research to ease them. 
4 . 1 . I n t e g r a t i n g the T a c t i c s 
To d a t e , t h e r e has been no s u c c e s s f u l a t tempt 
known to t h i s au tho r to i n t e g r a t e a s i g n i f i c a n t 
number of the t a c t i c s we have descr ibed i n t o a 
s i n g l e sys tem. What f o l l o w s are some 
p r e l i m i n a r y though ts on how such an i n t e g r a t i o n 
might be a c h i e v e d . 
F i r s t o f a l l , t he techn ique o f h i e r a r c h i c a l 
p l a n n i n g can be a p p l i e d independent ly of any of 
t he o t h e r s . That i s , a l l o f the o the r 
techn iques can be a p p l i e d at each l e v e l of 
d e t a i l w i t h i n the h i e r a r c h y . A number o f 
i n t e r e s t i n g problems (analogous to t h a t faced by 
t he " h i e r a r c h i c a l p l a n repa i r 1 ' t a c t i c ) would 
have t o b e faced i n i n t e g r a t i n g t h e i r 
a p p l i c a t i o n across l e v e l s o f the h i e r a r c h y . 
4 . 2 . F l e x i b l e C o n t r o l S t r u c t u r e 
_____________________________________________. 
Whi le the t a c t i c o f h i e r a r c h i c a l p l a n n i n g speeds 
up the problem s o l v i n g process g r e a t l y , i t 
r e q u i r e s t h a t a p l a n be f u l l y developed to the 
f i n e s t d e t a i l be fo re i t i s execu ted . I n r e a l -
w o r l d environments where unexpected events occur 
f r e q u e n t l y and the d e t a i l e d outcome of 
p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n s may v a r y , c r e a t i o n of a 
complete p l a n be fo re execu t i on i s not 
a p p r o p r i a t e . Ra the r , the p l a n shou ld be roughed 
out and i t s c r i t i c a l segments c reated i n d e t a i l . 
The c r i t i c a l segments w i l l c e r t a i n l y i n c l u d e 
those t h a t must be executed f i r s t , but a l s o may 
i n c l u d e o the r aspects o f the p l a n a t concep tua l 
"choke p o i n t s " where the d e t a i l s of a subp lan 
may a f f e c t g rosser aspects of o the r pa r t s of the 
p l a n . 
Hayes-Roth et a l . [24] are deve lop ing a program 
based on a model of problem s o l v i n g t ha t would 
produce the k i n d o f non- top-down behav io r 
suggested h e r e . The i r model is based on a 
H e a r s a y - I I a r c h i t e c t u r e [ 2 5 ] , but cou ld p robab ly 
be implemented us ing any methodology t h a t 
a l l owed f o r e x p l i c i t a n a l y s i s o f each o f the 
f o u r k i nds o f dependencies descr ibed in Sec t ion 
I I I above. S t e f i k [17] has implemented a system 
t h a t , a t l e a s t i n p r i n c i p l e , has the power to 
produce t h i s k i n d o f b e h a v i o r . H is system 
i n c o r p o r a t e s a f l e x i b l e means of de te rm in i ng 
which p l ann ing d e c i s i o n to make n e x t . H is 
d e c i s i o n s are l o c a l ones; shou ld g l o b a l ones be 
i n c o r p o r a t e d as w e l l , we might see a means of 
de te rm in ing dynamica l l y which t a c t i c to employ 
i n a g i ven s i t u a t i o n * 
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4 .3 . P lann ing f o r P a r a l l e l Execu t ion 
Problem s o l v e r s t o date have been w r i t t e n w i t h 
t h e i dea t h a t the p l a n is to be genera ted by a 
s i n g l e p rocessor and w i l l u l t i m a t e l y b e executed 
one s tep at a t i m e . The development of 
c o o p e r a t i n g prob lem s o l v e r s and a l g o r i t h m s f o r 
e x e c u t i o n b y m u l t i p l e e f f e c t o r s w i l l f o r c e a 
c l o s e r l ook a t the s t r u c t u r e o f p lans and the 
n a t u r e o f the i n t e r a c t i o n s between a c t i o n s * 
A s o l i d s t a r t has been made in t h i s a r e a . 
F l k e s , H a r t , and N l l s s o n [26] proposed an 
a l g o r i t h m f o r p a r t i t i o n i n g a p l a n among m u l t i p l e 
e f f e c t o r s - Smith [27] developed a prob lem 
s o l v e r t h a t d i s t r i b u t e s bo th the p l a n g e n e r a t i o n 
and e x e c u t i o n t a s k s . The pseudo - reduc t i on 
t a c t i c c rea tes p lans t h a t are p a r t i a l l y o rdered 
w i t h respec t t o t i m e , and are t h e r e f o r e amenable 
b o t h t o p l a n n i n g i n p a r a l l e l b y m u l t i p l e problem 
s o l v e r s and t o e x e c u t i o n i n p a r a l l e l b y m u l t i p l e 
e f f e c t o r s . C o r k i l l [28] i s adap t i ng the NOAH 
[11] p s e u d o - r e d u c t i o n problem s o l v e r to use 
m u l t i p l e p rocessors in p l a n g e n e r a t i o n , and we 
a t SRI are a d a p t i n g i t t o p l a n f o r the use o f 
m u l t i p l e e f f e c t o r s . 
e x p l o r i n g f o r p lans become more d a r i n g , the 
lessons t h a t can be lea rned f rom p l a n e x e c u t i o n 
can be ex t reme ly v a l u a b l e f o r p l a n g e n e r a t i o n . 
Th i s v iew suggests a d i r e c t i o n f o r f u t u r e work 
i n prob lem s o l v i n g : i t w i l l become more l i k e 
i nc remen ta l p l a n r e p a i r . The means of s t o r i n g 
and query ing s t a t e d e s c r i p t i o n models w i l l have 
t o a l l o w f o r e f f i c i e n t upda t i ng when the o rders 
of a c t i o n s are a l t e r e d and when new a c t i o n s are 
i n s e r t e d i n m i d - p l a n . P lann ing a t h i g h e r l e v e l s 
o f a b s t r a c t i o n w i l l appear ve ry s i m i l a r t o 
p l a n n i n g f o r i n f o r m a t i o n a c q u i s i t i o n du r i ng p l a n 
e x e c u t i o n . 
T h e r e f o r e , the best research s t r a t e g y f o r 
advancing the s t a t e o f the a r t i n problem 
s o l v i n g might w e l l be to focus on i n t e g r a t e d 
systems f o r p l a n g e n e r a t i o n , e x e c u t i o n , and 
r e p a i r . By deve lop ing ca ta logues of p l a n 
execu t i on t a c t i c s and p l a n r e p a i r t a c t i c s t o 
accompany t h i s ca ta logue o f p l a n g e n e r a t i o n 
t a c t i c s , we can b e g i n to dea l w i t h problems 
drawn from r i c h , i n t e r a c t i v e env i ronments t h a t 
have thus f a r been beyond u s . 
4 . 4 . P a r t i a l Goal F u l f i l l m e n t 
Problem s o l v e r s to date have been designed to 
f u l l y s a t i s f y t h e i r g o a l s . As the problems we 
work w i t h become more complex, and as we a t tempt 
t o i n t e g r a t e prob lem s o l v e r s w i t h e x e c u t i o n 
r o u t i n e s t o c o n t r o l r e a l - w o r l d b e h a v i o r , f u l l 
g o a l s a t i s f a c t i o n w i l l b e i m p o s s i b l e . I n 
p a r t i c u l a r , a system t h a t deals w i t h the r e a l 
w o r l d may need to execute a p a r t i a l l y 
s a t i s f a c t o r y p l a n and see how the w o r l d r e a c t s 
t o i t be fo re be ing ab le t o complete the nex t 
inc rement of p l a n n i n g . Thus, we must be ab le to 
p l a n f o r the p a r t i a l s a t i s f a c t i o n o f a set o f 
g o a l s . T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t a means must be found 
o f p r i o r i t i z i n g the goa ls and o f r e c o g n i z i n g 
when an adequate increment in the p l a n n i n g 
process has been a c h i e v e d . 
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Abstract and Introduction 
Some recent artificial intelligence programs whose task is to simulate the processes of scientific discovery can 
be taken as models of the history and processes of discovery within the Al discipline Itself. Consistently with 
these models, AI research relies basically on the methods of heuristic best-first search. Because of Its necessarlly 
vague end open goals, it works forward inductively (rather than backward In menea-ends fashion), guided by a 
crude evaluation function that tests running programs to identify promising directions. 
AI reseerch Is empirical and pragmatic, typically working with examples rather than theorems, and exemplfyin 
the heuristic of learning by doing. In Its essential reliance on weak methods and experiment Insteed Of proof, it is 
edepted to the exploration of poorly structured task domains, showing considerable contrest In the respect to 
operetione reseerch or numerical analysis, which thrive best In domains possessing strong formal structure. 
If human Intelligence Is unequal to the needs of history At scientific meetings it is customary to schedule, in 
addition to papers reporting specific pieces of research, 
"addresses, "keynote speeches," and the like, which may 
be described .as meta-papers. The task of meta-papers 
la not to report research but to Interpret the past and to 
peer into the future of the discipline. This is such a 
meta-paper. Presumably you expect me to say where 
artificial intelligence has been and where it is going. 
Clearly, this is not a task for human intelligence. 
Human beings are notoriously incapable of reviewing 
history — especially history in which they have 
participated — without rationalizing outrageously to make 
the pest conform to their picture of the present. And 
human forecests of the future almost always reveal much 
more ebout the forecasters' hopes, fears, desires and 
dreads than they do about the shape of the world to 
come. 
Early in the history of AI, in 1957, Allen Newell and 1 
made some predictions that became rather notorious 
(Simon & Newell, 1958). Skeptics and opponents of AI 
used them as evidence of the recklessness and 
irresponsibility of the advocates of AI. (Optimistic 
forecasts seem to attract such charges much more often 
than do doomsday forecasts.) 
Of course our forecasts were neither reckless nor 
irresponsible. As we said at the time, they represented 
our attempt to define in concrete terms the nature of the 
revolution in human affairs that was going to be 
produced by computers in general and artificial 
Intelligence in particular. As scientists privileged to 
witness the early stages of a momentous development, 
we felt a responsibility to interpret that development to 
leymen, and the predictions were our interpretation. Nor 
was our forecasting seriously inaccurate, if one allows a 
time-stretch factor of two or three — a not unreasonable 
mergin of inaccuracy in such crystal-ball ventures. 
I cite this little piece of history not to defend my 
record as either a seer or a historian, but as empirical 
evidence for my doubts, expressed earlier, that either 
foresight or hindsight are fit tasks for human intelligence. 
Such doubts undermine the very foundations of 
meta-pepers, including this one. 
and prophecy, perhaps we should call on artificial 
intelligence. Perhaps we should ask what AI has to say 
about the processes of discovery. After all, we do have, 
todey, a number of artificial Intelligence programs that 
are capable of making discoveries of one kind or another 
— I have in mind particularly Doug Lenat's AM program, 
and Pat Langley's BACON. Perhaps these programs can 
tell us more about the research process than human 
beings can. 
An Al program that makes genuine discoveries, or one 
that solves difficult problems, provides us with a theory 
of the discovery process, Indeed, a theory in the most 
concrete and explicit form that is conceivable. Since 
these programs reveal to us some of the essential 
requisites and structure of the discovery process, we can 
use them to illuminate the history of discovery in the 
domain of artificial intelligence itself, and to provide soma 
insight into the ways in which we can best proceed in 
future research and development aimed at new 
discoveries in that field. 
This is the path I propose to pursue in this paper. 
First, I will summarize what seem to me some of the 
salient characteristics of successful artificial intelligence 
problem-solving systems, especially those whose basic 
task is to make discoveries. Next, I will ask whether this 
list of program characteristics suggests why the process 
of discovery in the AI field itself has taken the particular 
course that it has. Finally, I will turn to the future, and 
ask what lessons we might learn from this experience In 
our continuing efforts to extend the boundaries of AI, 
particularly in the directions of greater capabilities for 
discovery and for solving Ill-structured problems. If this 
route seems somewhat circular — Al illuminating itself --
1 remind you that circles may be either vicious or 
virtuous, and I will argue that this is one of the virtuous 
kind. 
I will not try to cover every aspect of AI, and w 
undoubtedly overemphasize problem-solving and heuristic 
search at the expense of such areas as visual pattern 
recognition. This lapse will be the less serious to the 
extent that the techniques of heuristic search are today 
Invading the domain of pattern recognition, bringing 
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about a greater degree of unity in outlook throughout the 
whole field of artificial Intelligence. So I will take, as 
Allen Newell and I did In our Turing Lecture, heuristic 
search as the central paradigm for artificial intelligence 
(Newell & Simon, 1976). 
1. AI Programs at Theories of Discovery 
By a discovery program I mean a computer program 
whose output is not inferable in any obvious way from its 
Input. The phrase, "in any obvious way," is essential to 
the definition, since we know that a program does exactly 
what we program It to do — which is usually not at all 
the same es doing what we supposed we had 
programmed it to do. 
2* The Nature of Discovery 
Novelty, In computers as In human beings, lies in the 
eye of the beholder. The result Is novel if it was not 
expected from the outset. But even this definition is 
ambiguous. As the numerous documented cases of 
Independent Invention attest, a discovery may be novel 
to the discoverer but not to the whole society, for others 
may already have found it. However, to produce a 
novelty a second time, without knowledge that it has 
already been discovered by others, presumably requires 
the same kinds of cognitive processes as were required 
to produce It the first time. Anything we can learn by 
examining the program of the original discoverer we 
should be able \o learn also by examining the program of 
the rein venter.1 
It is probably true today that within any one hour 
period some computer program somewhere in the world 
has followed a path rsevnr before traversed, to produce a 
novel successful result. This must occur for example, 
more than once in almost every game played by a 
hobbyist's minicomputer chess program, since chess 
games rarely fully repeat others that have been played 
In the world. However, we generally do not $pp\y the 
term "discovery" to every novelty of this kind, however 
rational or adaptive the output may be. We require, In 
addition, that the novelty be in some sense remarkable or 
socially valuable. In particular, and borrowing language 
from the patent law, to be an invention, a novelty must 
not be "obvious to a person skilled in the art." While a 
minicomputer playing Class D chess discovers many novel 
solutions to its problems, these solutions would 
Rresumably be discovered easily by strong players, ence would not qualify as inventions in the legal sense. 
Even today, after a quarter century of AI efforts, it is 
hard to point to fully convincing examples of discoveries 
by artificial intelligence programs that satisfy this stricter 
definition, of being neither rediscoveries nor obvious to 
one skilled In the art. If pressed on this point, I might 
want to defend certain products of chess programs, 
programs for musical composition and visual design, and 
theorem-proving programs as meeting the stricter 
requirements of invention, but such a defense would take 
*Thia claim raqutras torn* qualifications. TKt rtinvtntor may po i t t t t 
knowtadfe — not tha mvantion itastf, but knowttdft ramvtnt to it - that 
waa not availabla to tha ordinal invantor, but which mahoe tha Job ttsiar 
♦ha Mcond time. Latar, I wiM hava mora to sty on thit point ■■ it •ppfct 
apactf ieaHy to At 
me away from my main concern here. 
I will draw my examples of discovery from computer 
programs that have mainly rediscovered what was 
already known, but whose discoveries are hardly trivial, 
and would indeed have been adjudged important if they 
had been genuinely new. I have in mind such examples 
es the discovery by Lenat's AM program of the concept 
of prime number and it* conjecturing of the fundamental 
theorem of arithmetic — that e^ery positive integer can 
be represented uniquely as a product of powers of 
primes (Lenat, 1977). Examples of a slightly different 
kind are BACON'S induction from empirical data of 
Kepler's Third Law, Ohm's Law, and the Laws of Boyle 
and Charles (Langley, forthcoming). 
Before we take the programs that found these 
concepts and laws as exhibiting the essential processes 
for discovery, we must satisfy ourselves on one point: 
that the human programmers did not, in some explicit or 
implicit way, embed the results at the outset in the 
programs and their inputs. Since we have already agreed 
that the outputs of programs are determined by the 
programs (and data), what can we mean by this 
requirement? Simply that the derivation of the outputs 
from program and data be sufficiently non-obvious. This 
is, of course, the same criterion we apply to a 
mathematical theorem to determine whether it is "deep"; 
and it is the same as the legal requirement for invention, 
quoted above. 
This is not to say that it is a precise criterion, statable 
in a formal way. The only way I know to decide whether 
AM or BACON, or any other program purporting to have 
powers of discovery (but exhibiting those powers 
through rediscovery) genuinely possesses such 
capabilities is to search the code carefully for hideaways 
where the conclusions may be concealed in the premises. 
The severity of the test will depend on how thoroughly 
the search is made and how strict a criterion of 
obviousness is applied. Since I know of no way at the 
present time to quantify either of these two dimensions 
of the test, we must still depend (as we do in evaluating 
the merit of scientific discoveries) on informal judgement. 
From close familiarity with the AM and BACON 
programs, I am satisfied that these two programs pass 
any reasonable tests of this kind. Let me, then, comment 
on the structure of the programs — on the sources of 
their powers of discovery. For the sake of those of you 
who 9re not acquainted with AM or BACON, I will first 
state briefly what each program does. As already noted, 
a fuller description of AM, by Doug Lenat, will be found in 
the Proceedings of the Fifth UCAIU977), and of BACON, 
by Pat Langley, in the Proceedings of this conference. 
Lenat's AM Program AM is a system that discovers new 
concepts and that conjectures new relations among them. 
Its input consists of an initial stock of concepts (in one 
application, the basic notions of set theory), goals and 
criteria (the goal of discovering new concepts and 
possible relations among concepts, and criteria for 
evaluating the worth or interest of concepts), and 
heuristics for searching for new concepts. Among the 
criteria for judging if a concept is interesting is how 
closely it is related to other interesting concepts, and 
whether examples of it can be constructed — not too 
easily, but with not too much difficulty. The search 
heuristics include the aovice to construct examples, to 
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pay particular attention to borderline examples, to 
particularize when examples are found too easily, to 
generalize when they are hard to find This is the Kind 
of initial information available to AM — initial concepts, 
goals and criteria, and search heuristics. 
The control structure of AM guides it in a best-first 
search} the criteria of concept worth determine which of 
the concepts already attained should be the starting 
point for the next quantum of search. On its most 
celebrated run, starting with the concepts of set theory, 
AM discovered — among other things — the integers, the 
arithmetic operations of addition, subtraction, 
multiplication and division, the concept of prime number, 
and, as I mentioned earlier, the prime number 
representation theorem. When it began concerning itself 
with numbers possessing maximal (instead of minimal) 
numbers of prime factors, Lenat thought it had entered 
on truly new ground, only to find that this territory had 
earlier been explored by the self-taught Indian 
mathematician, Srinivasa Ramanujan. Therefore, AM must 
be evaluated as a rediscoverer, rather than a discoverer 
of new mathematical truths. 
Lanelev's BACON Program BACON is a program that 
induces general laws from empirical data. Given sets of 
observations on two or more variables, BACON searches 
for functional relations among the variables. Again, it 
carries out a form of best-first search, in which a 
criterion of "simple things before complex" guides what 
to t ry next. 
BACON'S search is highly selective; it does not try all 
possibilities. It arranges the observations monotonically 
according to the values of one of the variables. Then it 
determines whether the values of some other variables 
follow the same (or the inverse) ordering. Picking one of 
these other variables, it searches for an invariant by 
considering the ratio (resp., product) of this variable with 
the original one. If the ratio (product) is not constant, it 
is introduced as a new variable, and the process 
continues. Thus, the newly defined variables in BACON 
correspond to the new concepts in AM, and the process 
Is driven by a search for invariants. 
It is easy to see how BACON, discovering that the 
product of electrical current by resistance in an electrical 
circuit was constant, would be led to Ohm's Law. The 
case of Kepler's Third Law requires BACON to generate, 
successively, ratios of powers of the radii of the planets 
orbits to powers of their periods of revolution, arriving 
at the invariant, D3 /P2 , after a search of a small number 
of possibilities. 
I have mentioned only a few of the salient features of 
BACON. The system has at least crude means for 
ignoring noise as data, and a number of other interesting 
features, but I will leave their fuller description to the 
program's author. What is interesting for our purposes is 
that a program, equipped and organized as I have 
described, detects regularities in data sufficiently 
perceptively to rediscover important scientific laws. 
AM and BACON use similar schemes of memory 
organization. The ability to apply the same basic 
processes to given information and to newly generated 
concepts or variables, respectively, hence to operate 
recursively, is guaranteed by using a homogeneous 
format for the storage of all data. Though the details of 
the data structures are different for the two programs, 
both use schemes — structures of proper\y lists -- to 
describe the objects with which they deal or which they 
generate. The main element of rigidity in their memory 
organizations is that the specific properties that may 
occur in these schemes — the "slots" — are specified In 
advance and known to the programs. 
Discovery Mechanisms The theory of discovery that 
emerges from an examination of how these programs 
work contains little that should surprise us — unless we 
have been seduced by the often-repeated myth that 
discovery processes, being "creative," somehow stand 
apart from the other actions of the human mind. In AM 
and BACON we see discoveries being produced by 
precisely the same kinds of symbolic processes that 
account for the efficacy of other AI problem-solving 
programs: theorem provers, chess players, puzzle 
solvers, diagnosis systems. A space of possible concepts 
and relations (AM), or of possible invariants (BACON) is 
searched in a highly selective, best-first manner. The 
search mainly works forward inductively from the given 
concepts or data. 
The discovery programs are distinguished from most 
other problem-solving systems in the vagueness" of the 
tasks presented to them and of the heuristic criteria that 
guide the search and account for its selectivity. Because 
the goals are very general ("find an interesting concept 
or relations, "find an invariant"), the use of means-ends 
analysis to work backward from a desired result is not 
very common. By and large, the programs work forward 
inductively from the givens of the problem and from the 
new concepts and variables generated from these givens. 
Both programs work at a very concrete level. AM 
makes a major use of examples, which it is capable of 
generating, in searching for new concepts. BACON works 
with numerical data. If we observed human scientists 
working in the manner of these programs, we would 
regard them as very pragmatic. We are reminded of 
Faraday's notebooks, in which he recorded, day after day, 
the experiments that were suggested to a curious mind 
by the findings of the previous day's experiment. Or, we 
think of Mendeleev arranging and rearranging his lists of 
the elements until their periodic structure begins to 
emerge from his worksheets. 
Both programs discover, they do not prove. Their task 
is to find regularity and pattern in nature, not to 
demonstrate the necessity of that pattern. Although their 
heuristics appear very general and weak — they do not 
rely et all on semantic information about the task domain 
that is being explored — they accomplish the search 
tasks with a remarkably small amount of trial and error. 
In the best tradition of heuristic schemes, they operate 
without any guarantees that they will succeed, but they 
do succeed in finding many interesting results. We would 
not even know how to define completeness for programs 
given these kinds of ill-defined tasks. 
Because the tasks addresssed by these systems are 
poorly defined, we do not have good measures of how 
powerful they are. Of course, we can make our personal 
evaluations of the quality of their discoveries — of how 
Impressed we are that AM finds the prime number 
factorization theorem, or that BACON readily Induces 
Ohm's Law from the data. But we do not have the 
precision of comparison with human performance that a 
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chess program gives us, or a program for medical 
diagnosis. The difficulty of evaluating them is 
compounded by the absence of a yardstick for measuring 
the knowledge with which they are endowed at the 
outset, or that is embedded in the program structures. 
We do not know whether BACON had the same starting 
point as Ohm, or whether one of them was faced with an 
essentially simpler problem of induction than the other. 
Of course the same uncertainties surround all of our 
attempts to evaluate human discovery also. AM and 
BACON pose no new methodological puzzles in this 
respect. 
How does the behavior of these programs compare 
with the behavior of the human scientists who have 
labored in the vineyards of artificial intelligence during 
the past 25 years? Do AM and BACON provide a true, if 
rough and approximate, description of that discovery 
effort? And what of the future of AI? Can these 
discovery programs help us in either prediction or 
strategy? Let me turn first to the history. 
3. The Discovery Process in AI 
Artificial intelligence has sometimes been criticized as 
being atheoretical, and consequently as having no solid 
substance. Of course, the premise might be true but the 
consequent false, unless we believe that all truth takes 
the form of rigorously proved theorems. Artificial 
intelligence has certainly been short of theorems, and in 
a field as densely populated with mathematicians and 
former mathematicians as is computer science, its 
nakedness in this respect has not gone unnoticed. 
It may be objected that 1 am neglecting the A* 
algorithm, or the various interesting properties of 
Alpha-Beta search, or even the theorems that Kadane and 
I have proved about optimal evaluation functions for 
best-first all-or-none search (Simon & Kadance, 1975). 
But these isolated examples, even if we add to them all 
the others known to us, do not constitute a theory of 
artificial intelligence. At best, they provide us with some 
islands of theory, separated by wide expanses of an 
atheoretical ocean. Moreoever, the heuristics of 
best-first search implied by these examples were known 
empirically and used in running AI programs for many 
years before the mathematics was developed (Newell A 
Simon, 1956).1. 
AI as Empirical Inquiry I am afraid that we must resign 
ourselves to the fact (or celebrate it, depending on our 
taste in science) that artificial intelligence has not been a 
branch of mathematics, but rather a field of inductive, 
empirical inquiry. The main strategy of investigation has 
been to propose tasks requiring intelligence for their 
performance, to write programs for handling those tasks, 
and to test the efficacy and efficiency of the programs 
by giving them a sample of tasks drawn from the domain 
In question. Nearly everything we have learned about 
artificial intelligence over the past 25 years (and much of 
what we have learned about human intelligence as well), 
has been found by following this experimental strategy. 
And the body of knowledge that exists in AI today Is 
The logic Theory Machine. In 1056,already Incoporated best first 
heuristic search, white the Alpha-Bate houristic it to be found In cKrat 
programs at early •• 1956. 
better described as a store of experimental data and 
inferences drawn from them than as a collection of 
mathematical truths. 
But the process I am describing corresponds closely to 
the kind of process that is carried out by AM and BACON. 
We have seen that both programs are inductive and 
experimental ~ even if the product of the former's 
efforts are mathematical constructs and conjectures, and 
of the letter's, postulated functional relations among 
numerical variables. Neither AM nor BACON proves 
anything. If they produce conviction, it is the conviction 
of the empirical scientist, relying on some postulate of 
the uniformity of nature, rather than the conviction of the 
mathematician, relying on the certainty of the laws of 
logic. 
Inferring Principles From Programs The 
problem-solving tasks that AI research has addressed 
during the past 25 years, like the tasks addressed by AM 
and BACON, seem largely fortuitous — targets of 
opportunity: theorem- proving in logic and group theory, 
the Eights Puzzle and Missionaries & Cannibals, chess, 
Euclidean geometry, medical diagnosis, mass spectrogram 
analysis, speech recognition, parsing natural language, to 
mention a few. An assiduous historian could no doubt 
track down the reasons why each of these domains was 
attempted, but those reasons would not add up to a 
grand strategy for artificial intelligence. Probably the 
choice was neither much more nor much less considered 
than the choice of sweet peas and fruit flies as favored 
organisms for genetic research. 
The true comparison is between these tasks, on the 
one hand, and the examples generated by AM or the data 
sets of BACON, on the other. The central inductive 
problem for AI has been to generalize from the 
performance of programs dedicated to individual tasks 
some principles (empirical principles, not necessarily 
theorems) about the mechansims required for intelligent 
problem-solving behavior. How successfully this problem 
has- been solved can be judged by assessing how far new 
AI programs make use of the heuristics and structural 
principles of the programs already in existence, and by 
examining the extent to which AI textbooks are organized 
in terms of general principles. 
On both scores there is evidence of steady progress in 
AI. In the first decade or two, one can find a number of 
reinventions of general principles by investigators who 
were exploring different task domains (or even, 
occasionally, the same task domain). For example, 
best-first search apparently appeared intially, as already 
noted, as a component of one version of The Logic 
Theory Machine, disappeared in early versions of GPS, 
which tended to be oriented towared depth-first search, 
and reappeared in the MATER chess combinations 
program (Baylor A Simon, 1966). As another example, 
schemes appear in programs as early as 1956, but were 
subsequently reinvented and rechristened "templates" or 
-frames" (Minsky, 1975; and Simon, 1972). During the 
past five or ten years, however, the main structural 
components of AI programs have been identified, and a 
reasonably consistent vocabulary adopted for referring 
to them. 
This gradual progress toward awareness of general 
principles Is reflected by the textbooks in the field. 
Early textbooks were little more than collections of 
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examples of more or loss successful problem-solving 
programs. Beginning with Nilsson's book, Problem-solving 
Methods In Artificial Intelligence (Nilsson, 1971), some 
genera) threads of organization began to appear, and 
specific programs were not merely described, but were 
analysed for their contributions to these threads. With 
all this progress, the contemporary books still reflect the 
pragmatic and empirical foundations of the field, and 
resemble textbooks in geology more than they resemble 
treatises in analytical mechanics. 
Departures from the Discovery Model There is one 
respect in which the history of At research departs 
significantly from the trace of a computer discovery 
programs for in the Al world, many lines of inquiry can be 
pursued simultaneously — provided that the discipline is 
sufficiently well populated by researchers, and that the 
researchers are not too much driven by fads. Hence, 
when we try to interpret the annals as exemplifying 
best-f irst search, we must use that term loosely. To be 
sure, there was a period of several years during which 
attempts at theorem- proving nearly dominated AI 
research, and a more recent period when much of the 
inquiry was focused on problem-solving in 
knowledge-rich domains. When a topic like one of these 
seems to be progressing rapidly, it attratts much of the 
field's research effort, as would be true of a best-first 
search system. But other lines of investigation are never 
wholly dormant. 
What has happened when the AI research strategy has 
departed from the discovery model? The most instructive 
examples are the cases where pragmatism was sacrificed 
to the demand for more theory and formal development. 
One such case is theorem-proving, where mathematical 
tastes have exercised greater influence than in most 
other AI task domains. 
From the time of Hao Wang's early and successful 
program for proving theorems in the propositional 
calculus (Wang, 1960), most theorem-proving efforts have 
placed great emphasis on the completeness of their 
programs and upon employing elegant proof methods 
(e.g., natural deduction and resolution) from symbolic 
logic. Since completeness Is most easily proved for 
breadth-first programs that do not use pragmatically 
constructed selective heuristics, the mainstream of 
research eschewed best-first search and heuristics that 
lacked guarantees of completeness. 
When heuristics could be used that did not threaten 
completeness (e.g., set of support), they were adopted 
readily, but heuristics possessing this guarantee were not 
in sufficiently long supply to prevent the exponential 
explosion of search trees. The net result has been a 
general disillusionment with the progress of 
theorem-proving research, and a diversion of effort to 
other task domains within AI. Some exceptions can be 
found, of course. For example, in the impressive work of 
Bledsoe and his associates, we see exhibited a much more 
pragmatic attitude towards heuristics than has been 
characteristic of theorem-proving research in general 
(Bledsoe, 1977). 
Al as I Residual Domain Some years ago, Allen Newell 
described artificial intelligence as the domain of weak 
methods, a description that still seems to hold (Newell, 
1969). th is Is not because anyone prefers weak methods 
to strong. No one would solve a problem by heuristic 
search if he thought that the simplex algorithm of linear 
programming would do the job. But strong methods 
apply only in domains that have sufficiently rich and 
smooth structure to support them. The simplex method 
works only in a problem space that is convex, bounded 
by linear inequalities, and with a linear criterion function 
to be maximized. The method exploits the mathematical 
structure of the space to home in on solutions in a 
relatively direct and straightforward fashion. 
AM, and to a lesser extent BACON, are designed to 
work in spaces that have little regular structure, or which 
have structure that is intiailly unknown to the program. 
They use the weak methods of heuristic search for the 
same reason that artificial intelligence has used those 
methods — because not enough was known, In advance, 
of the shape of the problem space for stronger methods 
to be used. 
Similarly, attempts to derive measures of computational 
complexity for typical AI domains have not yet yielded 
much of a mathematical harvest. Proofs about the 
dependence of amount of computation, in the worst or 
average cases, upon problem size depend on knowledge 
of structural features of the problem domain, and where 
such structural features are unknown or absent it 
becomes difficult to obtain strong mathematical results. 
Necessity should not be redefined as a virtue. Yet, it 
makes some sense to define artificial intelligence as a 
residual domain -- the domain in which it has not yet 
been possible to substitute powerful special-purpose 
techniques for weak methods. At any time that such 
techniques are discovered for a particular subset of 
problems, those problems are removed from the 
jurisdiction of AI to that of operations research or 
numerical analysis. But human intelligence, applied, for 
instance to the discovery of new knowledge, is not 
limited to working in orderly domains that have strong 
structure, and it is the task of AI to show how 
intelligence works, and even to complement its working, 
in less well structured domains. 
4. From Past to Future 
If we take AM and BACON as our models of the 
discovery process, then we should despair of making 
exact forecasts of where artificial intelligence research is 
likely to go in the next few years. For the discovery 
process illustrated by those programs is myopic, its 
best-f irst search responding to intimations of 
opportunity. Consequently, targets will continue to shift, 
as they have shifted in the past, to those task domains 
that exhibit from time to time, most promise of movement. 
Allocation of Effort One important difference has 
already been noted between a discovery process 
programmed for a serial digital computer and the social 
discovery process of the AI community. That community 
is a parallel, rather than a serial, machine. With the 
increase in manpower that has been attracted to the field 
in the past five years, the prospects are now brighter 
than they were earlier for maintaining sustained research 
activity in a number of AI domains at the same time. At 
the present time, for example, a more or less continuous 
effort of several research groups is being devoted to 
chess programs, to natural language understanding, to 
visual pattern recognition, to medical diagnosis, and to 
various kinds of information retrieval tasks. 
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The fact that a computing system has modest parallel 
capacity does not, however, invalidate the main features 
of the best-first search model. The parallel capacity Is 
still highly limited, and does not grow exponentailly (at 
least not for long), as it would have to in order to avoid 
decisions about what part of the tree to search next. 
The effort allocation problem for a parallel, but not 
exponentially growing, system is merely a little less 
poignant than the problem for a strictly serial system. At 
any given moment, several branches that are most 
promising for exploration have to be chosen, instead of a 
single branch. Hence, with limits of both manpower and 
funding in AI, increased activity in some directions means 
decreased activity in others. 
For example, research on speech recognition appears 
to have receded again to a relatively low level of activity 
with the termination of the special ARPA funding, as has 
AI research on robotry. (I will have a bit more to say 
about robotry research later, but will simply observe 
now that the current boom in industrial robotry is only 
tenuously connected with the main stream of AI research, 
and makes only limited use of AI methods.) Automatic 
programming has never reached the level of attention 
that Its potential importance and centrality to AI would 
seem to justify. Theorem- proving — and 
problem-solving in general -~ appear to be attracting 
relatively little effort currently. 
Judged in terms of the contents of the Proceedings of 
UCAI5 (I don't have the corresponding numbers for the 
current conference), natural language is attracting the 
most attention in AI research, followed closely by vision 
and the representation and acquisition of Knowledge. 
These three areas together accounted for about 607. of 
all the papers. 
The Evaluation function From the shifts in allocation of 
research effort, we can draw some conclusions about the 
evaluation function that is used to guide the best-first 
search. But we must note carefully whose evaluation 
function it is. To those of us who have been working in 
AI, it is obvious that the shifts in emphasis among speech 
recognition, robotry, and automatic programming (these 
especially, but not exclusively) have been determined to 
a much greater degree by the judgments of funding 
agencies as to what kinds of work were more likely to 
lead promptly to practical application, than by the 
judgments of the researchers as to what lines of inquiry 
held the greatest promise for advancing fundamental 
knowledge. 
In part, this vulnerability of the research agenda to 
genuine or imagined priorities for applications is the 
price that AI pays for being a "big science" field, 
dependent for its progress on the availabity of expensive 
computing equipment. But some other big science fields 
— for example, radio astronomy — have attained 
considerable freedom in selecting their research goals, 
and we can only hope that AI can gradually acquire 
similar autonomy as the field becomes better established 
and the fundamental character of the phenomena it 
studies more widely understood. 
If I were to contrast my own personal evaluation 
function with the function Inferred from the actual 
present allocation of effort, I would be inclined to give 
considerably more attention to the domains of robotry 
(that is, the AI aspects of robotry) and automatic 
programming than these areas are now receiving. Later, 
I will have a few words to say about the reasons for my 
preferences. 
Common Themes One factor that mitigates the possible 
damage done by the whims of funding agencies and the 
fads of AI research itself, is that there is a considerable 
overlap in the basic problems encountered, and in the 
basic AI mechanisms required to solve those problems in 
all the task domains where AI research is carried on. 
Best-first search, for example, is a recurring theme, 
regardless of whether we are concerned with 
theorem-proving, chess playing, or robot planning. 
Similar problems of data representation, organization, and 
access must be faced in almost all task domains. Many 
tasks call for natural language capabilities of wider or 
narrower extent. The context-dependence of knowledge 
acquired through search, and the extrapolation of 
knowledge from one context to another is a recurrent 
theme. Because of these commonalities, progress in our 
understanding of any new task is likely to contribute 
substantially to progress for other, temporarily dormant 
tasks. 
But these benefits of commonality will be realized only 
If we pay explicit attention to the transfer problem. The 
existence of multiple parallel research efforts in different 
tasks domains increases the danger that the same 
principles and mechanisms will be reinvented, perhaps 
more than once, by specialized investigators who are 
unaware of work going on outside their own narrow 
areas. As the AI research field grows and more 
investigators enter it, specialization will undoubtedly 
grow also (it has already), and the dangers of duplication 
will increase correspondingly. 
Perhaps the most important preventive step against 
reinventing wheels is to define research goals not simply 
in terms of constructing programs that will perform 
specific tasks well, but in terms of using programs as 
examples and test beds for generating and illuminating 
general principles. Computer science has its roots in 
both scientific and engineering traditions. For the 
engineer — at least the nonacademic engineer ~ the 
device Is the thing; the proof of his pudding is in how 
well the system he has designed works. For the 
computer scientist, the device (the program) is not an end 
in itself, but a means for testing whether particular 
methods and principles, incorporated in the device, 
perform the functions for which they are intended. 
Journal referees and reviewers of funding proposals can 
contribute much to the development of AI by insisting on 
these broader goal specifications for AI research 
projects. 
There would also appear to be room in AI research for 
more generalists and theorists who would devote their 
attention to extracting general principles by comparative 
analysis of programs in different task domains. Of course 
such activity goes on at the present time, but perhaps it 
would be encouraged further if we did not restrict the 
term "theory" to formal, mathematical developments. 
It might appear that I have fallen into a contradiction. 
Using AM and BACON as my models of discovery 
programs, t pointed out the futility of trying to predict 
the course of discovery. Now, only a few paragraphs 
later, I am expressing my views about the allocation of 
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effort. There is, in fact, no contradiction. In best-first 
search, choosing an evaluation function and using it to 
guide the allocation of effort is unavoidable. This does 
not mean that one can predict where the search will lead; 
but a well-choosen evaluation function can indicate the 
most productive points at which it can start. Let me offer 
a few illustrations. 
Research on Robots One criterion of a promising task 
domain is that successful Al programs in the domain will 
rely on important components of intelligence that have 
not been much explored in other research. Robotry is a 
promising domain, because it takes us away from planning 
actions In simple worlds of the Imagination — where the 
consequences of our actions can be deduced precisely — 
into planning actions in complex real worlds, where we 
must be prepared to readjust our estimates of the state 
of the world repeatedly as our actions fall short of or 
beside our intentions. 
Methods for matching the predicted to the actual state 
of the world, and for correcting the former to reflect the 
latter, are fundamental to the success of systems that can 
survive in complex environments and particularly in 
environments where there is much uncertainty. 
When I refer to robotry research, I have in mind 
something rather different from the development of 
Industrial robots that is now burgeoning in a number of 
countries. Most industrial robots are being designed to 
carry out fairly restricted ranges of tasks in factory 
environments that are carefully tailored to the robots. 
Moreover, AI techniques have not played a prominent 
role in these developments, most of which come out of 
the tradition of engineering control theory. 
In this application, the residual status of AI methods is 
again apparent. If an environment can be sufficiently 
smoothed and simplified, then the methods of 
servomechanism and control theory may provide the best 
means for designing flexible devices to operate in that 
environment. AI methods are likely to have a 
comparative advantage in rough and complex 
environments that have to be dealt with in their raw, 
natural form. For this reason, research on vehicles 
capable of locomoting autonomously on remote planets is 
probably more relevant to basic issues in artificial 
intelligence than is research on industrial robots that are 
to operate in factory environments. The former kinds of 
systems will have to be flexibly intelligent to a much 
higher degree than the latter. 
However, I do not want to overstate the case. As the 
development of industrial robots goes forward, there is a 
need for strong capabilities in visual pattern recognition, 
a domain in which artificial intelligence concepts are likely 
to play a role of increasing prominence. The point of my 
example is that we don't simply want to seize on robotry 
as a task domain, but want to ask what aspects of 
robotry call especially for AI approaches, and what light 
Is likely to be cast on general AI concerns by research 
focused on those aspects. 
Automatic Programming A second domain I singled out 
as promising for Al research today is automatic 
programming. Here again, the general value of the 
research for advancing our basic understanding of 
artificial intelligence depends on how the problem Is 
defined, I have especially In mind systems that would 
take ill-structured and incomplete descriptions of a 
desired program (of the sort we would give as 
instructions to a human programmer), and transfer them 
into executable code. Automatic programming, so defined, 
is an excellent domain in which to experiment with the 
automatic design of problem representations — a problem 
we must address if we are to extend AI further Into 
ill-structured domains. 
An additional reason why automatic programming tasks 
deserve high priority on the research agenda is that they 
offer excellent opportunities for work on natural 
language and knowledge representation. Research in the 
latter two fields has sometimes suffered from vagueness 
in the specification of the task. To study natural 
language effectively we must study particular kinds of 
situations in which information and meanings have to be 
communicated for a definite purpose. The automatic 
programming task defines that purpose (as does also the 
closely related task of understanding problem instructions 
written in natural language). By the same token, we are 
apt to learn most effectively about the problems of 
knowledge representation in the context of a specific 
task domain like automatic programming. 
If we accept necessity as the mother of invention, we 
must remember that another parent is needed too. 
Automatic programming deserves a high rating for its 
research potential only if there is reason to believe it 
can be done — that our basic knowledge has reached the 
point where it is reasonable to talk about automatic 
design of task representation. I would argue that both 
the progress ~ modest though it be — that has already 
been made in automatic programming, and the progress in 
the design of representations for other domains provide 
favorable indications that we are ready for the next step 
(Hayes & Simon, 1974). 
Local and Global Knowledge A problem that has 
plagued heuristic search systems from the beginning is 
that information gathered at one node in a search 
through a problem space is not generally usable by the 
system to guide its search in other parts of the space. 
The same information may have to be generated again 
and again at different nodes. 
Partly, this is a problem of information organization, 
solvable through such devices as blackboard schemes 
(Lesser & Erman, 1977). In such schemes, information is 
not stored in association with the nodes at which it is 
generated, but is placed in a common space where it 
becomes permanently available to all parts of the 
program, and at all times during the exploration of the 
problem space. 
But there is a deeper problem with making information 
more broadly available: the information may be true only 
in a local context. Then the boundaries of this context 
must be determined and associated with the information 
before it can be exported safely. There is still not much 
theory (or experience) in the Al literature as to how this 
is to be done, but some progress has been made toward 
solving the problem in connection with research on 
speech recognition programs and chess programs, both of 
which are promising environments in which to pursue this 
issue (Lesser ft Erman, 1977; Perdue ft Berliner, 1977). 
Learning Systems In AI a great deal more progress has 
been made in constructing performance programs than In 
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designing programs that learn. In the early history of 
artificial intelligence, the topic of self-organizing systems 
was pursued vigorously but, as it turned out, not 
particularly successfully. As the best-first search 
progressed, the nodes associated with this topic received 
low evaluations, and were gradually abandoned. 
Yet the topic of learning in AI is not at all dead; rather 
it has been redefined. In early efforts, great importance 
was attached to starting systems off at or near ground 
level. The guarantee that they were learning was that 
they started off Knowing almot nothing. Today, we 
characterize learning in a somewhat different way; wa 
look for adaptive change, and we look for that change to 
be recursive and cumulative. 
In the broadest sense, any program is a learning 
program that gradully changes over time so that on each 
new encounter with a particular kind of task it behaves in 
a more appropriate way. In neither human beings nor 
computers should we expect to find just a very limited 
number of processes called "learning processes,'' for 
there generally are a multitude of ways in which a 
complex system can modify itself adaptively. 
Learning will generally be incremental. That is, each 
new step in adaptaation will itself improve the capacity 
for further adaptation. A problem-solving system 
becomes a learning system whenever it is designed so 
that problem solutions can be stored and used to 
contribute to subsequent problem-solving. Clearly, 
discovery programs like AM and BACON are learning 
programs, since their explicit task is to produce novel 
outputs and to use those outputs recursively. 
With this broader definition of learning, a whole 
spectrum of AI systems qualify as learning systems. 
Learning can connote all degrees of pasivity or activity of 
the learner. Thus, at one extreme, we have interactive 
systems aimed at making it easier for the programmer to 
add new knowledge to an information structure, where 
the program itself is a wholly passive learner. At the 
other extreme, we have adaptive production systems that 
are able to extract information from their experiences, 
and use the information to improve themselves even 
without explicit instruction from outside. Most systems 
that learn from experience are aided, of course, if the 
experience is organized for them in a favorable way — in 
a succession of carefully graded lessons. It is the skill of 
a good teacher to present experience in this way. 
One might ask whether it is time to revive learning as 
a major explicit goal of AI research. Since learning 
pervades almost all aspects of Intelligent performance, 
the right search strategy is probably to incorpooate 
learning goals In our performance systems. That seems 
to be a quite natural thing to do in building systems for 
visual pattern recognition, for example, for automatic 
programming, or for understanding natural language 
instructions. 
But there are apprentices in the world as well as 
Journeyman; and presumably the apprentice's first 
concern in his learning rather that his performance. So 
perhaps there is room, on the tree of AI research, for an 
active branch that works with tasks In which learning and 
adaptation are the central concerns. Considering the 
recent rapid progress that has been made in constructing 
adaptive production systems, good progress can be 
anticipated along that branch, and I would assign it a 
rather favorable evaluation. But the fact that some 
investigators specialize in learning processes should not 
deter the rest of us from experimenting with learning 
components in our performance systems. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper I have reviewed the AI community as if it 
were a medium-size slightly parallel processor searching 
its way in inductive, best-first fashion through the 
problem space of intelligent action. I have compared it 
with some of the existing AI programs that best 
characterize the discovery process. The comparison does 
not yield any great surprises, but perhaps provides some 
reassurance. 
As a typical example of a discovery program, the AI 
community uses weak methods uder the guidance of a 
somewhat imprecise evaluation function and vague 
ultimate goals. It tries to discover the mechanisms that 
enable a system like the human mind to behave 
purposefully, adaptively, and sometimes even effectively 
over a wide range of difficult and ill-structured tasks. 
The search is highly pragmatic, steered and redirected 
by concrete empirical evidence culled from experiments 
with programs operating in an accidentally determined 
collection of task environments. The output of the 
research is mostly encapsulated in heuristics, not yet 
formalized in coherent theories of broad scope. All is 
confusion and mild chaos, as it should be at an exciting 
frontier of fundamental scientific inquiry. Although only a 
quarter of a century old, the search has already yielded a 
solid body of empirical knowledge about the nature of 
Intelligence and the means of capturing it in programs. 
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S k i l l of I n t e l l i g e n t Robot 
Kunikatsu Takase 
E lec t ro techn ica l Laboratory 
Tokyo, Japan 
ABSTRACT 
This paper reviews the development of the i n t e l l i g e n t robot and separates s k i l l s from high 
leve l i n t e l l i g e n c e . It demonstrates that s k i l l s can be represented as v i r t u a l mechanisms 
programmed in sof tware. V i r t u a l mechanisms are def ined by c o n t r o l l i n g both motion and force 
of a robot arm in a task re la ted car tes ian coordinate system. By adding moni to r ing , a 
s k i l l f u l robot system can be b u i l t . The s k i l l of an i n t e l l i g e n t robot is accumulated in the 
form of task - p a r t i c u l a r knowledge that is a s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the mechanism. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Various i n t e l l i g e n t robots have been developed 
by combining computer decis ion making wi th 
mechanical mechanisms, espec ia l l y wi th robot 
arms. In t h i s f i e l d the e f f o r t s have been 
mainly d i rec ted to developing high leve l i n ­
t e l l i gence system such as fo r so lv ing puzzles, 
i n t e r p r e t i n g drawings or recognizing th ree-
dimensional ob jec t s . There has been l i t t l e 
study of low leve l i n t e l l i g e n c e re l a t i ng to 
s k i l l or d e x t e r i t y of a robot arm. In order 
to make the motion of a robot arm smoother and 
more adapt ive , a ser ies of studies - kinemat­
i c s , t r a j e c t o r y c a l c u l a t i o n , sensory feedback 
of a robot arm - were undertaken in the A r t i f ­
i c i a l I n t e l l i gence Project a t Stanford Univer­
s i t y . But in general we are at the dawn of 
the study of the s k i l l of robot arms. 
The p r a c t i c a l study of assembly automation 
which s ta r ted as one of the app l i ca t ions of 
i n t e l l i g e n t robots is developing as an i n ­
dependent area wi th remarkable r e s u l t s . R e l i ­
able assembly systems are being released one 
a f t e r another. Although those are compara­
t i v e l y special-purpose low i n t e l l i g e n c e sys­
tems, t h e i r s k i l l s are fa r more dexter ious 
than those of i n t e l l i g e n t robots . I t seems 
the increased s k i l l o f the i n t e l l i g e n t robot 
could be obtained only through the i n teg ra t i on 
of t a s k - p a r t i c u l a r knowledge that is normally 
ob ta ined, fo r example, during the development 
of special purpose systems. The "Move" com­
mand in AL, f o r example, and i t s mod i f i ca t ion 
are not s u f f i c i e n t fo r speci fy ing the d e x t e r i ­
ous act ions of robot arms. "Composing v i r t u a l 
mechanisms by software" seems to be the best 
con t ro l s t ruc tu re for the purpose. 
Recently the performance of ar i thmet ic LSI has 
improved remarkably enabling us to carry out 
the exact ca l cu la t i on of dynamic models of a 
robot arm in the servo cyc le , and to compose 
v i r t u a l mechanisms in sof tware. 
The author has been a v i s i t i n g s c i e n t i s t of 
E l e c t r i c a l Engineering at Purdue U n i v e r s i t y , 
West La faye t te , IN , since August 1978 u n t i l 
August 1979. 
2. INTELLIGENT ROBOTS 
In the beginning of 1970*s several Hand-Eye 
systems had been developed at un i ve r s i t i e s and 
research labora tor ies in the wor ld . Those 
robot ic systems consisted of a camera and arm 
wi th 6 degrees of freedom and computer. At 
Stanford Un ivers i ty a robot which could suc­
cess fu l l y solve the " i ns tan t i nsan i t y " puzzle 
was developed C1D. In t h i s puzzle four cubes 
wi th d i f f e r e n t colored faces must be stacked 
up so that no two s im i la r color appear on any 
s ides . A robot made at Hi tachi could under­
stand simple drawings and b u i l d block s t ruc ­
tures as spec i f ied in the drawings C23. At 
the E lec t ro techn ica l Laboratory a robot was 
developed, which could inser t a beam in to a 
box wi th small clearance using v isua l feedback 
[ 3 ] . In these robot ic system i n te l l i gence had 
been appl ied to recognizing a 3-dimensional 
p a t t e r n , understanding a drawing, or so lv ing 
puzzles. 
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In order to rea l i ze computer con t ro l of an 
arm, several elements had been s tud ied : arm 
des ign, servo system, t ransformat ion between 
j o i n t coordinates and car tes ian coord inates, 
computer i n t e r f a c e , and robot operat ing sys­
tem. Although a good deal of e f f o r t was de­
voted to the computer con t ro l of the arm, the 
arm only could perform "p ick and p lace" opera­
t i o n s , tha t i s , to pick up an o b j e c t , to 
t rans fe r i t and then to place i t . Some a t ­
tempts were made to make the a robot arm more 
dex te r ious , f o r example, by adding t a c t i l e 
sensors in order to grasp objects more dex-
t e r i o u s l y . None of those attempts was, howev­
e r , successful in developing a r e l i a b l e e l e ­
ments to be incorporated in the robot ic sys­
tem. 
It was in the Assembly Automation Systems 
developed at Stanford Un ivers i t y ( l a t e r r e ­
fe r red to as the AL System) that an i n t e l l i ­
gent robot was f i r s t able to act in the prac­
t i c a l wo r l d , emerging from the stage of "p lay " 
in the block world C5,6,7D. Assembly 
processes, such as par ts mating and i n s e r t i n g , 
required adaptive object handling c a p a b i l i t i e s 
found only in a human workers were demonstrat­
ed. These tasks could not be performed by 
conventional hard automation machines. 
In many cases of low volume assembly produc­
t i o n programmabil i ty was the key fac to r to 
enhance the u t i l i t y of the assembly system. 
In the AL system much a t t e n t i o n paid to the 
design of task desc r i p t i on language. AL o f ­
fered the programming s t ruc tu re in which a 
user could describe an assembly procedure in 
terms of m u l t i l e v e l commands ranging from the 
simple "move" command to t ask - l eve l commands 
[ 4 ] . H igh- leve l assembly statements would be 
expanded i n to the sequence of move-level com­
mands in a general manner. 
In an assembly system robot arms have to be 
s k i l l f u l enough to be able to carry out par ts 
mating and other adaptive motions. In the AL 
system, prec ise motions were c o n t r o l l e d , based 
on t r a j e c t o r y ca l cu l a t i on and the mod i f i ca t i on 
of motions based upon force feedback or touch 
feedback to adapt to the outer wo r ld . To i n ­
tegra te these funct ions i n to the system, 
software servoing was used, where a d i g i t a l 
computer con t ro l l ed each motor d r i ve leve l 
d i r e c t l y . By using such a con t ro l scheme, the 
c a p a b i l i t y of the robot arm was remarkably im­
proved. 
3. PRACTICAL ASSEMBLY AUTOMATION 
While general assembly automation was being 
studied a t Stanford U n i v e r s i t y , other p r a c t i ­
cal research was s ta r ted at several other l a ­
bora tor ies and companies. A system, which 
consisted of p o s i t i o n con t ro l l ed robots and 
var ious spec ia l l y designed too ls was developed 
at Kawasaki Unimate to assemble a gasol ine en­
g ine . The work demonstrated a p r a c t i c a l ap­
proach to assembly automation. H i tach i 
developed a precise i n s e r t i o n robot which 
operated r e l i a b l y based on ac t i ve accommoda­
t i o n by a f l e x i b l e force sensing mechanism 
C81. A p o s i t i o n con t ro l l ed robot equipped 
wi th a compliance mechanism (RCC) at the wr i s t 
which could perform precise i n s e r t i o n qu ick ly 
wi thout force feedback was developed at Draper 
Laboratory C93. At SRI a system which could 
carry out assembly using a passive accommoda­
t i o n tab le had been developed C103. In these 
p r a c t i c a l system, g loba l motion was con t ro l l ed 
by simple pos i t i on ing robots and f i ne accommo­
dat ion was accomplished by too l s spec ia l l y 
designed fo r the tasks . 
F i g . 1 Peg i n s e r t i o n by compliance 
mechanism 
It would be i n s t r u c t i v e to compare the opera­
t i o n of a p r a c t i c a l system wi th that of an i n ­
t e l l i g e n t robo t . We w i l l take peg i n s e r t i o n 
as an example. The robot attached wi th a RCC 
at the wr i s t w i l l move a peg i n to a ho le . As 
shown in F ig . 1, i f there is a misalignment 
between the peg and the h o l e , the peg w i l l be 
guided to the hole by the chamfer., The RCC is 
a compliance mechanism which provides the ac­
commodation. I f a l a t e r a l force is exerted at 
the t i p o f the peg, i t w i l l t r ans l a te wi thout 
r o t a t i o n , and i f a torque is exerted at the 
t i p , i t w i l l ro ta te without t r a n s l a t i o n . With 
the help of the chamfer any t r a n s l a t i o n e r ro r 
is corrected- During the i nse r t i on process 
i n to the hole any r o t a t i o n e r ro r is cor rec ted . 
In the AL system the peg i nse r t i on could be 
described as: 
MOVE peg TO hole-bottom 
WITH FORCE = 0 ALONG X,Y OF hole-bottom 
This command means "move coordinate frame peg 
to hole-bottom wi th two proper j o i n t s f ree so 
that the x and y components of force are 
zero . " With t h i s method the peg i nse r t i on 
sometimes becomes impossible. For example, if 
a f ree j o i n t l i e s close by the normal of the 
chamfer as shown in F ig . 2, the angle between 
chamfer tangent and f ree surface becomes less 
then arctangent of f r i c t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t . The 
peg w i l l be locked. This is indeed a probable 
case. This disadvantage of the AL system 
shows not only that the system can not perform 
the peg i nse r t i on in t h i s way, but also that 
the system lacks the systematic representat ion 
capab i l i t y o f the necessary s k i l l . I t i s un­
des i rab le that the operat ion of a robot arm is 
dependent on i t s c o n f i g u r a t i o n . A user would 
l i k e to w r i t e machine independent programs. 
In general a robot arm s k i l l consists of pa t ­
terns of ac t ion to the task environment, i n ­
t e r p r e t a t i o n of r e s u l t s , and the dec is ion of 
f u r the r a c t i o n . We have to represent the 
knowledge about an ac t ion and i t s r e s u l t , 
which is task p a r t i c u l a r , so that i t is robot 
arm independent. 
most e f f i c i e n t to design mechanisms su i ted fo r 
the task , and to cont ro l the operat ion of 
these mechanism using sensory feedback. H i t a ­
c h i , Draper Laboratory, and SRI had taken t h i s 
approach in developing assembly systems. 
Therefore i t is senseless to simply compare 
the c a p a b i l i t i e s of special-purpose systems 
and i n t e l l i g e n t robots in which gene ra l i t i es 
are most important . The s k i l l representat ion 
capab i l i t y of the i n t e l l i g e n t robot should 
also be general so as to provide the s k i l l of 
special-purpose t o o l s . If we could bu i l d up 
v i r t u a l mechanisms by sof tware, we would be 
able to u t i l i z e a l l task p a r t i c u l a r knowledge 
which is obtained from the study of spec ia l -
purpose t o o l s . And we w i l l be able to ex­
change too ls and s k i l l s by sof tware. 
What kind of robot arm cont ro l would be re ­
quired in order to b u i l d up v i r t u a l mechanisms 
by software? It is motion and force cont ro l 
in car tes ian coordinate systems. A few 
methods have been proposed to rea l i ze such a 
type of cont ro l [11,12]. We w i l l describe 
here the d i r ec t servoing method in cartesian 
coordinates that seems to have the highest 
g e n e r a l i t y . As shown in F ig . 3 t h i s system 
provides fo r the real time t ransformat ion 
between j o i n t coordinates and car tes ian coor­
d ina tes , the t ransformat ion of acce lerat ion 
and force in car tes ian coordinates in to j o i n t 
torques. I n a d d i t i o n , c o l i o l i s f o r c e , c e n t r i ­
fugal force and g rav i t y loading force are can­
celed in r e a l - t i m e . 
4. BASIC CONTROL SCHEME FOR SKILLFUL ROBOT ARM 
4.1 Control in Cartesian Coordinate Systems 
If the form of assembly is def ined, it is most 
e f f i c i e n t to use the special devices or t oo l s . 
Not only in assembly, but in general , i t is 
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4.2 Real-t ime Computation 
As the dynamic model of a robot arm is very 
complicated it has been considered impossible 
to compute j o i n t torques in r e a l - t i m e . Howev­
e r , recent improvement both in ca l cu l a t i on a l ­
gorithms and in a r i thmet ic elements has now 
made it r e a l i s t i c . Dynamic model in matr ix 
rep resen ta t ion , whi le s imple, was \/ery t ime 
consuming to compute. Bejczy developed an ap­
proximat ion model which was very fas t to com­
pute . The author formulated the equations of 
motion in a vector representa t ion . Walker 
devised a recurs ive a lgor i thm fo r evaluat ing 
the model in vector representat ion without 
redundant r e p e t i t i v e ca l cu la t i on [ 1 3 ] . As 
shown in Table, we can now ca lcu la te j o i n t 
torques wi th t h i s a lgor i thm about 200 times 
fas te r than using the matr ix method. 
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Powerful a r i thmet ic elements such as 
16bi t x 1 6 b i t LSI m u l t i p l i e r wi th 200 nano 
second execution t ime , have also become a v a i l ­
ab le . I t i s not d i f f i c u l t to develop 
special-purpose processors wi th these a r i t h ­
metic elements f o r performing fas t vector c a l ­
cu la t i on such as dot product or cross product . 
It would also be possib le to make the ca l cu la ­
t i o n speed shown in Table ten times as f a s t . 
Above considerat ions show that soph is t i ca ted 
ca l cu la t i on fo r car tes ian coordinates con t ro l 
could eas i l y be car r ied out in less than 10 
mi I Li seconds. 
4.3 Torque Contro l led Robot Arm 
Rel iab le force sensing systems have not been 
obtained y e t , although force sensing, espe­
c i a l l y w r i s t force sensors have been a c t i v e l y 
s t ud ied . At the present stage it would be im­
possib le to incorporate the force sensors i n to 
the arm con t ro l system c o n t r o l l i n g motion and 
force in car tes ian coord inates. The author 
and co-workers have developed a robot arm 
dr iven by magnetic powder c lutches and have 
demonstrated that the robot arm wi th open loop 
torque con t ro l a b i l i t y could exert a force 
wi th an er ror of +100 grams [ 1 4 ] . The author 
bel ieves that i t is possib le to design a com­
pact arm using torque motors, wi th a load 
capaci ty of 5 Kg and wi th a force exer t ion e r ­
ror of £100 grams. Torque cont ro l a b i l i t y of 
a robot arm is essent ia l if a car tes ian coor­
dinates con t ro l system is to be successfu l ly 
implemented. The use of force sensors w i l l be 
necessary fo r the precise cont ro l of f o r c e . 
4.4 Execution Monitor ing 
If we speci fy the con t ro l of the arm in task 
re la ted car tes ian coord inates, we can make the 
execution of the task independent of any 
spec i f i c robot arm and we can eas i l y analyze 
the causa l i t y between ac t ion and i t s r e s u l t s . 
In usual execution mon i to r i ng , react ing forces 
are monitored dur ing geometr ica l ly spec i f i ed 
mot ion. The con t ro l in car tes ian coordinates 
enables another form of execut ion mon i to r ing , 
f o r example, force or compliance are spec i f ied 
and the resu l tan t pos i t i on or v e l o c i t y are ob­
served. In the AL system, reac t ion forces are 
tested in a threshold manner. The AL command 
fo r a peg i nse r t i on i s : 
MOVE peg TO hole-bottom 
WITH FORCE = 0 ALONG X, Y OF hole-bottom 
ON FORCE (Z WRT hole-bottom) > 18*0Z DO STOP 
In t h i s case, once the z component of the 
force exceeds 18 oz dur ing mot ion, the robot 
arm w i l l s top . However i f the cha rac te r i s t i c s 
of f r i c t i o n between the peg and hole is as 
shown in F ig . 3, the peg i nse r t i on w i l l stop 
ha l f way when the v e l o c i t y exceed Vc. A p ro ­
grammer has to have knowledge about the f r i c ­
t i o n . A con t ro l scheme that spec i f i es force 
and observes the resu l tan t motion would be 
more su i tab le fo r t h i s task . The peg inser ­
t i o n task would be more r e l i a b l e i f the inse r ­
t i o n speed versus i n s e r t i o n depth pa t te rn is 
observed in the performance of the task . 
To erect a t h i n bar on a tab le is a s k i l l 
which can not be rea l i zed wi th simple t h r e s ­
hold t e s t s . I f the car tes ian coordinates are 
chosen as shown in F ig . 4 and the bar is r o ­
ta ted about X a x i s , an angle versus torque 
graph w i l l be obtained as shown in F ig . 5. 
Angle a0, where the bottom plane of the bar 
comes in f u l l touch wi th tab le su r face , could 
be i d e n t i f i e d as the angle where the value of 
torque changes d iscont inuous ly in the graph. 
CONCLUSION 
The s k i l l of a robot arm consists in the accu­
mulat ion of task p a r t i c u l a r knowledge. This 
knowledge, that is a s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the 
mechanism to perform a task , is embodied by 
the robot arm in the form of a v i r t u a l mechan­
isms in sof tware. The r e a l i z a t i o n of these 
v i r t u a l mechanisms is by motion and force con­
t r o l in car tes ian coordinate systems and by 
monitor ing the response pa t te rns . The pro­
posed method provides a systematic method by 
which to develop s k i l l s fo r an i n t e l l i g e n t 
robot . 
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